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ABSTRACT 
It is an inalienable right of every state to manage its own affairs 
independently. Normally, a state possesses "sovereignty" over its subjects 
and its affairs within its territorial limits. Consequently, international law 
imposes an obligation on every state to abstain from intervention in the 
internal and external affairs of any other state. Dictatorial interference in 
the affairs of another sovereign state in known as intervention. 
This study is an attempt to explain the Law and Politics of Intervention and 
its recent developments. Non-intervention is the rule, but it is frequently 
claimed, "my state or my side ought to be allowed to make exceptions to 
the rule in the form of permissible or justified interventions". 
In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations resolved that, no 
state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason what 
ever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. However, 
circumstances may demand intervention. Intervention, which is dictatorial 
and is prohibited in the international law, however, can be justified on 
certain grounds, which are given below: 
1. Enforcement of Treaty Rights. 
2. Self - Defense or Right to Exist. 
3. Right Over Protectorate. 
4. Inpursuance of UN Charter. 
5. Inviolation of International Law. 
6. In Protection of Persons and Property Abroad. 
7. On Humanitarian Ground. 
8. Intervention in Civil War. 
Any such exceptional rights of intervention of states must be subordinated 
to their primary obligations under the United Nations Charter, so 
intervention must not go so far as the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. No matter how 
moral or desirable or plausible sum of the foregoing justifications of 
intervention may have appeared in specific instances, the fact remains 
that intervention per se is an act in violation of rights which should be 
inviolable, represents a hostile act, and may be taken to be an 'act 
rendered possible only because of the superior force of the intervening 
state'. 
The Soviet attitude towards intervention is very closely connected with 
their theory of sovereignty. The aim of the Soviet Government, as set forth 
by the Third International, being to foment world revolution and thereby 
establish a class-less commonwealth, when a foreign non-communist 
state is viewed as a struggle of classes, intervention on the part of the 
Soviets is a commendable and justifiable act by which the sovereign 
laboring class fulfils its duty of extending its own class achievements to 
those who are still deprived of the enjoyment of the privileges. 
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The study of Soviet interventions in general reveals that, it justified its 
interventions on the basic of "invitation" by 'legitimate' governments and 
'limited sovereignty" within the socialist community as propounded by 
Brezhnev in his "Brezhnev Doctrine". Lenin first propounded this theory in 
February 1918 by stating that the interests of socialism are higher than the 
interests of the right of nations to self-determination. 
The United States' policy has always included contradictory attitudes and 
practices with respect to intervention. In order to discourage European 
intervention in the Western Hemisphere, however, the United States 
asserted the right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries in 
a fashion that expanded significantly throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The United States in this century expanded its 
definition of areas of vital interest to include most parts of the world, and, 
accordingly, has been tempted to intervene in the affairs of states far from 
the shores of the Western Hemisphere. 
The legal logic employed by the United States to support its use of 
intervention historically has been couched in the articulation of 
Presidential doctrines. The foundation of US interventionist policy in the 
Third World rests in the "Monroe Doctrine" and its "Roosevelt Corollary". 
Since the Second World War, however, the term 'communist' has been 
used to justify US intervention against a variety of regimes with widely 
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different ideologies and relationships with the Soviet Union. The "Johnson 
Doctrine" stated that the United States will oppose where it can or where it 
dares the establishment of new communist or communist-leaning 
governments, whether they come into being through foreign invasion, 
domestic revolution, or election. The presence of a communist element— 
even the possibility of subsequent communist takeover—-justifies US 
intervention. "Communism is so blatantly an international and not an 
internal affair, its suppression, even by force, in an American country by 
one or of the other republics would not constitute an intervention in the 
internal affairs of the former". 
Throughout the Cold War, proponents of US intervention have made two 
principal claims: that the Third World interventions protect American 
security by preserving the global balance-of-power; and that intervention 
promote democracy, thereby promoting human rights. The Bush 
Administration continued America's past interventionist policies in the 
post-Cold War era. The Clinton Administration also said that it would act 
forcibly to promote human rights and democracy. 
The study of US interventions in general reveals that, it justified its 
intervention on the basis of self-defence, humanitarian assistance, 
protection of nationals, and "invitation" by legitimate governments. 
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The Third World countries since long have been the victims of 
stronger/great powers' designs to maintain their respective control over 
them. In the past, almost all were colonized and after their independence 
in the post-War era, they have been forced to surrender to the desires and 
interests of the major powers. And to force compliance, they have 
extensively intervened in the affairs of the Third World countries. 
While both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened on number 
of occasions in the affairs of the Third World countries, the United States 
became increasingly outspoken in claiming the unilateral right to make the 
determination whether a conflict any where in the world constitutes a 
threat to its national security or international order, the United States 
placed undue emphasis on the Soviet Union as the main provocateurs of 
conflict and instability in the Third World overlooking the historical roots of 
these upheavals in the Third World. The United States' perceptions of the 
Soviet Union as trouble-maker and its challenge to US hegemonistic goals 
in the post-War provided a false context to the interventional activities of 
the US in the Third World. 
The United States pursuing its policy of interventionism established in 
nineteenth century continued its interventions in the same way as it had 
been doing in the past. It is to emphasize here that the United States often 
has intervened in the Third World for reasons that have little to do with its 
rivalry with the Soviet Union, but with its desire to safeguard and promote 
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America's economic and military interests. The US-Soviet rivalry has 
virtually disappeared with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The 
communism is no more a force to reckon with. The Third World has been 
the actual theatre over the last five decades, where the United States was 
extensively involved. And the Third World stands to the greater chance of 
US interventionism. 
The Third World countries will remain a battle-field for great powers, 
especially now for the United States, as it is evident from the role played 
by it in the recent Gulf crisis. Any state reluctant to relinquish its 
sovereignty will be visited by American onslaught. The recent US missile 
attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan and the ongoing US and British military 
assault on Iraq are naked examples of the violation of sovereign rights of 
the states and the provisions of the international law. The Third World 
countries would continue to be exploited and their policies, especially the 
economic policies will be controlled and dominated by the big powers. The 
Third World countries failing to accept the international rules of political, 
economic and military behaviour, formulated by big powers like the United 
States, Britain. France, etc., will be visited by their interventionist 
onslaught as they have experienced the interventional activities of the 
big powers in the past. 
The principle of "invitational intervention" has provided pretext to 
superpowers to use smaller states as a pawn on the Chess-Board of 
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power politics in the past during the Cold War period. Now, after the 
collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States has 
emerged as the only superpower and started dominating the world as an 
"International Policeman", by dictating terms even to the UN Security 
Council. And, the other major powers, like the Great Britain and the 
France, have started working as allies of the United States atleast in the 
present situations. Although, in the near future, no any country is going to 
emerge on the international scene, which can pose a challenge to the 
United States and stop her interventionary activities. In such a situation, 
this principle of "invitational intervention" would be used unhesitatingly 
without any check posing dangers to the sovereignty and independence of 
smaller states. However, it would be in the interest of international 
community to reject this principle. In fact, one is tempted to agree with 
Starke that, "in the case of strife, which is primarily internal, and 
particularly where the outcome is uncertain, the mere invitation by either 
faction to an outside state to intervene does not legalise and otherwise 
improper intervention". 
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PREFACE 
It is an inalienable right of every state to manage its own affairs 
independently. Normally, a state possesses "sovereignty" over its 
subjects and its affairs within its territorial limits. Consequently, 
International Law imposes an obligation on every state to sustain from 
inten/ention in the internal and external affairs of any other states. Duty 
not to intervene extends both in internal and external affairs. However, 
circumstances may demand intervention. Intervention, which is dictatorial 
and is prohibited in international law can, therefore, be justified on certain 
grounds. 
This study is an attempt to explain the Law and Politics of Intervention and 
its recent developments. Non-intervention is the rule, but it is frequently 
claimed, "my state or my side ought to be allowed to make exceptions to 
the rule in the form of permissible or justified interventions". 
From the ancient Greeks to the present time, there have, always, been 
some states who intervened in other states in various ways, and by 
different means. The past and the present history is repleat with examples 
showing that generally the strong states have intervened in the affairs of 
weak. In the period of colonialism, the European powers intervened 
almost every where or where ever they liked—considering and justifying it 
as their imperial prerogative. 
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Soviet Union (now disintegrated) had always justified its interventions, 
wherever it intervened, on the basis of "invitation". Later, Brezhnev 
propounded the "Brezhnev Doctrine" as the justification of intervention 
stating that the socialist countries cannot go beyond the communist orbit. 
Therefore, if any socialist country wants to be independent of Soviet 
influence, other communist countries have a right to intervene. It is, infact, 
interpretation of Lenin's Theory that the interests of socialism are higher 
than the interests of the right of nations to self-determination. 
The United States, which itself was a colony of the British Empire, became 
one of the strong powers in international system after getting 
independence in eighteenth century. And, it very frequently started 
resorting to the use of intervention in its relations with other countries. The 
United States very early assumed the right of hegemonial intervention in 
the Western Hemisphere, its claims limited mainly by the modest 
dimensions of American power before the twentieth century. Typically, in 
the fashion of great powers, the United States in this century expanded its 
definition of areas of vital interest to include most part of the world, and, 
accordingly, has been tempted to intervene in the affairs of states far from 
the shores of the Western Hemisphere. 
The United States from the very beginning has been the interventionist 
power, aspiring to dominate the world by setting the rules of international 
behavior and directing the developmental course of the Third World 
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countries in accordance with its economic interests. The "Monroe 
Doctrine" provided to the United States a unilateral right to intervene 
anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. All the five post-War military 
doctrines of US Presidents; Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter and 
Reagan have been concerned with the US intervention of one sort or the 
other in the Third World. The United States in order to prevent the 
countries of the Third World to adopt the policies not acceptable to it has 
intervened in their affairs. It is to say that the use of intervention, 
throughout the history, by some states in the affairs of other states, has 
been a very common phenomenon. 
For completion of this work, I am gratefully indebted to Prof. Ishtiaq 
Ahmad, Ex-Chairman, Department of Political Science, for supervising the 
entire project from its very beginning. It is due to his able and intellectual 
guidance, constant encouragement and unhesitant help, the work could 
be completed. My gratitude to him is unbounded. 
I must also express my sincere thanks to Prof. M. A. Kishore, Chairman, 
Department of Political Science, for his help in the submission of the 
Thesis without any hindrance. 
I am deeply in debt to my teachers in the Department, Prof. H. A. S. Jafri, 
Prof. T. A. Nizami, Prof. M. Murtaza Khan, Dr. Arif Hameed, Dr. Asmer 
Beg for their encouragement and co-operation. 
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I have gained a lot of confidence from the experience and advices of my 
fellow research scholars, particularly when the disruptions and delays 
discouraged me. I wish to thank Mr. Shaukat Ali Khan and Dr. M. Sayeed 
Alam in this regard. 
I duly acknowledge the encouragement and well wishes of my friends and 
sympathizers: Mr. Khusro Qasim, Dr. Mohd. Khatid, Dr. Zafar Maqbool, 
Mr. Mohd. Alim, Mr. Badruddin Khan, Dr. Masroor Alam, Mr. Javed A. 
Khan, Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Dr. Aftab Alam, Dr. M. Naseem Khan, Mr. 
Minhaj Alam, Mr. Sitwat Hussain, Mr. S. Mujeeb Ali, Mr. A. S. M. Rashid, 
Mr. Abdul Vahab, Mr. Khursheed Ahmad, Mr. Ashfaque Khan, Mr. Reyaz 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LAW OF INTERVENTION 
Normally every state is deemed to possess independence and 
'sovereignty' over its subjects and its affairs within its territorial limits. In 
the interests of the international community, every state has accepted 
restrictions on its liberty of actions. Therefore, it is probably more accurate 
today to say that the sovereignty of a state means the residuum of power 
which it possess within the confines laid down by international law. In 
reality, sovereignty is also largely a matter of degree. Some states enjoy 
more power and independence than other states. 'Sovereignty' is, 
therefore, a term of art rather than a legal expression capable of precise 
definition1. 'Sovereignty' is the possession of supreme power unlimited by 
any other state resulting in autonomy within a state and independence in 
relation to other states2. To Soviet scholars, sovereignty is "the 
independence of the state of any other state, this independence amounts 
to the right to decide freely and according to its own judgement all its 
domestic and foreign affairs without interference on the part of other 
states"3. 
One of the oldest duties of states, enshrined both in customary 
international law and in numerous multilateral conventions, is the basic 
1. J. G. Starke; Introduction to International Law (10th ed.), 1989, p.100. 
2. Richard J. Erickson; Int. Law and the Revolutionary state, 1972, p.50. 
3. V. V. Evgenev; "Subjects of Law, Sovereignty and Non-intervention in Int. Law", (Soviet 
State and Law), no.2 (March 1955), p.77. as cited in Richard J. Erickson, op. cit, p.50. 
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obligation of a state to abstain from intervention in the internal and 
external affairs of any other state or in the relations between other states4. 
International Law generally forbids such intervention, which in this 
particular connection means something more than mere interference and 
much stronger than mediation or diplomatic suggestion. According to 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), an intervention is prohibited by 
international law if (a) it impinges on matters as to which each state is 
permitted to make decisions by itself freely; and (b) it involves interference 
in regard to this freedom by methods of coercion, especially force5. A 
notable historical example of dictatorial intervention for which there was 
ostensible justification—was the joint demarche in 1895 by Russia, 
France & Germany to force Japan to return to China the territory of 
Liaotung which she had extorted from the Chinese by the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. As a result of this intervention, Japan was obliged to 
retrocede Liaotung to China, a fateful step which led ultimately to the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-56. 
In 1966 the General Assembly of the United Nations resolved that, no 
state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, 
4. G.V. Glahn; Law Among Nations (2nd ed.), 1970, p.162. This is recognised in arts 1 and 3 of 
the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States adopted in 1949 by the UN Int. Law 
Commission. 
5. e.g. choice of its own political or economic system or adoption of its own foreign policy and 
provision of indirect forms of support for subversive activities against the state subject of the 
alleged intervention. 
6. J.G. Starke; op. cit., p. 104. 
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armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the state or against its political, economic or 
cultural elements are condemned7. 
It means there may be interference with states not amounting to force and 
not directly connected with national territory, and that international law 
prohibits any coercion which indirectly subverts a state's legal competence 
or jurisdiction, including coercion applied by a state to its own nationals in 
order to instigate the families of those persons naturalised or resident in 
foreign countries to pursue a course of action. The United States 
protested in 1923 against the threatened confiscation by Greece of the 
property of Greek citizens whose sons, naturalised in America and did not 
return to Greece for military service8. It means: (i) A state must not 
coerce another by organising hostile expeditions upon its territory, (ii) 
Acts not involving force but which are calculated to impair the authority of 
another sovereign must equally be condemned by international law e.g. 
the undertaking or encouragement oy the authorities of a state of activities 
calculated to foment civil strife in another state, or the toleration by the 
authorities of a state of organised activities calculated to foment civil strife 
in another state. 
The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of terrorist 
7. D. P. O' Connell; Int. Law (2nd ed), Vol. I, 1970, p.299. 
8. Hack Worth, Vol. Ill, p. 179 as cited in D. P. 0' Connell; Vol. I, p.299. 
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activities in another state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state of 
organised activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another state9. 
In connection withjhis formulation there is a resolution of the General 
Assembly on the Essentials of Peace, calling upon every nation "to refrain 
from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, 
independence or integrity of any state, or at fomenting civil strife and 
subverting the will of the people in any state"10, (iii) A state also offends 
international law by allowing seditious elements from other states or its 
own residents to organise rebellion in friendly states11. In 1934, the 
Council of the League of Nations resolved "that it is the duty of every state 
neither to encourage nor tolerate on its territory any terrorist activity with a 
political purpose; that every state must do all in its power to prevent and 
repress acts of this nature and must for this purpose lend its assistance to 
Govts. Which request it". 
Interventions: Conflicting Views of Jurists 
Dictatorial interference in the affairs of another sovereign state is known 
as intervention. It means interference has got to be dictatorial in order to 
constitute intervention. If it is not dictatorial, it does not amount to 
intervention. There are two views on the meaning of this word "intervene" 
as used in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. One view is that it must be 
9. The Draft Code of offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the Int 
Law Commission in 1951 See D. P. O'Connell; op. cit, pp.304-5. 
10. D. P. O'Connell; op. cit., p.305. 
11. Such activities are crimes in both the United States and United Kingdom. 
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interpreted in the technical sense of international law to mean "dictatorial 
interference". The other view is that it is ordinary interference and it has 
been argued that only the Security Council has the capacity to act with 
legal effect, and hence to "interfere dictatorially" in the affairs of a state; 
action by any other organ, since it can not have direct legal effect, can not 
amount to "dictatorial interference"12. The last type of compulsive method 
is intervention. Being a compulsive method intervention must involve the 
use of force or compulsion by a state or states not party to the 
controversy. Intervention must mean the use of force or compulsion or 
dictatorial interference by a Third State. Intervention as a compulsive 
method always contains the element of dictates. Hence intervention on 
invitation can not be equated to intervention as a compulsive method. 
Intervention as a compulsive method is a kind of external intervention and 
may not be properly in operation in a case where the disputing parties are 
not two "states" but simply two sections of the same state. 
"Intervention" is very vague term in international law. We are told that 
"intervention is a right; that it is a crime; that is the rule; that it is the 
exception; that it is never permissible at all"13. Intervention may be 
anything from a speech of Lord Palmerstone's in the House of Commons 
to the partition of Poland14 This remark is really sufficient to indicate that 
12. D. P. O'Connel; op. cit, pp.298-99. 
13. S. K. Mukherjee; A New Outlook for Int. Law (1964), p.99. 
14. Winfiekl; "The History of Intervention in Internal Law", in British Yearbook of Int Law (1922-
23), p.130. 
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there is an element of chronic vagueness attached to the term 
'intervention'. 
There is complete lack of agreement among jurists as to the legal nature 
of intervention or its moral justifications. Some jurists approached it from 
the point of view of the state intervening as a measure of self-defense; 
others took the side of the state whose independence was being violated. 
British and American jurists showed a tendency to defend intervention 
while most continental'and Latin American writers rejected it as a right. 
The conflicting views of the jurists were reflected in the lack of agreement 
upon the very definition of intervention. In popular use the term 
"intervention" included the interference of a third state in a war between 
two states; the interference of foreign govts, between parties to a civil war, 
and the interference of one govt, in the domestic or foreign affairs of 
another. To some writers the interference was only intervention when 
unwarranted; and this is doubtless the accepted attitude towards 
intervention at the present day15. 
A number of govts, hold that the "intervention" condemned is the arbitrary 
interference of an individual state or a group of states, not the collective 
15. See Hyde; Int. Law, I, p.246. 
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action of the whole group in accordance with rules of law16. Mere friendly 
advice and general political influence do not strictly come under this term 
as the essential requisite of intervention, viz., use of force or a threat to 
use force is lacking in them. The interference must take an imperative 
form—it should be forcible or backed by the threat of force. Intervention 
is, as a rule, forbidden by the law of Nations. International Law, however, 
permits intervention, as dictatorial interference by one state in the affairs 
of another state, "only as reaction of the former against a violation of its 
right by the latter". Such a doctrine is possible only if the bellum justum 
principle is recognised17. 
The majority of commentators agree that intervention under present day 
international law means 'dictatorial' interference by one state in the affairs 
of another state for the purpose of either maintaining or changing the 
existing order of things18, rather than mere interference per se. Such 
intervention could take place by right and also without the existence of a 
right, but in any case, it concerns the independence, territory, or 
supremacy of the state involved. 
There can not be any doubt that, as a rule, such intervention is prohibited 
by international law, for that law has been created, atleast in part, to 
16. Charles G. Fenwick; Int. Law (3rd ed.), 1952, pp.243-44. 
17. MP. Tondon; Shorter Int. Law (5th ed.) 1975, p.80. 
18. See Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, Vol. I, p.305. J. L Brierly; The Law of Nations (6th ed. by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, 1963), p.402. Charles G. Fenwick; Intervention: Individual & Collective" 
39 A.J.I.L (1945), pp. 645-63. 
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protect the international personality of the states of the world. However, 
there are exceptions to this principle, for some interventions take place by 
right and are thus lawful; and there are some forms of interventions which 
lack a right yet must be accorded lawful status19. 
As Anzilotti stated authoritatively in 1912: if states, in order to satisfy non-
legal interests, can resort to war, i.e., attack the integrity and the very 
existence of international subjects, it is easily understandable that they are 
also allowed to impel—not by war but by threat to wage a war—another 
state to adopt a certain behaviour either within the ambit of its own 
authority or in its relations with other states. This is what called 
intervention20. 
By forcible interference in the internal or external affairs of another state, 
is meant compelling this state, by the threat or use of force, either to do 
something (for example, to change its govt., to enter into a treaty with a 
third state, to cede territory etc.) or to carry out actions in its territory in the 
interest of the intervening state. 
Forcible intervention took the form of military occupation of the territory of 
another state, naval demonstration, naval blockade (that is to say the 
blocking of men-of-war of a portion of the coast of another state), seizure 
19. G.V. Glahn; Law Among Nations (2nd ed.) 1970, p.163. 
20. D. Anzilotti; Corso di diritto internazionale, i (Rome, 1912-14), p.315. as cited in Antonio 
Cassese; Int. Law in a Divied World, 1986, p.145. 
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of assets belonging to the other state or its nationals, embargo (in the old 
sense, that is—the seizure of ships belonging to the other state or its 
nationals), arrest and detention of foreigners, expulsion of foreign 
diplomats, etc. International practice is replete with cases of armed 
intervention. So, for instance, after the down-fall of Napoleon, the Holy 
Alliance provided for military intervention in European countries menaced 
by revolutions—Austria sent troops to Italy; France both to Italy and 
Spain. Later on interventions were carried out by Great European Powers 
against Turkey and Egypt and in colonial territories of other states, and by 
the U.S. in Latin-American countries. 
According to Kelsen, "The intervention prohibited by international law is 
usually defined as dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of 
another state. A dictatorial interference is an interference by threat or use 
of force". 
According to Hall, intervention takes place "when a state interferes in the 
relations of two other states without the consent of both or either of them 
or when it interferes in the domestic affairs of another state irrespective of 
the will of the latter for the purpose of either maintaining or altering the 
actual condition of things within it". 
According to Jackson, intervention is the dictatorial or imperative violation 
by one state of the independence of another state. The essence of 
10 
intervention is the force or the threat of force and it must be distinguished 
from such peaceful acts of interference as good offices, intercession, 
mediation and arbitration. According to Alf Ross, "Intervention means the 
dictatorial interference of a state in the internal or external affairs of 
another state". 
Intervention is dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another 
• state for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of 
things21. Intervention can take place in the external as well as in the 
internal affairs of a state. It concerns, in the first place, the external 
independence, and in the second, either the territorial or the personal 
supremacy. But it must be emphasised that intervention proper is always 
dictatorial interference, not interference pure and simple. Therefore, 
intervention must neither be confused with good offices, nor with 
mediation, nor with intercession, nor with co-operation, because none of 
these imply dictatorial interference. 
Kinds of Intervention: 
Prof. Winfield refers to three kinds of active, material interventions22 and 
these are internal, external and punitive intervention. 
i. Internal Intervention: In this kind of intervention a state interferes 
2 1 . L. Oppenheim; Int. Law - A Treatise (8th ed.), 1955, p.305. 
22. Winfield; The Foundations and the Future of Int. Law (1941), pp.32-33. 
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between the disputing sections of other state, in favour either of the 
legitimate government or of the insurgents. In 1936-38, during the Civil 
War in Spain, Germany and Italy intervened on the side of General 
Franco. Likewise, the Govt, of Red China intervened in the Korean War 
when the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Again, the Russian 
intervention in the uprising of Hungarian people in October 1956 was yet 
another instance of internal intervention. 
ii. External Intervention: In this a state interferes in the relations— 
generally the hostile relations—of other states, as when Italy entered the 
Second World War on the side of Germany, and against Great Britain. It is 
in other words, an intervention in the foreign affairs of another state. This 
kind of intervention is tantamount to the declaration of war23. 
iii. Punitive Intervention: This is the case of a reprisal, short of war, for 
an injury suffered at the hands of another state. It is in the nature of a 
retaliation against the guilty state. It is frequently carried out by stronger 
nations towards weaker nations. A pacific blockade to compel the 
observance of treaty engagements or to redress some breach of law 
affords an illustration of this type of intervention. 
The term 'intervention' has also been used by some writers in the 
expression 'subversive intervention' to denote propaganda or other activity 
23. MP. Tondon; op. cit., p. 81. 
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by one state with the intention of fomenting, for its own purposes, 
revolt or civil strife in another state. International Law prohibits such 
subversive intervention24. 
Subversive Intervention by States: 
According to Quincy Wright, one of the most difficult problems in this 
sphere is that dealing with "subversive intervention"25. It has been 
generally recognised that there does exist an obligation or duty to abstain 
from subversive intervention, that is to say, from engaging in propaganda, 
official statements, or legislative action of any kind, with the intention of 
promoting rebellion, sedition, or treason against the govt, of another 
state26. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted a 
resolution on November 3, 1947, condemning all forms of seditious 
propaganda, limiting itself, however, to propaganda likely to provoke 
threats to peace or an act of aggression. On December 1, 1949, the 
Assembly urged all states to refrain from, among other things, any threats 
or acts aimed at fomenting civil war or subverting the will of the people in 
any other state27. The United States and the Soviet Union have been 
24. The Declaration on Principles of Int. Law Concerning Friendly Relations & Co-operation 
among states in Accordance with the UN Charter, adopted by the General Assembly in1970, 
proclaims that 'no state shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another 
state, or interfere in civil strife in another state'. 
25 . Quincy Wright; "Subversive Intervention", 54 AJ.I.L(1960), pp.521-534 
26 . G.V. Glahn;op. cit, p.173. 
27 . Ibid., p. 174. 
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foremost in condemning subversive intervention. The United States has 
been highly critical of the subversive activities promoted by the 
communist-bloc states labeling such efforts "indirect aggression". 
The Soviet Union and its friends on the other hand, have continuously 
attacked every form of aid by non-communist countries as a manifestation 
of imperialist intervention, and became particularly incensed when 
President Eisenhower issued a proclamation, setting aside a third week of 
July, 1950, as "Captive Nations Week"28. 
As President Eisenhower stated on April 16, 1953: Any nation's right to a 
form of govt, and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable. 
Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is 
indefensible29. 
Subversive Intervention by Private Groups: 
All discussion thus for has dealt with actions of govts, promoting some 
form of subversive intervention. When similar acts are undertaken by 
private individuals or groups, govts, have usually refused to accept 
responsibility of such acts. Obviously a state adversely affected by such 
propaganda emanating from private sources in a neighboring country will 
not only protest the act but will attempt to prevent the subversive 
propaganda from reaching its own citizens, by censorship, jamming of 
28. Ibid., p. 174. 
29. The New York Times, April 17, 1953. 
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broadcasts and telecasts, and so on. Such defensive measures appear to 
be the right of any government and can not be termed illegal. 
If private individuals utter libelous statements, no responsibility devolves 
on their government. There are, however, a few democratic states which 
apparently are willing to prosecute their own citizens for libeling foreign 
govts, or the heads of the same, provided that reciprocity in this matter 
existed. On the other hand, if a public official engages in such acts, it 
appears to be the duty of his govt, to restrain him, to rebuke him, or even 
to punish him, if friendly relations with the govt, allegedly slanderous or 
libeled are to be preserved. 
Conditions during which Intervention is Justified: 
The fact that certain varieties of intervention have been justified by 
outstanding jurists reflects the growing perturbation on the part of writers 
in international law who would like to perpetuate a theoretical doctrine of 
absolute prohibition of intervention, yet who are drawn in the direction of 
approving some form of intervention because it strikes them as desirable 
from humanitarian considerations, from a political point of view, or, some 
times, because logic appears to dictate the correctness of a particular 
employment of intervention, despite the over all legal prohibition extant30. 
According to Prof. Brierly, the strictly legal occasions of an intervention 
30. G.V. Glahn; op. cit., p. 164. 
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may be brought under three heads, viz., self-defence, reprisals and the 
exercise of a treaty right. Such interventions as take place by right must 
be distinguished from others. Wherever there is no right of intervention, an 
intervention violates either the external independence or the territorial or 
personal supremacy. 
According to Oppenheim and Starke, it is claimed that following are, 
broadly expressed, conditions in which a state has at International Law a 
legitimate right of intervention: 
1. Enforcement of Treaty Rights 
2. Self Defence or Right to Exist 
3. Right Over Protectorate 
4. Inpursuance of UN Charter 
5. Inviolation of International Law 
6. In protection of Persons and Property Abroad 
7. On Humanitarian Ground 
8. Intervention in Civil War. 
1. Enforcement of Treaty Rights: 
If a given state has been restricted by treaty either in its territorial 
supremacy or in its external independence and violates the restrictions 
imposed, the other party or parties to the agreement would possess a 
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lawful right of intervention. A state is justified in interfering in the affairs of 
another state if the provisions of any treaty oblige the former to preserve 
the independence or neutrality of the latter. Such intervention does not 
violate any right of independence because the state that suffers has 
conceded such liberty of interference by treaty. The Treaties of London of 
the years 1831 and 1839 guaranteed the integrity and neutrality of 
Belgium, but the invasion of Belgium by Germany in 1914 led to the 
intervention of Great Britain in pursuance of treaty right by declaring war 
on Germany. It was again in pursuance of Art. 3 of the Treaty of London of 
186331 that France, Russia and Great Britain, who had guaranteed the 
independence of Greece, interfered in the affairs of Greece in 1916 and 
1917 and re-established constitutional government. King Constantine had 
to abdicate, and his second son, Alexander, was installed as king of 
Hellences. Again by the Treaty of Havana, 1903, Cuba agreed that U.S. 
might intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence. In 1906, 
American intervened in the affairs of Cuba under the Art. 3 of the Havana 
Treaty of 1903. A similar treaty existed between U.S.A. and Panama 
under which U.S.A. intervened in Panama in 1904. 
2. Self-Defence or Right to Exist: 
The right of self-preservation is more sacred than the duty of respecting 
the independence of other states. A state has a right to interfere in the 
31. Which provides that, 'Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the 
guarantee of the three courts, forms a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state 
17 
affairs of another state where the security and immediate interests of the 
former are compromised. Interventions, therefore, in order to ward off 
imminent danger to the intervening state are justified by the force of 
circumstances. The danger must be direct and immediate, not contingent 
and remote. The leading case of the Caroline32 sets out the principles that 
govern the doctrine of self-preservation. 
Since the beginning of international law, self-preservation has been 
considered as a sufficient justification for violation of the rights of other 
states. But there is no such thing as fundamental right of self-preservation. 
The doctrine, however, developed as corollary of the emphasis laid on the 
sovereignty of the state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Violations of the rights of other states in the interests of self-preservation 
are not allowed, except rarely, in cases of necessity. Mr Webster, the 
American Secretary of State, defined the scope of "necessity" in the 
following words: "the danger must be instant, overwhelming, leaving po 
choice of means and no moment for deliberation, before a state can invoke 
32. During the revolt in Canada in 1837 preparations for subversive action against the British 
authorities were made in US territory In particular a U.S. arsenal at Buffalo was looted to obtain 
arms The U.S. acted properly in taking measures against the organisation of armed forces upon 
its soil so that no breach of duty could be alleged against its authorities. However, the rebels in 
Upper Canada were being reinforced and provisioned by the Steamer Caroline from ports in the 
U.S. A British force from Canada entered the U.S. territory, seized the Caroline in the state of New 
York and destroyed her. In the action two U.S. citizens were killed. Great Britain justified its action 
on the ground of "self-defence" and "self-preservation" but the U.S. arrested one of the British 
force involved, named Alexander McLeod, a British subject, and charged him with murder and 
arson. Great Britain protested and the correspondence which followed is accepted as the classical 
formulation of the conditions upon which invasion of neighbouring territory can be justified under 
the conception of self-defence. There must be a "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, 
leaving no choice of means, and moment for deliberation", and the action taken must not be 
"unreasonable or excessive", and "limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it". The dispute 
ended with an apology by Great Britain. See Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases", 
A.J.I.L, Vol. 32 (1938). Cited in D. P. O'Connell, Int. law (2nd ed., 1970), vol. I, p. 316. 
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the doctrine; of necessity of self-preservation". 
Intervention thus involved a conflict of two fundamental principles of 
international law, the right of self-govt. or "independence" on the part of 
the state against which the complaint was brought. For the solution of the 
conflict international law had, at the time, no acceptable remedy. 
It was with the out break of the French Revolution that the conflict of the 
two principles of self-defence and independence began to take its modern 
shape. Austria and Russia saw in the revolution a threat to the peace of all 
Europe. They had the right, as they saw it, to intervene to prevent the 
spread of ideas which would incite all Europe to revolt and anarchy. On 
the basis of this principle Austria intervened to supress uprising in Italy in 
1821, France intervened for a similar purpose in Spain in 1823, and plans 
were made to assist the Spanish govt, in recovering its rebellious 
colonies33. 
Intervention now succeeded to intervention, and it is difficult to classify the 
numerous cases which fill the pages of history of Europe during the 
second and third quarters of the nineteenth century. To intervene or not to 
intervene was a matter which each state decided for itself according to its 
military power and its national interests. 
33. It was in reaction against these plans that the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed, a doctrine of 
'non-intervention' to oppose the intervention of Triple Alliance in the relations between Spain 
and its rebellious colonies which had been recognised by the US as independent. 
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The right of intervention and the obligation of non-intervention fell within 
the field of political action, and jurists could do little more than find 
justification for what govts, were doing by referring to the necessity of a 
summary procedure which, as one jurist expressed it, "may sometimes 
snatch a remedy beyond the reach of law"34. 
Examples of Self-Preservation: 
1. See the case of the American ship The Neptune (1795) which was 
seized and brought to a British Port with the Cargo consisting mainly of 
food stuff when there was a great famine in England. 
2. To prevent France from seizing The Danish Fleet and using it against 
Great Britain, the latter shelled Copenhagen and seized the Danish 
Fleet in 1807 on Denmark's refusal to deliver up her fleet to Great 
Britain. 
3. In 1904, Japan invaded Korea in this ground. 
4. Japan sought to justify the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, by invoking 
the principles of self-preservation and self-defence. The Assembly of 
the League of Nation denied the validity of Japan's plea. 
5. The Italian conquest of Abyssinia (1935) by Fascist Italy. 
6. The British action in sinking the French Fleet at Oran during the 
Second World War in 1940 is a typical case of self-preservation. 
34. Sir William Harcourt; Letters of Historicus, p. 41. as cited in Charles G Fenwick Int Law 
(3rd ed.), 1952, p. 242. 
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Individual Self-defence: 
Article 51 states that nothing in the United Nations Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace & security. The law 
has not traditionally required a state to wait until it is actually attacked 
before taking measures of self-defence. In traditional international law, 
measures of self-defence could in certain circumstances be taken, not 
only against a state which is threatening attack, but against a foreign 
territory which is being used as a base for attack by rebels of the 
threatened state35. The power deployed in self-defence must be 
proportionate to the threat, and the right of self-defence may only be 
exercised until the Security Council has acted36. If the Security Council 
fails to take action, self-defence must cease as soon as its purpose, that 
is, to repel the armed attack, has been achieved. In particular, they 
prohibit prolonged military occupation and annexation of territory 
belonging to the aggressor. 
Collective Self-defence: 
Article 51 refers to collective as well as individual self-defence. An attack 
on one member is not necessarily an attack on all; but neither must each 
35. See The Caroline Case, 1837. 
36. D. P. O'Connel; op. cit., pp. 315-18. See the UK argument in the Suez Canal matter. S. C. 
O. R., 6th yr., 550 meet. 
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member wait before taking action until the coercion applied to another 
member constitutes an immediate threat to all. The group may act jointly if 
there is a proportionate relationship between the threat to one and the 
threat to all. A state is not precluded from seeking assistance from abroad 
and agreeing to join action in its territory on the part of interested states37. 
Article 51 grants any member state of the UN the right to use force in 
support of another state which has suffered an armed attack. But the 
Intervening state must not be itself a victim of the armed attack by the 
aggressor (in which case it would act by way of "individual" self-defence). 
Both the NATO treaty and the Treaty of the Warsaw Pact point in this 
direction. It is said, a state cannot use force against a country which has 
attacked another state, without the request or the previous consent of the 
latter. So for" Collective" Self-defence (that is intervention by one or more 
states in favour of the victim) has been invoked by the US in the case of 
Vietnam i.e. the US relied upon Article 51 for their military action in 
support of South Vietnam38. 
37. Bowett; "Collective self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations", B. Y. I. L, Vol. 32 
(1955-56). cited in D. P. O'Connel; op. cit, p. 320. The Soviet Union justified its action in 
Hungary in 1956 partly under the Warsaw Pact: S.C.O.R., 11 th yr, 746* meet. The US 
argued that in taking action to assist South Vietnam it was engaged in collective self-
defence The Lebanon justified its request for US military assistance against a threat from 
Syria on the ground of self-defence: S.C.O.R., 13th yr., 836th meet. 
38. The US memorandum of 4 March 1966 in the Vietnam War and International Law, ed. R. A. 
Falk (Princeton, N. J., 1968), pp. 583-86, as referred in Antonio Cassese; op.cit., p. 236. 
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The Soviet Union has intervened militarily in two instances 
(Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979) claiming that it was 
acting both at the request of the state concerned, and on the strength of 
Article 51, that is, 'Collective' self-defence, to repel an aggression against 
the state to whose territory it sent its troops. Now, it is clear that in fact no 
armed attack proper by a third state had been committed—one could at 
most speak (in the case of Afghanistan) of military aid of some sort by 
third countries to rebels. It is, indeed, no coincidence that in the UN the 
USSR never made it clear by which specific state the alleged aggression 
had been carried out, but simply spoke of "external interference in 
Czechoslovakia's internal affairs" and "subversive actions by external 
forces" in Afghanistan. It can therefore be said that according to the Soviet 
Union, the Article 51 also authorises collective self-defence in case of 
"indirect armed aggression"39. 
Abatement Theory: 
Another reason advanced on occasion in justification of intervention is the 
" abatement" of an international nuisance. It could be argued that this was 
one of the reasons cited in the United states in 1898 in partial justification 
of armed action in Cuba. The argument was actually utilized by Japan in 
1932 in defense of the invasion and conquest of Manchuria. It was also 
brought forward, in conjunction with the concept of debellatio, in 1939, in 
defense of Russian interference in the form of invasion followed by 
39. Antonio Cassese; op. cit, p.235. 
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annexation when the Polish State had crumbled under German Attack . 
The abatement theory holds that when conditions in the territory of a 
neighboring state border on anarchy, with concurrent inability of the 
constituted authorities (if they still exist at the time) to restore order and to 
prevent a spilling over of the disturbance into one's own territory, then one 
has a duty to intervene—quite likely by armed force—to restore order 
along one's frontiers and to end the chaos next door41. If no selfish aims 
are involved in the intervention in question, if no territorial aggrandizement 
or other gain is contemplated or realized, then it is difficult, in many 
instances, to deny a moral right, based on self-defense or self-
preservation, to violate the ban on intervention for the sake of abating the 
nuisance at one's doorstep. 
3. Right Over Protectorate 
A state has a right to intervene in the affairs of a state over which it holds 
a protectorate. If protectorate acts and behaves in such a manner as to 
contravene against the interest of Protecting state, the protecting state has 
the right to intervene in the affairs of protectorate, e.g. The American 
intervention in and occupation of Haiti in 1915 was as assertion of a 
protectorate. 
40. George Ginsburg's instructive "A Case Study in the Soviet Use of International Law: Eastern 
Poland in 1939", 52 A.J.I.L (1958), pp.69-84 as cited in G. V. Glahn; op. cit, p.169. 
41 . G. V. Glahn; op. cit, p.169. 
4. Inpursucince of UN Charter: 
The Covenant of the League of Nations as well as the Charter of the 
United Nations by its enforcement action under Chapter VII, have provided 
for the collective intervention of member states, for the purpose of 
restraining states which disturb the peace of the world. Moreover, the 
Covenant contemplated collective intervention in certain events against 
states which were not members of the League.42 The Charter of the UN 
imposes upon the organization the duty of ensuring that states which are 
not members shall act in accordance with its principles so for as this is 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.43 
Lawful intervention would occur in the case of collective action undertaken 
by an international organ on behalf of the community of nations or for the 
enforcement of the principles and rules of international law44. 
Some writers, notably, Richard A. Falk, have advocated or justified 
international (United Nations) intervention in civil wars45, asserting 
correctly that such conflicts may easily escalate into international, 
regional, or even global wars. Yet the fact remains that United Nations 
intervention of any consequence could only take place if agreement 
prevailed among the Great Powers. And if such agreement should exist, 
then a given civil war would not be likely to constitute a danger to world 
42 . See Article 10, 11 and 17 of the Covenants. 
43 . See Article 2(6) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
44 . Lauterpacht's Oppeheim, op. cit, Vol. I, p.320. 
45. G V. Glahn; op. cit., pp. 169-70. 
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peace calling for international intervention. Collective intervention took 
place under the authority of the UN to stop (a) the Korean War in 1950; (b) 
The Suez Canal crisis in 1956, (c) The Congo Crisis in 1960, and (d) The 
Gulf Crisis in 1991. 
5. In violation of International Law: 
If a state or a group of state violates international law; customary or 
conventional, the other states may intervene in the affairs of that 
state and may compel them to submit to the rules, to observe rules 
and to behave according to the rules. Thus, if a belligerent 
proceeded to violate rights of neutral states during a conflict, the 
neutrals would have rights of intervention against the violating 
belligerent state. 
If, for instance, a state sought to extent its jurisdiction over the 
merchantmen of another state on the high seas, not only would this be an 
affair between the two states concerned, but all other states would have a 
right to intervene because the freedom of the open sea is a universally 
recognized principle. 
6. In Protection of Persons and Property Abroad: 
A state may intervene to protect the rights and interests and the personal 
safety of its citizens abroad. If the citizens of a state are mistreated in 
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another state, the former, it has been asserted, possesses a lawful right to 
intervene on behalf of its citizens after all available peaceful remedies 
have been exhausted. 
This is a subject of much discussion and the most frequently cited 
instances are the interventions in Nicaraguan internal affairs on the part of 
the United States, beginning in 1909, on grounds of protecting American 
private interest and citizens in that republic, and the collective intervention 
in China in 1900 through the joint military and naval expedition sent there 
by Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, 
and the United States. The present writer cannot subscribe to the belief 
that such actions represent lawful intervention—they ought to be viewed 
as prohibited dictational intererence46 in the affairs of other states. 
A typical example of resort to force against alleged violations of 
international law by another state, is the decision on the part of a state to 
send armed troops abroad for the purpose of protecting its nationals. In 
such a case the justification normally invoked by the invading state was 
that the territorial state had failed to take all the precautionary and other 
measures necessary for safeguarding the life and property of foreigners, 
and it, therefore, proved imperative to substitute for this omission, and 
exercise the requisite measures of control. Plainly, this sort of justification 
fends itself to may abuses. 
46. G.V. Glahn; op. cit., p.165 
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According to American writer Offutt47, between 1813 and 1928, U.S. 
troops were sent abroad at least seventy times in order to protect U.S. 
nationals or 'U.S. interests'. Not expectedly, most military expeditions 
were effected by the US in Latin-American countries, but U.S. troops also 
landed in other countries, such as Japan (1853, 1854, 1863, 1864, 1868); 
China (1854, 1856, 1859, 1900); Egypt (1858 and 1882); in Kisembo (on 
the West Coast of Africa) in 1860; Farmosa (1867); and Korea (1871, 
1888, 1894). During the same period, British forces landed in the 
Honduras in 1837 and in Nicaragua in 1895 and 1910, and German forces 
in Samoa in 1899. 
In various instances states have used force for the purpose of protecting 
their nationals whose lives were in danger in foreign territory. In certain 
cases force has been used without the consent of the territorial state: 
Belgium intervened in the Cango in 1960; the U.S. in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965; Israel in Uganda in 1976; the U.S. in Iran in 1980, and in 
Grenada in 1983. In case of Grenada48, independent reports disclosed 
that there was actually no imminent threat or danger to the lives of 
American citizens, and the fact that U.S. troops were stationed in the 
island after evacuating the American nationals confirmed that the ground 
for landing forces adduced by U.S. authorities was indeed a mere pretext 
for unlawful forcible intervention. 
In four other cases military .intervention was effected with the consent of 
47. A. Offutt; The Protection of citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the U.S. (Washington, 
1928),pp.12 ft As cited in Antonio Cassese; op. eft., p.219. 
48. Antonio Cassese; op. cit, pp. 236-37. 
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the territorial state: the U.S. sent their troops to Lebanon in 1958;49 
Belgium did the same, with help from U.S. in the Congo in 1964; the 
Federal Republic of Germany sent a commando to Mogadishu with the 
consent of Somalia in 1977, and, in 1978, French and Belgian troops 
intervened in the Shaba area at the request of Zaire. 
One striking thing is that in cases of use of force to protect nationals, the 
intervening state is invariably a Western power, and the state on whose 
territory the military action is carried out is a Third World Country. The 
second remarkable thing is that only Western states have expressed the 
view that armed intervention for the protection of nationals is 
internationally lawful, being authorized either by Article 51 of the UN 
Charter or by a customary rule unaffected by the Charter.50 By contrast, 
developing and socialist countries have consistently opposed the legality 
of this class of resort to force and foreign intervention has consistently 
been attacked by Eastern European and Third World countries as contrary 
to international law. Thus, for instance, on the occasion of the armed 
action by the U.S. in Lebanon in 1958, Ethiopia stated in the General 
Assembly: Ethiopia strongly opposes any introduction or maintenance of 
troops by one country within the territory of another country under the 
49. The principal grounds for American intervention adduced both by the U.S. and Lebanon 
were the request of the Lebanese Govt, as well as the applicability of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. See the statement made in the S.C. by Lebanon on 15 July 1958, in S.C.OR., 827th 
Mtg., Para 84. The U.S. delegate to the S.C. also emphasized that the U.S. troops had been 
sent to Lebanon in order to protect American lives. See S.C.O.R., 827* Mtg., Para 34 and 
35. 
50. The U.S. went so far as to adopt in 1948 national legislation laying down the right of the U.S. 
to use force abroad to protect 'the lives and property' of American citizens 'against arbitrary 
violence'. 
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pretext of protection of national interest, protection of lives of citizens or 
any other excuse. This is a recognized means of exerting pressure by 
stronger power against smaller ones for extorting advantages. Therefore, 
it must never be permitted.51 
On the same occasion Poland argued that the protection of nationals 
abroad constituted an "old pretext.52 in 1978, during French and Belgian 
military operation in Zaire, the Soviet official news agency Tass stated that 
'humanitarian intervention' was merely 'a fig leaf to cover up an 
undisguised interference in the international affairs of Zaire'53. 
The reasons for the strong opposition of these two large groups of states 
are obvious. States fear that the protection of nationals may serve as a 
means of using leverage on developing countries; in other words, as a 
form of neo-colonialism. However, when the territorial state genuinely and 
spontaneously grants its consent and both the situation obtaining in its 
territory and the attitude of the intervening state are such as to rule out the 
possibility of a neo-colonialist intervention in disguise, the use of armed 
force can be considered lawful. 
5 1 . See GAOR, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 742nd PI. Mtg., 20 August, 1958, Para.75. 
52. Ibid., 740th PI. Mtg., 19 August 1958, Para. 84. 
53. Antonio Cassese; op. cit, p. 238. 
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7. On Humanitarian Grounds: 
Intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible. During the 
" nineteenth century, numerous interventions took place upon "grounds of 
humanity". The Ottoman Empire, seeking to retain its hold over its 
rebellious vassal states and subjects, resorted to methods of suppression 
which shocked the conscience of Europe. In 1827, the Great Powers 
jointly intervened to secure the independence of Greece. In spite of the 
admission of the Ottoman Empire to participate in the public law and 
concert of Europe in 1856, intervention again took place in 1860 to protect 
the Christians of Mount Lebanon, in 1878 to secure the deliverance of the 
Balkan States, and in 1891-1896 following massacres in Armenia and in 
Crete. Jurists discussed at length the possible technical grounds in 
justification of these interventions, since they constituted an interference in 
the domestic government of the misbehaving state and a violation of its 
right of independence. But while differing as to the technical grounds of 
intervention jurists found no difficulty in responding to the higher appeal of 
a common humanity, and in conceding to a state the same right to protect 
the moral feelings of its people, shocked by the accounts of the 
massacres of their correligionists, that it had to protect their material 
interests.54 
According to Grotius, Vattel, and Westlake, humanitarian intervention is 
legally valid when a state treated its people "in such a way as to deny their 
54. Charles G. Fenwick; op.cit., p.242. 
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fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind".55 
Such interference in the affairs of other was defended by the argument 
that if certain practices or actions, revolting when judged by generally 
accepted standards of morality and decency continued to take place in a 
given state despite protests and objections by its neighbours, then 
humanitarian considerations outweighed the prohibition on intervention 
and justified a decision to interfere. 
Humanitarian intervention has been carried out by individual countries 
(Russia in Turkey on behalf of Bulgarian nationalists in 1877; the United 
States in Cuba in 1898) or on a collective basis (the Great Powers in 
Turkey on behalf of Greece, in 1827; France in Syria in 1860, on the basis 
of an agreement among the major powers; the European Great Powers 
plus Japan in China in 1900, during the Boxer Rebellion). 
In late November 1964, rebel forces in the eastern Congo had captured or 
isolated hundreds of white residents, increasing numbers of which were 
killed. The United States government agreed, for humanitarian reasons, to 
supply air transport for Belgian paratroopers and for the evacuation of 
white refugees. Within four days, this operation had been completed and 
two days later all paratroopers had also been removed from the Congo56. 
This intervention resulted in wide spread criticism from African members 
55 Lauterpacht's Oppenheim: op. cit.. Vol. 1., p. 312. 
56. The New York Times, November 29, 1964, P.E-I. See Whiteman, Vol. 5. pp. 475-76. 
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of the United Nations and an unsuccessful attempt was made by eighteen 
of them to have the Security Council condemn the rescue operation as 
"armed aggression". In retrospect, however, the episode presents one of 
the clearest modern instances of true humanitarian intervention and 
should be viewed as lawful in character, in view of the conditions then 
existing in the "target state" and of the total inability of the incumbent 
government to protect the refugees in question. 
One of the most publicized recent instances of alleged humanitarian 
intervention was the landing of U.S. marines in the Dominican Republic on 
April 28, 1965. Initially this intervention was explained in terms of 
protecting American citizens residing in the Dominican Republic and said 
to be threatened by the outbreak of civil strife. Two days later, President 
Lyndon Johnson substituted self-defense (national security) as the reason, 
citing the threat of the establishment of communism in the Republic. After 
two more days, justification for the continuation of the presence of 
American forces was sought in terms of a stopgap measure until the 
Organization of American States could act effectively. And at all times, 
humanitarian intervention considerations intruded on more mundane 
reasons advanced for the armed intervention.57 Ultimately the United 
States forces were withdrawn and replaced by an Inter-American Peace 
Force (IAPF) established by the OAS. 
57. G.V. Glahn; op. cit. pp. 168-69. 
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The Charter of the United Nations reaffirms its faith in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. By recognizing 
the promotion of respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, the 
UN Charter has elevated the principle of humanitarian intervention to a 
fundamental rule of international law58. In short, it is the task of the UN to 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all. 
8. Intervention in Civil War: 
Before the Spanish Civil War (1936-38), the principle was generally 
approved that revolution or civil war or other grave emergency in another 
state might be cause for intervention if the safety of state desiring to 
intervene were affected by the conflict, or emergency, or if there were 
serious interference with the exercise by it of some rights which should be 
respected.59 But in 1936, the European Great Powers departed from the 
principle by agreeing not to intervene in the Spanish Civil War. In October-
November 1956, after the signing of the United Nations Charter, Great 
Britain and France did jointly intervene by force against Egypt in the Suez 
Canal Zone in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, under claim of a threat to their 
vital interests. This action was condemned by majority of the countries in 
58. See Preamble and Articles 1(3), 55 (c), 68,76 (c), of the Charter. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim; 
op. cit., p.313. 
59. Hyde; International Law (2nd ed), 1947, Vol. I, p.253. 
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the UN General Assembly as a breach of the United Nations Charter. It 
was maintained that, as Egypt had not been guilty of any actual armed 
attack within the meaning of article 51 of the Charter60, recourse to an 
alleged right of collective self-defense was not justified. For similar 
reasons, the United States action in landing forces in Beirut in July 1958, 
on the invitation of the President of Lebanon, to assist that country against 
an alleged threat of insurrection stimulated and assisted from outside, and 
to protect American lives and property, was not stricto sensu a measure of 
self-defense authorized by article 51.61 
The Beirut landing was, however, justified not only as an act of self-
defense, but also on the ground that the legitimate government of 
Lebanon has consented to the intervention. "The general rule in this 
connection is that, in the case of strife, which is primarily internal, and 
particularly where the outcome is uncertain, the mere invitation by either 
faction to an outside state to intervene does not legalize an otherwise 
improper intervention"62. In as much as it is claimed that subsequent 
events showed that the strife in Lebanon was purely of an internal 
character, the legality of the American intervention in Lebanon has been 
doubted. 
60. The Charter by article 51 recognizes an inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense of member states against armed attack, pending enforcement action by the Security 
Council, and reserving to the Security Council full authority in the matter. 
6 1 . For reasons similar, British troops were landed in Jordan on the invitation of the government 
of that country shortly after the Beirut landing. 
62. 62. J.G. Starke; op. cit., p. 106. 
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In the period 1961-1972, the United States assisted militarily to South 
Vietnam, on the basis that the latter requested it, the justification among 
others being that South Vietnam was confronted with an insurrection 
directed and assisted from outside. 
Intervention in time of civil war has formed the subject of numerous 
controversies. The Principle of the "Troppau Protocol of 1820"63 was used 
to justify the intervention of third states on the side of a 'legitimate' 
government based upon dynastic succession. It was in accordance with 
this Protocol that Austria intervened in Naples and Lombardy in 1821 and 
France intervened in Spain. This principle was condemned by Great 
Britain in the strongest possible terms. In 1928 the American republics, 
after long experience in intervention in time of civil war, adopted at 
Habana a convention setting forth the rights and duties of Third States in 
such cases'54. It was agreed that third states should use all means at their 
disposal to prevent their inhabitants from participating in civil strife in 
neighboring states, that they should intern rebel forces crossing their 
boundaries and that they should forbid the traffic in arms except when 
intended for the government while the belligerency of the. rebels had not 
been recognized. 
63. The Protocol provided thus: "States which have undergone a change of government due to 
revolution the results of which threaten other states, ipsofacto cease to be members of the 
European Alliance and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantee for legal 
order and stability If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other states, 
the Power bind themselves, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great 
Alliance". Charles G. Fenwick; Int. Law (3rd ed.) 1952, p.244. 
64. Ibid, p. 144 
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The intervention of third states in the civil war in Spain in 1936 came close 
to precipitating a general conflict. Germany and Italy intervened on the 
side of General Franco, Russia on the side of the Loyalists, while Great 
Britain and France enacted embargo measures against both sides. The 
Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution affirming the 
obligation of states to refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of 
another state; but no constructive rules of law were drawn up to govern 
similar cases in the future65. It remained uncertain whether aid to a de jure 
government could be said to be an illegal act, although its consequences 
could be aid by other states to the rebels and the danger of war. 
The Charter of the United Nation, clearly condemns the traditional forms 
of intervention as measures of self-help. Even the collective intervention 
of the UN as a body is prohibited, "in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state", exception being made of 
enforcement measures taken by the Security Council in accordance with 
the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The scope of this provision of 
Article 2 awaits interpretations in the light of changing conditions and new 
forms of intervention66. In 1945, the Soviet Union intervened in Iran by 
giving support to rebels in Azerbaijan; and the case was referred to the 
Security Council, which did not regard itself as intervening in the domestic 
affairs of Iran. In 1946, Great Britain and in 1947, Yugoslavia, Albania and 
65. Ibid, p. 245. 
66. Ibid. 
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Bulgaria were alleged to have intervened in Greece, the former by 
assisting the government against guerillas and the latter by assisting 
guerillas against the government. The action of the United States in 1947 
in making loans to Greece and Turkey was regarded by the Soviet 
delegate to the United Nations as a form of intervention. The United 
States and Great Britain regarded the support given by the Soviet Union in 
1947 to the Communist Party in Hungary and other countries as an 
unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of that state. In none of 
these cases would action by the Security Council in the interest of 
maintaining peace come within the condemnation of intervention in the 
domestic affairs of the particular state.67 
The Reagan administration illegally intervened into the civil war in El 
Salvador by providing enormous amounts of military and economic 
assistance to the brutal dictatorship that used it to perpetrate a gross and 
consistent pattern of violations of the most basic human rights of the 
people of that country. The Reagan administration's illicit intervention in El 
Salvador's civil war contravened the international legal right of self-
determination for the people of El Salvador as recognized by Article 1(2) 
of the UN Charter. 
67. Ibid 
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Those civil wars which have provoked intervention by foreign states differ 
from each other in many respects. Norms governing intervention in civil 
wars generally veer between two opposite approaches: One stresses the 
legitimacy of outside support for the incumbent government against either 
internal political rebellion or secession—an approach that has been 
described by one author as "Metternich legitimacy"68. The other stresses 
that "international law developed a stronger emphasis upon anti-
intervention doctrine than upon doctrine favouring constitutional 
legitimacy"69. The former approach favours one-sided intervention, the 
latter neutrality. 
For Corbett, unilateral intervention by foreign states in civil strife would be 
prohibited on behalf of either the incumbent govt, or the rebels or 
insurgents, and broad interventionary authority would be granted by the 
United Nations. Foreign states have used the traditional rule permitting aid 
to a widely recognised incumbent government prior to recognition of 
belligerency as the basis for intervention in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the 
Dominican Fiepublic, and Vietnam, to name only the most recent cases. 
Invitational Intervention: 
Invitational interventions are mostly found in civil strifes. In a purely local 
68. Wolfgang Friedmann; "Law and Politics in the Vietnamese War: A Comment", A.J.I.L 
61(1967), pp. 776-782 
69. Richard A. Falk; Legal Order in a Violent World (1968), p. 134. 
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strife between two or more hostile groups, the legal government should 
not seek foreign assistance. Thus, if a state intervenes in another state 
during civil strife between the local government and local revolting group 
or community, it would be termed as intervention even if it is at the 
invitation of the legal government. However, if the revolting group is 
basically helped by a foreign power, the other foreign power may 
justifiably help the legal government, if invited to do so70, e.g. Russian 
intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968 could not be permissible in 
international law because Dubcek government was not aided by any 
foreign power, even if Russia was claiming that it was invited by some 
Czech comrades which, of course, they equally failed to substantiate. 
Brezhnev's doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist countries has no 
place in international law71. 
Soviet Union again claimed intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979 
at the invitation of President Amin who was killed in the process. It was 
alleged by the Soviet Union that the Afghanistan was threatened by rebels 
who were being supported by Pakistan, China and the United States. If it 
is correct, Soviet action may be justified. 
Intervention appears to be by right when it takes place at the genuine and 
explicit invitation of the lawful government of a state. A striking example of 
70. R.C. Hingorani; Modern Int. Law (2nd ed), 1981, p.326. 
71 . According to the Brezhnev Doctrine, socialist countries can not go beyond the communist 
orbit Therefore, if any socialist country wants to be independent of Soviet influence, other 
communist countries have a right to intervene. Soviet Land, December, 1968. 
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this kind of intervention was supplied by the landing of American Marines 
in Lebanon in 1958, and the sending of requested British troops to Jordan, 
following charges of United Arab Republic intervention in the internal 
affairs of Jordan. On January 25, 1964, British forces went into action in 
Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya, in each instance at the request of the 
respective government, in order to put down mutinies by African troops72. 
On the other hand, in the case of "invitational intervention" as in the case 
of all other forms of such action, the particular circumstances of a given 
instance determine whether the intervention did possess any legal merit at 
all. Thus the invasion of Austria by armed forces of Germany in 1938 did 
take place at the request of an Austrian government to be rare, but it was 
highly dubious whether the government in question could be regarded at 
the time as the lawful government of the Republic of Austria. In the 
particular case of intervention, the motives promoting the action adopted 
by the intervening state differed radically from the motives ascribabje to 
the actions of the United States in the case of Lebanese landing73. 
Comparable in many respects with the Austrian situation, the military 
intervention by the Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956, represented, in 
American eyes, an illegal intervention, because the Kadar government 
which had asked for Soviet assistance under the terms of the Warsaw 
72. The New York Times, January 26, 1964, pp.1,3. cited in G.V. Glahn; op. cit., p.165. 
73. G.V. Glahn; op. cit., p.165. 
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Pact did not represent a legitimate government in Hungary but rather a 
puppet regime established by the very state whose military aid and 
intervention were requested74. Another example of invitational intervention 
was the temporary stationing of British Air Force units in the Republic of 
Zambia in early December, 1965. 
Most important of all recent examples of this kind of intervention has been 
the involvement of the United States and other States in the Vietnamese 
conflict. G.V. Glahn believes that the United States intervention in that 
conflict has been a lawful intervention75. Under generally accepted rules of 
international law, outside assistance cannot be requested by a 
government faced by a purely domestic civil war in which the outcome is 
in doubt, for such a government can not truly speak for its country. But if a 
civil war is aided and promoted from the outside, by agencies of another 
state—if, in other words subversive intervention has occurred—then the 
target government has a legal right to ask for assistance in its struggle to 
maintain itself. This appears to have been the situation in South Vietnam 
after the initial phases of civil war which began as a domestic uprising 
against the government in Saigon in 1957. Infiltration from the North 
appears to have started in early 1958, even though Northern military units 
did not penetrate the demilitarized zone until after the Gulf of Tonkin 
episodes in early August, 1964. 
74. Whiteman; Vol. 5, pp. 667-702. cited in G.V. Glahn; op. cit.. p.166. 
75. G.V. Glahn; op. cit., p. 166 See Moore, J.N.; "The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the 
Republic of Vietnam", 61 A.J.I.L. (1967), pp. 1-34. 
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Under the conditions described—that is, a civil war supported, on the 
rebel side, from the outside—-third parties may assist the incumbent 
government regardless of a possible diminution of the control exercised by 
it over its national territory76. 
The initial stages of Egyptian intervention in Yemen, in the fall of 1962, 
although made at the invitation of the Yemen Arab Republic, must be 
regarded as of dubious legality, in view of the limited control exercised 
from its beginning by the allegedly lawful government. Eventually, 
however, acknowledged support of the royalist faction in the struggle by 
Saudi Arabia appears to have provided a legitimate basis for Egyptian 
assistance to the republican faction77. 
Armed Intervention with the Consent of the Territorial State: 
In traditional international law this principle volenti-non-fit-injuria (an illegal 
act is no longer such if the party whose rights have been infringed 
previously consented thereto), was obviously in full force—each member 
being on a par with the others, there were no limits to the freedom of 
states and all rules could be derogated from. Thus each state was free to 
allow another to use force in any form on its own territory. Just as a state 
was able officially to sanction its own mutilation, dismemberment, or even 
its total extinction, so it could agree to allow another international subject 
76. Ibid., p. 166 
77 . Ibid., p. 167. 
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to use force on its own territory. 
A close scrutiny of the Charter allows for only one conclusion: by explicit 
consent a state may authorise the use of force on its territory whenever, 
as the object of an 'armed attack' it resorts to individual self-defence (by 
giving its consent the state authorizes a form of collective self-defence). 
In 1958, for instance, the British Foreign Secretary78 asserted. The 
structure of the Charter preserves the customary law by which aid may be 
given to a nation of the kind which I have described (in the face of civil 
strife fomented from abroad)—I do not believe that either the spirit or the 
letter of the Charter takes away the customary traditional right 
However, in 1963 Brownlie79, the distinguished English Jurist, stated that 
one should tread very warily, especially in the case of civil war, and never 
lose sight of certain general principles which were emerging at that time 
within the international community, and which were tending to restrict the 
freedom of states. 
Brownlie felt that, as a rule, it was necessary to ascertain that consent had 
not been vitiated by illegal pressure and to establish that it had been 
issued by the legitimate authorities. Once these preliminary enquiries were 
78. Antonio Cassese; op. cit., p. 239. 
79. I. Brownlie; Int. Law And Use of Force by States (Oxford, 1963), pp. 317-27. 
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completed, with specific reference to intervention in civil war or internal 
disorders, one ought to distinguish between three main hypotheses. First, 
that in which consent to the use of force was given by a state on whose 
territory an organised movement was not fighting the government 'with a 
general political object of replacing it; in this case the use of force was 
acceptable'. Second, that in which a substantial body of the population 
supported the insurrection 'and there is no question of foreign aid, moral 
or material, to the insurgents' in such a case the use of force by a third 
state in support of the government can provoke objections 'on 
consideration of principle' because it could conflict with the principles of 
self-determination and non-interference, or for reasons of policy (the 
danger that these internal disturbances could escalate into an international 
conflict). Third, that in which the rebels receive military aid from third 
states. According to Brownlie, under these circumstances, the use of force 
at the behest of the government is legitimate. 
Certain states all too readily claim their own military intervention to be 
lawful. For example, the Soviet intervention in Hungary, that of the U.S. in 
i Lebanon, and of the U.K. in Jordan, both in 1958, that of U.S. in the 
Dominican Republic in 1965, in Greneda in 1983, not to mention Soviet 
intervention in Czech in 1968 and in Afghanistan in 1979. Thus on more 
than one occasion, in cases of subversion in the territory of one state, 
other states have considered it quite legitimate to intervene, after a 
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request to do so, either because the rebels were said to receive aid from 
third states, or because the consenting state was said to be the object of 
an "armed attack" as laid down in Article 51. In fact, it would appear that 
many of these cases of so called armed intervention were unlawful. Often 
the rebels were not in fact receiving any 'external' aid, and certainly not in 
the form of massive 'military assistance'; or else, the individuals 
requesting or authorising foreign intervention could not be regarded as the 
lawful authority of the 'inviting' state. Further more, whenever the 
intervening state justified the use of force by the need to repulse, in 
conformity with Article 51, an 'indirect aggression', the justification was 
based on a questionable interpretation of Article 51 because, it should not 
allow the use of force against that particular form of 'aggression'. 
Clearly state practice makes extensive use of the consent exception, even 
though this practice hardly conforms with present day international law. 
The present legal system may be summarized as follows: First, consent 
must be freely given; it must be real as opposed to merely 'apparent', and 
it must have been given by the lawful government, that is, by the authority 
empowered thereto by the constitution. Second, consent can not validly 
legitimize the use of force when it is contrary to principles of jus-cogens, 
for example if its use tends to deny or to limit the right of peoples to self-
determination, or if it turns out to be a case of interference in the domestic 
affairs of the state on whose territory force has been used. 
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Distinction between aid to de jure government and aid to rebels: 
There is no rule in international law against civil wars. Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter prohibits the use or threat of force in international 
relations only. That does not necessarily mean, however, that other states 
are at liberty to participate in the civil war by giving help to one or other of 
the sides. 
As a general rule, foreign states are forbidden to give help to the 
insurgents in a civil war. For instance, General Assembly resolution 2131 
(XX) declares that "no state shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite 
or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the 
violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in 
another state"80. An exception to this rule probably exists when the 
established authorities are receiving foreign help81. 
There are two views regarding help for the established authorities or de 
jure government to resist subversion or revolt. One view is that help given 
to the established authorities in a civil war is always legal. The theory 
underlying this argument is that the government is the agent of the state, 
and that therefore the government, until it is definitely overthrown, remains 
competent to invite foreign troops into the state's territory and to seek other 
80. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p.94; the resolution was passed by 109 votes to 
nil. 
81 . For instance, after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979, Egypt started 
providing military training and weapons for the Muslim insurgents against the Soviet backed 
government and Saudi Arabia gave money to the insurgents. 
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forms of foreign help, whatever the effect which that help may have on the 
political future of the state. It is also said that, the established government 
of a country is alone competent to exercise the sovereign rights there of, 
and among those sovereign rights is the right to maintain political order: 
an invitation to a foreign nation to assist in maintaining order is not an 
abrogation of sovereignty82. Another view considers that interposition in 
pursuance of an invitation or treaty of guarantee is illegal because it 
influences the political destiny of another country, and thereby its 
sovereign right to determine its own political institutions. On the other 
hand, the above view, is open to abuse; for instance, during the Spanish 
civil war, Germany and Italy tried to legitimise their help to the nationalists 
(insurgents) by prematurely recognising the nationalists as the de jure 
government of Spain. Even apart from such obvious instances of abuse, 
there may be situations where it is genuinely hard to say who are the 
established authorities and who are the insurgents. Thus, shortly after the 
Congo became independent in 1960, the President (Kasavubu) and the 
Prime Minister (Lumumba) came into conflict with each other, and each 
purported to dismiss the other; in such circumstances it is dangerously 
easy for foreign states to argue that their own proteges are the established 
authorities, and that the other side are the insurgents. 
82 . The S.U. justified its action in Hungary in 1956 partly on an invitation from Hungary. 
G.A.O.R., 2nd emergency special session, 546th meet. In the S.C Iraq argued that the U.K. 
was in breach of Int. Law in assisting Muscat and Oman: S.C.O.R., 783rd meet. The U.K. 
argued that a state is entitled to accept an invitation from a recognised government: British 
Practice, 1963, pp.86-7. 
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One must be very careful, not to assist in subverting an established order 
by recognising a rebel organisation as the government de jure and then 
assisting it to overthrow the anterior regime. Such recognition would be 
premature, and thus ineffective to qualify a state for accepting an invitation 
to interfere on the rebel side in a civil war83. 
The idea that foreign states should not intervene on either side in a civil 
war is a wise one, otherwise help given by some states to the established 
authorities runs the risk of provoking other states into helping the 
insurgents i.e. counter-intervention. Non-intervention has received some 
support as a rule of law in subsequent state practice; in 1963 the United 
Kingdom stated that it 'considered that, if civil war broke out in a state and 
the insurgents did not receive outside help or support, it was unlawful for a 
foreign state to intervene, even on the invitation of the regime in power, to 
assist in maintaining law and order'84. 
The conclusion that "policy, not law, determines the actions of states with 
regard to intervention in civil wars"85 may come uncomfortably close to 
describing the present. It may be more accurate to say that law plays an 
undetermined but probably a very subordinate role in the establishment of 
policy with regard to intervention in civil wars. 
83. D.P.O'Conneli; op. cit, pp.301-2. 
84. British Practice in Int. Law, 1963, p.87. 
85. Wolfgang Friedmann; "Intervention, Civil War and the Role of Int. Law" pp.151, 158-59 
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The United Nations and Civil Wars: 
International law, including the Charter has not been notably successful in 
controlling internal wars and external intervention in such wars; the 
influence of the organisation has also been less than decisive. In the 
absence of external intervention or the clear danger that an internal war 
will otherwise threaten international peace, the jurisdiction of the United 
Nations is open to question: it, too, is not supposed to intervene in strictly 
"domestic affairs"86, and presumably the strictly civil war, contained within 
national boundaries, would be deemed "domestic". It is hampered by lack 
of a clear Charter mandate and other uncertainties of law, and by 
uncertainties and disputes as to fact. 
In any event, the United Nations can not prevent revolution; it can not 
readily provide peaceful solutions to prevent or end civil war. It may 
attempt to mediate or conciliate, but there are often issues not susceptible 
to accommodation or third-party settlement. In regard to external 
intervention, especially in the absence of an agreed Charter norm 
forbidding assistance to either side, the United Nations can not easily 
obtain agreement that there shall be none. Where big powers become 
involved, moreover, there is even less likelihood that the United Nations 
can act in a way that will defeat the interests of one of them (e.g. 
Vietnam). In internal wars, then, often it can only hope to help contain the 
86. UN Charter, Article 2 (7). There has not been agreement as to what matters are "essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state, and some may question whether the United 
Nations would even in fact deny itself jurisdiction on this ground. 
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war in the territory of the country in question, to keep the internal war from 
becoming international. 
Still there are internal wars and external wars, and in some the United 
Nations acted effectively in the cause of peace. It superceded "preventive 
intervention" by the United States in Lebanon in 195887. It has tried to 
continue its pacifying activities in Cyprus88. It attempted to end intervention 
and civil war in Yemen in 196389. It was a major participant in the dramatic 
events of 1960 in the Congo to prevent a race of military interventions 
between the Soviet Union and the United States90. Of course, the United 
Nations might contribute most if it promotes welfare and stability that 
render internal wars less likely. However, the United Nations General 
Assembly passed a resolution 2105 (XX), on December 21, 1965, by 74 
votes to 6 with 27 abstentions, which recognises the legitimacy of the 
struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-
determination and independence and invites all states to provide material 
and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial 
territories*. 
87. 13 UN S.C.O.R., 825th meeting (1958); See also UN Doc. S/4113 (1958). 
88. The United Nations continues to maintain a force in Cyprus pursuant to the authorising 
resolution of the Security Council adopted in 1964. UN Doc. S/5575 (1964). 
89. See 18 UN S.C.O.R., April-June Supp., at 52-53, UN Doc. S/5331 (1963). 
90. UN Doc. A/4867 (1961) contains a summary of United Nations actions in the Congo durina 
1960-61 a 
The United Nations Yearbook, 1965, pp. 554-5. 
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Conclusion: 
Any such exceptional rights of intervention of states must be subordinated 
to their primary obligation under the United Nation Charter, so intervention 
must not go so for as the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state. 
No matter how moral or desirable or plausible some of the foregoing 
justifications of intervention may have appeared in specific instances, the 
fact remains that intervention per se is an act in violation of rights which 
should be inviolable, represents a hostile act, and may be taken to be an 
'act rendered possible only because of the superior force of the 
intervening state'. 
The past few years have witnessed other instances of armed intervention, 
surrounded in a number of cases by such a multitude of contributory and 
confusing issues that debate about them is still going no. The duty to 
abstain from armed intervention clearly means also that no state may 
permit the use of its territory for the staging of hostile expeditions against 
another state. 
According to Lawrence, 'states should intervene very sparingly on the 
clearest grounds of justice and necessity and when they do so, they 
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should make it clear that their voice must be attended to and their wishes 
carried out'91. 
In addition to intervention by right there are other kinds of intervention 
which cannot be considered illegal, although they violate the 
independence or the territorial or personal supermacy of the state 
concerned. These are of two kinds, namely, in self-preservation92 and in 
the interest of the balance of power93. 
91 . V.D. Mahajan; Int. Law (1956), p. 174. 
92. See Corfu Channel Case, decided in 1949 between the United Kingdom and Albania by Int. 
Court of Justice. 
93. Most of the interventions exercised in the Balkan Peninsula must be classified as 
interventions in the interest of the balance of power. For examples, collective interventions 
exercised by the Powers in 1886 for the purpose of preventing the outbreak of war between 
Greece and Turkey, in 1897 during the war between Greece and Turkey with regard to the 
island of Crete, and in 1913, for the purpose of establishing and independent state of 
Albania 
CHAPTER TWO 
SOVIET POLICY OF INTERVENTION 
Introduction: 
Foreign policy is the sum of all the attitudes reflected in myriads of 
relationships and numberless points of contact that one nation has with 
others, large and small. Foreign policy also includes the attitudes 
enshrined in the constitution, in legislative enactments, executive orders 
and regulations, judicial decisions that have import for relations with other 
nations or their nationals. It includes even unofficial attitudes of peoples 
and individuals, of domestic companies, trade unions and institutions, their 
actions and reactions which affect relations with others. In largest part, 
then, foreign policy is sometimes, undramatic, uncontroversial, 
"uninteresting"—I do not say unimportant—aimed at achieving national 
ends usually through stability, order, good relations. Like good health, or a 
good marriage, it is mostly unnoted and taken for granted—unless the 
routine is uninterrupted. 
The concept of territory and territorial sovereignty is not prominent in 
foreign policy; but every foreign policy assumes the integrity and 
inviolability of the national territory, and any intentional violation would 
probably lead to major crisis. 
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Not least, by far, are particular prohibitions of the law deriving from the 
basic concepts, such as those designed to protect the independence of 
nations against various forms of intervention. Accusations of intervention 
are common fare; to refrain from "intervention" is a tenet of foreign policy 
for many nations1. 
World War II was a major watershed in Soviet Foreign policy. Before the 
war, the Soviet Union was at best a middle level power whose overriding 
concern was the preservation of the Bolshevik revolution and the 
protection of the nation's security. World War II radically altered the 
structure of international politics. Europe no longer dominated world 
affairs. The great powers of the pre-war era (with the exception of the 
United States) were either vanquished or exhausted. Soviet Russia 
emerged for the first time in its history as a great power, surpassed in 
strength only by the United States. Within a short period of time, the 
Soviet Union and the United States acquired a special status in world 
affairs as not merely great powers but super powers. Since 1945, the 
central focus of Soviet foreign policy has been its relationship with the 
United States. 
Now with the perspective of more than a generation, we can see rather 
clearly the main outlines of the changes that have operated upon Soviet 
1. Intervention is an effort to bring influence to bear on other govts, by particular 
means. Strictly, intervention is unlawful interference; what by definition constitutes 
intervention is unlawful. Strictly, too, intervention means dictatorial interference by 
force or threat of force, but the term is often used loosely for any impermissible 
interference or attempt to influence. 
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foreign policy. There are six general variables that stand out as 
fundamental: four of an external nature and two internal. They are as 
follow: 
1. The change in the structure of the international system from bipolarity 
to multipolarity. 
2. The growth of polycentrism in the international communist movement. 
3. The development of a military technology that makes the total 
destruction of an adversary possible. 
4. The achievement of military parity between the Soviet Union and the 
United States and the change from a regional to a global military 
power. 
5. The change in Soviet regime from a totalitarian polity to an 
authoritarian bureaucratic oligarchy, and 
6. The difference reflected in the leadership of different personalities from 
Stalin to Gorbachev. 
The Soviet Union was the first great power to claim the ideas of Marxism 
as the basis for all public policy, both domestic and foreign. Every Soviet 
leader from Lenin to Gorbachev has explained and defended his actions 
as conforming to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. 
As the cold war emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was 
not necessary for Stalin to develop any new concept to describe the 
changing relationship between the Soviet Union and its former allies. He 
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had only to revive the old "two camps" thesis with its message about the 
danger of a capitalist attack against the Soviet Union. Andrei Zhdanov's 
speech at the founding conference of the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform) in Poland in September 1947 heralded a new militant phase 
in Soviet Policy toward the West. He accused the United States of 
seeking world supermacy, of plotting to "hatch a new imperialist war"2. 
What the cominform was designed to do in the way of enforcing 
uniformity in the "informational" sphere, the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) was intended to accomplish in the economic 
arena. A crude imitation of the European Recovery Program, it helped to 
ensure Soviet access to East European resources and to bind the 
economies of these countries more closely to that of the USSR. 
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Communism had spread 
from one country (two counting Mongolia) to a system that held under its 
sway 100 million additional people in 11 more states of Europe: Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the eastern zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. The first three were 
reannexed into the USSR—an act unrecognized but not strenuously 
protested by the West. 
2. Nogee & Donaldson; Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (3rd ed.), 1988, p.26. 
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At the beginning of the War, communist parties were non existent in 
Albania, Germany and Poland, and almost so in Rumania and Hungary. 
They were stronger in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and strongest of all in 
Czechoslovakia. All were under the tight control of the Comintern and thus 
of Stalin himself. Most of East European Party leaders (with the notable 
exception of the Yugoslavs and Albanians) spent the war year in 
Moscow.3 
The Soviet Union operates within four networks of relationships, all of 
which are interrelated4: (1) as a great power in the international system; 
(2) as one of the two dominant states of the world socialist system, (3) as 
the leading member of the "socialist commonwealth"; and (4) as a leading 
member of the international communist movement. The international 
system encompasses all the states of the world. The world socialist 
system, which can be considered a subsystem of the international system, 
consists of those states governed by communist parties. Formed in the 
aftermath of World War II with the creation of the people's democracies in 
Eastern Europe, the world socialist system today numbers eighteen 
states. A subgroup of this system is the "Socialist commonwealth", 
consisting of the members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
and the Warsaw Pact. The international communist movement, antedating 
the Russian Revolution, comprises all the communist parties through out 
3. Ibid., p.75. 
4. Ibid., p. 211 
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the World whether in or out of power. Not only does the Soviet leadership 
distinguish between the world socialist system, the socialist 
commonwealth, and the international communist movement, but it 
observes different rules of behavior towards the members of these 
different networks. 
From the moment the Red Army started moving across Eastern Europe in 
1944, laying the foundations for communist rule in the liberated countries, 
the Soviet leadership was confronted with the problem of defining the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and other socialist states. There 
was never the slightest doubt that Stalin intended to subordinate the 
people's democracies to Soviet rule, but there were different ways by 
which this might be accomplished. Soviet control in such a relationship 
would put the countries of Eastern Europe in a position some where 
between that of a satellite or simply within the Soviet sphere of influence. 
In 1947, however, Soviet policy changed. Stalin apparently became surer 
of the international situation and the conditions within Eastern Europe. It 
became increasingly clear that the Western powers would not interfere 
however far Stalin might go. Furthermore, the Soviet Union shortly 
became the dominant military power on the continent. Within the Soviet 
sphere of influence, Stalin was pleasantly surprised to observe that the 
non-communist forces were considerably weaker than he had anticipated. 
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The official signal for the change in Soviet policy was the establishment of 
the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947 in the 
Polish resort town of Szklarska Poreba (Near Warsaw). Ironically, the only 
opposition to the creation of the Cominform came from Wladyslaw 
Gomulka, representing the host party. Another irony of the Cominform's 
origin was the strong support given to it by Josip-Broz-Tito, head of 
Yugoslavia's Communist Party. The principal function of the new 
communist international organization was ostensibly to promote the 
construction of communism by an exchange of information among 
Europe's leading parties. It was not supposed to be a policy making body 
like its predecessor, the Comintern. Besides the Soviet Union, 
membership in the organization included the parties of Yugoslavia, 
Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, as well as the 
powerful Western Parties of Italy and France (Albania was not included 
because it was scheduled to be incorporated into Yugoslavia). To promote 
an exchange of information among Cominform members, a biweekly 
newspaper (later a weekly) was published with the cumbersome name, 
"For a lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy". It was at the 
Cominform's founding meeting that Andrei Zhdanov made the vitriolic 
speech that heralded a new Soviet hard line toward the West. 
The real significance of the Cominform had less to do with relations 
between the Soviet Union and the West than it had to do with those 
between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European neighbors. Its 
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function were to curb the nationalistic and independent tendencies that 
had been growing within the communist elites of Europe and to accelerate 
the speedy takeover of power by communists in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary5. Though its accomplishment were meagre at best, it marked the 
beginning of a uniform system of satellite states. 
The Council on Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) was formed 
in January 1949 largely as response to the Marshall Plan. It too was an 
instrument under Stalin for economic exploitation, although its main 
activity was originally limited to coordinating trade among the satellites. 
The founding members were the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Rumania and Czechoslovakia. They were joined subsequently by Albania 
(which broke away in 1961) East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam. 
In 1950, the rouble, became the standard currency for international 
transactions within COMECON, making the USSR the arbiter of all rates 
of exchange. 
In sum, Stalin created a socialist system that was truly monolithic. Eastern 
Europe became part of a Soviet-bloc whose centre was Moscow. While he 
lived, Stalin controlled this empire through a variety of informal techniques. 
Chief among these was his personal selection or approval of every 
satellite leader. Those who held power did so not because they had 
indigenous support but solely by virtue of Stalin's approval. 
5. Ibid., pp.216-17. 
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The official History of Soviet Foreign Policy describes the policy's four 
basic tasks as 6: 
1. To secure, together with the other socialist countries, favorable 
conditions for the building of socialism and communism; 
2. To strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries, their 
friendship and brotherhood; 
3. To support the national-liberation movement and to effect all-round 
cooperation with the young, developing countries. 
4. Consistently to uphold the principle of peaceful co-existence of states 
with different social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the 
aggressive forces of imperialism, and to save mankind from a new-
world war. 
The invasion of Czechoslovakia certainly demonstrated the paramount 
importance to the Soviet leadership of the first and second of the basic 
tasks of their foreign policy. But as for the third task (support of national-
liberation movements), the Soviet Union gave North Vietnam enough help-
- and no more than that—both to keep it on its feet and to maintain Soviet 
influence in Indo-China against the Chinese; in Chile, the Soviet Union 
made no attempt to repeat its Cuban experience; Soviet commitment to 
this task is taken with a pinch of salt by Egyptians; and it is ridiculed by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)7. Above all, since 1972/3 the Leninist 
6. Robin Edmonds; Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-73,1975,p.3. 
7. Ibid., p. 4. 
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principle of peaceful coexistence has been given an interpretation that 
goes far beyond anything ever suggested by Lenin. In short, although 
Soviet Foreign Policy may have remained unaltered on paper for nearly 
twenty years, in fact a gap has developed between its theory and its 
practice. For a Marxist, there can be no difference between theory and 
practice. In non-Marxist terms such a difference may be regarded as a 
conflict that can not be tolerated indefinitely. 
The Soviet Union is unique among the Great Powers in that neither the 
Foreign Minister nor the Defence Minister is a member of the policy-
decision-making body, the Politburo. Foreign Policy is, therefore, 
formulated on the advice of professional experts, but the decisions are 
taken by the eleven Party leaders without the professional's participation. 
The following principles guide the Soviet leaders: 
(a) The survival of the Soviet Union as a state and as a world super 
power, with some decree of parity with the United States. 
(b) No military-strategic confrontation with the U.S. 
(c) No foreign commitment beyond the reasonable capability of the Soviet 
armed forces to fulfil them. 
(d) Some degree of injection of communist ideology into foreign policy, 
especially within the world communist movement, where China 
represents an ideological threat. 
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(e) Wherever consistent with any first two principles, the general increase 
of Soviet political influence and prestige throughout the world. In a 
clash between survival and ideology or prestige, survival will always 
win. 
(f) The retention of an active role in the United Nations, with the proviso 
that UN decisions which run counter to Soviet National or ideological 
aims will be unacceptable. 
The concept of peaceful coexistence has always been the general line of 
Soviet foreign policy. From its very inception, the Soviet state proclaimed 
peaceful coexistence as the basic principal of its foreign policy. The fact 
that the very first political act of the Soviet Russia was the Decree on 
peace, the decree on stopping the bloody war, is not to be considered an 
accident. Co-existence is a continuation of the struggle between the two 
social systems, but struggle by peaceful means, without resort to war, 
without interference by one state in the internal affairs of another. 
In short, coexistence on a reasonable basis presupposes the recognition 
of the existence of different social systems, the recognition of the right of 
every people to deal independently with all political and social problems of 
its own country, respect for the sovereignty of other nations, adherence to 
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries and 
the settlement of all international issues by negotiation. 
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Thus, the Soviet view of peaceful co-existence of countries with different 
social and political systems does not simply imply an absence of war or a 
state of temporary and unstable armistice. It provides for the maintenance 
of friendly economic and political relations and envisages the 
establishment and development of a variety of forms of peaceful 
international cooperation. 
If we have a look at the UN Charter itself we can find out that it is based 
on the principle of peaceful co-existence although it does not use this very 
word. In its Preamble, the UN Charter, for example, states that the 
member countries undertake "to practice tolerance and live together in 
peace with one another as good neighbors", and to unite their "strength to 
maintain international peace and security". 
Soviet Concept of Intervention: 
To Soviet scholars, sovereignty is "the independence of the state of any 
other state, this independence amounts to the right to decide freely and 
according to its own judgement all its domestic and foreign affairs without 
interference on the part of other states"8. 
"Sovereignty" is the possession of supreme power (summa potestas) 
unlimited by any other state resulting in autonomy within a state and 
8. V. V. Evegenyev; "Subjects of Law, Sovereignty and Non-intervention in Int. Law", 
(Soviet State and Law), no. 2 (March'1955), p.77, as cited in Richard J. Erickson; 
Int. Law and the Revolutionary State, 1972, p.50. 
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independence in relation to other states . 
Although claiming absolute respect for sovereignty, the Soviet Union does 
not advocate a 19th century classical concept of sovereignty. At the 1964, 
Mexico City Meeting of the UN Special Committee on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States, the Soviet Representative Mr. Khlestov, went on record as saying, 
Some countries even considered that international Law, too, was 
an invasion of state sovereignty. His own delegation, however, did 
not share that view; it held that rules of international law restricted 
the freedom of states with a view to safeguarding international 
peace and security, without infringing the sovereignty of states 
concerned. His country's policies and Soviet legal doctrine were 
consistent with that view10. 
Although states may possess sovereignty they may not be able to 
exercise the independence of sovereignty. Injury to the socialist 
movement has been used by Soviet scholars to explain why the 
sovereignty of Soviet Republics or of national minorities within the USSR 
must be restricted. With the Czech crisis of 1968 this reasoning was 
elevated officially to the international plane in what has become known as 
9. Richards J. Erickson; op. tit., p.50. 
10. Mr. Khlestov (USSR.), 1964Mexico City Meeting of the UN Special Committee on 
Principles of Int. Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States, A/AC. 119/SR22 (September 14,1964), p.28. 
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the "Brezhnev Doctrine"11. The Soviet Union made it clear that 
Czechoslovakia could maintain its independence (sovereignty) only as a 
socialist country. "The sovereignty of individual countries", wrote S. 
Kovalyov explaining the Brezhnev Doctrine, "can not be used in opposition 
to the interests of world socialism and the revolutionary world 
movement"12. Czechoslovakian sovereignty had to be subordinated to the 
extent that it ran counter to the laws of the class struggle and of social 
development13. 
The imperialist, contrary to the United Nations Charter, openly interfere in 
the domestic affairs of independent states. The attempt to dispute the right 
of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, and to establish 
international control over the Canal was an obvious example. An act of 
outright aggression was committed against Egypt in October-November 
1956, by Israel, Britain and France with the aim of compelling the Egyptian 
people to renounce their independent policy both at home and abroad. 
British military intervention in Oman in 1957, the American intervention in 
Lebanon and that of the British in Jordan in 1958 were also examples of 
gross intervention by the imperialist powers in affairs of other countires14. 
11. Brezhnev clearly stated the Doctrine on November 12, 1968, inhis Warsaw speech, "If the 
internal and external enemies of socialism think they can attempt to direct the development 
of any single socialist to a restoration of the capitalist system, if there then arises a threat to 
socialism in this country which is a threat to the security to the entire socialist community of 
states, then this is not merely a problem for the country concerned, but a general problem 
that must engage the attention of all socialist states". See Richard J. Erickson op cit 
pp.68-69. 
12. Ibid., p 52 
13. Ibid., p.53. 
14. Ibid., p.57. 
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The imperialists do not hesitate to use the UN Charter as a cover for 
intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Thus, contrary to Article 
2(7) of the Charter, and despite the protests of the legitimate govt, of 
Hungary, a discussion of the "Hungarian Question" was imposed on the 
United Nations15. 
On the one hand the West's activities in the Middle East were a violation 
of the principle of non-intervention while, on the other hand, Soviet action 
in Hungary in 1956 did not alter the essentially domestic character of 
Hungarian situation and that it was, on the contrary, the UN which had 
violated international law by submitting to Western demands for 
consideration of the "Hungarian Question". 
The Communists' attitude towards intervention is very closely connected 
with their theory of sovereignty. The aim of the Soviet Government, as set 
forth by the Third International, being to foment world revolution and 
thereby establish a class-less commonwealth, when a foreign non-
communist state is viewed as a struggle of classes, intervention on the 
part of the Soviets is a commendable and justifiable act by which the 
sovereign laboring class fulfills its duty of extending its own class 
achievement to those who are still deprived of the enjoyment of the 
privileges16 
15. Ibid, p. 58. 
16. T.A. Taracouzio; The Soviet Union and Int. Law, 1935, p.37. 
68 
By the same token, no government based upon communist philosophy 
could brook intervention in Russian affairs by capitalist states. Thus the 
reaction of the Soviet Govt, to the intervention of the "Allies" from 1917-22 
was one of strong protest. The whole intervention of Etente from 1917 to 
1922 was viewed by the Soviet authorities as nothing more than a large 
scale attempt of the capitalist class to oppose the development of the 
proletarian movement, and, as such, it evoked violent opposition on their 
part. 
The principle of opposition to intervention was consistently manifested by 
the Soviet Govt, even in favor of other states. Various treaties and 
agreements signed by the R.S.F.S.R. and the USSR, embody this 
attitude. A clear expression of it is to be found in the Polish-R.S.F.S.R. 
Treaty of Peace, signed on March 18, 1921. Article 5, of this Treaty 
provides that each Contracting Party under takes "—to respect in every 
way the political sovereignty of the other party, to abstain from 
interference in its internal affairs, and particularly, to refrain from all 
agitation, propaganda or interference of any kind and not to encourage 
any such movement"17. 
Where as, it may be argued that in all these instances the communist 
authorities were guided by practical interests in their opposition to 
17. Ibid., p.38. 
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intervention, there interests were not always the same. In the beginning 
they were desirous of denouncing the invasion of territory under their 
jurisdiction; subsequently they feared that anti-proletarian propaganda 
might deprive them of the prestige they had gained. These practical 
considerations led the Soviet Govt, to subscribe to the view of the majority 
of non-communist authorities that intervention is an undesirable violation 
of the sovereign right of a state—so long as the state is looked upon 
objectively as the classical non-communist political person of international 
law. At the same time as a special method used for the propagation of 
communist philosophy, intervention is juridically acceptable during the 
transition period of state evolution18. Indeed, it appears to be normal and 
inevitable between the communist and capitalist worlds. 
The last measure of non-amicable settlement of international disputes, 
short of war to be considered is intervention. The theory, advanced as 
early as Grotius, that intervention was not illegal when under taken for the 
purpose of liberating the masses from tyranny19, is perfectly acceptable to 
the Soviets. Essentially, a manifestation of class differences for the 
communists, intervention is admissible for them in principle inspite of the 
fact that when materialized it is nothing but a forced subjection of the weak 
to the strong. 
Wars of liberation, are waged to defend the people from foreign attack and 
18. Ibid., pp.39-40. 
19. Ibid., p.301. 
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from attempts to enslave them; or to liberate the people from capitalist 
slavery; or lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the 
yoke of imperialism. As for back as 1939, for instance, Stalin20 himself and 
publicly declared that "we stand for the support of nations which are the 
victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their 
country". F:or all Soviet spokesmen, from Khrushchev on down, make no 
secret of where there sympathies lie, publicly declaring that"— we are 
against imperialistic, colonialistic and, in general, against all wars, accept 
those wars which people wage in fighting for their own liberation. These 
are sacred popular wars against slavery, against colonial regimes"21. 
The socialist countries and the communists all over the world will continue 
to aid and support the peoples who are waging an armed struggle against 
colonialism. Far from contradicting the concept of peaceful-co-existence, 
this is an affirmative of that concept, since the issue at stake is respect for 
one of the basic principles of peaceful co-existence—the right of all 
peoples to order their own ,ife as they see fit, to be masters in their own 
house22. 
Traditionally, the Soviet Union has been a vigrous exponent of the 
sovereign prerogatives of the nation-state, considering state sovereignty 
20. J. V. Stalin; Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the 18th Congress of 
the Communist Party of the S.U. (Bolsheviks) 15 (1939). as cited in Hans W. 
Badde; The Soviet Impact on Int. Law, 1965, p.90. 
2 1 . N. S. Khrushchev (Communism—Peace and Happiness of Peoples) 379 (1962) as 
cited in Hans W. Badde, op. cit., p. 90. 
22. Ponomaryov, Some Problems of the Revolutionary Movement, 12 World Marxist 
Review 13 (1962). as cited in Hans W Badde; op. cit., p. 90. 
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to be "the keystone of international law". Sovereignty is used both as a 
shield to protect the Soviet Union from interference by capitalist states, 
and as a weapon in its struggle with such states23. Sovereignty is a 
reliable means of defending the small states from the major imperialist 
power's attempts to struggle them to their diktat. 
The creation of aggressive blocs, the building of military basis abroad, 
intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the suppression of 
the national liberation movements are all aggressive actions which are 
incompatible with the sovereignty of states and peoples24. 
Soviet insistence upon sovereign prerogatives still serves a protective 
function. The protective umbrella, however, has been expanded to include 
the members of the socialist commonwealth of nations, other socialist 
states, and the newly emerging states of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It 
also takes into account the possibility of interference in internal affairs by 
international organizations25. For example, efforts of the United Nations to 
delve into the events in Hungary in 1956 have been resisted on the basis 
of the sovereign principle of non-interference in domestic affairs reflected 
in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. Similarly, despite the 
continuing, bitter split between the Soviet Union and Chinese Communist 
Parties, the Soviet delegate opposed consideration of the Tibet question 
23. Bernard A. Ramundo; Int. Law in the Building of Communism, 1969, p. 87. 
24. Int. Lav/ (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), p.97. 
25. Bernard A. Ramundo; op. cit., pp. 94-95. 
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at the Twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations as 
an invasion of the sovereignty of the Chinese People's Republic. 
The Soviet initiative opposing intervention is meaningful only in the context 
of the double standard used to determine the legality of intervention—a 
prime example of unilateral characterization in the Soviet interests. The 
legality of intervention depends upon the type of state involved as, by 
definition, only capitalist states "intervene" in the internal affairs of other 
states. 
Intervention is the armed invasion or interference of one or several 
capitalist states in the internal affairs of another state aimed at 
suppression of a revolution, seizure of territory, acquisition of special 
privileges, establishing domination, etc26. 
The imperialist states have made repeated attempts to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the Soviet State and other socialist countries, and also in 
the internal affairs of countries which have freed themselves from the yoke 
of colonialism (Indonesia, the countries of the Near and Middle-East and 
others)27. 
The United States in its "shameful role gendarme of the World" is said to 
have a long tradition of intervention under the doctrines of Monroe and 
26. Ibid., p. 96. 
27. Ibid., p. 96. 
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succeeding Presidents28. In contrast, the socialist states are portrayed as 
opposed in principle to intervention because it negates the peaceful co-
existence of states. 
The Soviet Union and all peace loving states consider the principle of non-
interference the most important means of realizing the principle of the 
peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems and an 
effective means of developing collaboration between states29. 
When action comparable to intervention is taken by socialist countries, it 
can be characterize as fraternal assistance because, in the Soviet lexicon, 
intervention is defined as the exclusive sin of capitalist state. It can also be 
justified on the basis of the purpose served by the intervention. For 
example, assistance in the crushing of a popular uprising in a socialist 
country is not intervention since such as an uprising, being non-socialist in 
character, is not sanctioned by the principle of self-determination, the 
violation of which constitutes the principal Soviet criterion of the 
intervention barred by international law30. Similarly, the current anti-racist 
campaign has produced the soviet position that action in opposition to 
racism does not constitute intervention under international law31. 
28. ibid., p. 96. 
29. Ibid., p. 97. 
30. Ibid., p. 97 
31. Racism has been branded as a crime against peace and humanity. It has ceased 
to be a private affair of individual countries and nation. Responsibility for racist 
crime has also ceased to be a question of domestic, national jurisdiction and has 
acquired int. significance. 
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The Soviet doctrine of intervention has been described by a competent 
Western observer as opposed "in principle—to all forms of intervention 
with the exception of those which answer the aims of Soviet policy and 
which may be characterized in a different way"32. 
Soviet initiatives in this area reflect a residual defensism vis-a-vis the 
existing legal order, and the ever-present courtship of neutralist states in a 
bid for extra-camp support for the policy and law of peaceful co-existence. 
At the very least, these initiatives are part of a continuing propaganda-
diplomatic effort to maintain the integrity of the shield of sovereignty—in 
the United Nations context, the domestic jurisdiction limitation on its right 
of intervention [Article 2(7) of the Charter] and to neutralise or counter 
Western influence among neutralist states. More importantly, they reflect 
recognition that, if foreign policy objectives are to be realized, sovereignty, 
the key element in the law which is to assist in their realization, can not be 
used principally in a defensive role. 
The principle of non-intervention, a corollary of sovereignty, is similarly 
influenced by socialist internationalism. The essence of the new content 
provides the legal basis for interference in internal affairs in the greater 
interest of the socialist commonwealth. The basis for Soviet license under 
this formulation is provided by the complimentary position that the foreign 
policy of the Soviet state always coincides with the needs of socialist 
32. Bernard A. Ramundo; op. tit., p. 97. 
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internationalism and the interests of the proletariat of all countries . 
Thus, the socialist, more progressive content of the principle of non-
intervention is essentially a rationalization for the relationship of 
subordination by a large, powerful state of its smaller neighbors who have 
been sentenced by history and geography to a client-state status. 
Although the Soviets formally reject the legality of subversion, they 
approve of support to the forces of national liberation, and draw a self-
serving distinction between the two types of intervention. When 
insurgency favorable to Soviet interests develops, they openly support it 
under the general banner of assistance to national liberation movements. 
The Soviet vehemently deny that support for wars of national liberation 
constitutes a form of aggression or unlawful intervention34. 
On 16th September Victor Louis, The Soviet journalist who had scooped 
the fall of Khrushchev, wrote an article in the "Evening News" about the 
danger of war, which included the following passage: 
The Soviet Union is adhering to the doctrine that socialist countries 
have the right to influence in each other's affairs in their own interest 
33. Ibid., p. 104. 
34. The Soviet policy to support national liberation movements reflects the view that this tide of 
revolution, although not socialist in character can be used in the struggle against capitalism 
and its international manifestation, imperialism, as a means of weakening it by enlisting the 
support of the emerging states in combating it. The Soviet Union advocates the use of the 
every form of struggle for national liberation. The peoples' right to freedom and 
independence, whether established by peaceful means or in armed struggle in sacred. The 
Soviet Union gives comprehensive assistance to the peoples fighting with weapons in hand 
against imperialism and colonialism. (Pravda, June 28, 1965). 
76 
or those of others who are threatened. The fact that China is many 
times larger than Czechoslovakia and might offer active resistance is, 
according to Marxist theoreticians, no reason for not applying this 
doctrine35. 
After the intervention in Czechoslovakia, Soviet ideologues soon launched 
the doctrine of the "Soviet community". Thus Pravda, on September 25, 
1968, published the statement that "(each communist party) is responsible 
not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the 
entire communist movement. As a social system, world socialism is the 
common gain of the working people of all lands; it is indivisible and its 
defense is the common cause of all communists and all progressives in 
the world, in the first place, the working folk of the socialist countries". 
"People who 'disapprove' of the actions of the allied socialist states are 
ignoring the decisive fact that these countries are defending the interests 
of all, of world socialism, of the entire world revolutionary movement"36. 
Ul'ianovski and Kim, but also, with some reservations, the slightly less 
enthusiastic Solodovnikov. and Manchkha, all spoke of the "obligation1 or 
duty of the socialist world to help the national liberation movements. (Kim 
35. Robin Edmonds; Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-73, 1975, p. 50. 
36. Andrew M. Scott; "Military Intervention by the Great Powers", I. William Zartman 
(edited); Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact, 1970, pp. 98-99. 
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spoke of this as a "basic law")37. And starushenko provided the "legal" 
justification for the "right" of the socialist states to render assiatance38. 
They all argued that, by helping these movements, the socialist world 
would be better able to influence their future socio-political orientation. 
Although Starushenko, in providing the legal justification for outside 
support, appeared to be advocating even military intervention. Thus, he 
spoke of Soviet assistance of all kinds against the (imperialist) export of 
counter-revolution39. 
Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe: An Overview 
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which 
emerged after World War II was shaped by a complex of factors which 
almost defy comprehensive analysis. History, geography, culture, 
language, religion, psychological attachments, national character, and 
ideology have all influenced the development of the relationship, although 
the impact of each factor has varied considerably with the individual 
countries of Eastern Europe. In each case, the particular complex has in 
turn contributed to determining relations between Moscow and the 
different countries of Eastern Europe. Thus, some of these factors have 
served to bind the countries of Eastern Europe to Moscow, while others 
have served to alienate them. 
37. UTianovski; "Leninism, Soviet Experience", p. 18; Kim; Socialist World, pp. 18-19. 
as cited in Galia Golan; The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in 
the Third World, 1988, p. 215. ^^^t^dt^^ 
38. G. Starushenko; Int. Law and National Liberation", I n t e m a t i o j M f f f ^ ^ ^ o ^ ^ v X v 
(1983), p. 83. f * r \ K 
39. Ibid., p. 83. / f 
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Consideration of history and geography alone would appear sufficient to 
explain the special role for Moscow in this region. Geographically, the 
area has been a buffer zone between Russia and other major powers of 
central Europe for many centuries, and, for the past two hundred years, 
Russia has sought to assert a dominant influence in the region. Many of 
the Eastern European attitudes and perceptions were shaped by the 
events and circumstances of nineteenth century European diplomacy. 
Less than two hundred years ago, all of the nationalities of Eastern 
Europe (except the Serbs and Montenegro) were languishing under 
Ottoman or Hapsburg domination. The circumstances of their liberation 
and independence were to shape national attitudes toward Russia for 
many decades. 
Since all of the subject nationalities of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires 
in the region were either Slavic and/or Orthodox (with the exception of the 
Magyars who became a co-ruling nationality in 1848), the fact that Russia 
was the largest and most powerful Slavic and Orthodox state was 
destined to influence both Russia's diplomatic calculations and Eastern 
Europe's perceptions. Russia was instrumental in liberating the 
Rumanians, Bulgars, and Serbs and was eager to pose as the champion 
and potential deliverer of the Croats, Slovenes, Czechs, and Slovaks (all 
Catholic but Slavic) from Hapsburg domination. Thus was forged a 
symbiotic relationship between Russia and the Slavic/Orthodox 
nationalities of E a ^ f V & j r o p ^ p ± was manifested before World War 
i ( A9* \NTP. 
,\ 1 \ 
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in the Pan-Slavic movement that has in many ways survived the 
vicissitudes of revolutionary upheaval, social convulsions, elite hostilities, 
military occupation, territorial dismemberment, political subjugation, 
ideological conflict, and two World Wars. The Rumanians, being Orthodox 
but non-Slavic, have conflicting perceptions, for, while Russia was 
instrumental in freeing them from Ottoman rule, Moscow has insisted upon 
retaining Bessarabia, considered part of Rumania irrdenta. Hungary and 
Poland have traditionally viewed Russia both as a rival for power in the 
region and as an oppressor. This is particularly true of Poland, a Catholic 
Slavic nation, with its own proud history as a great power in the area, the 
bulk of whose population languished under Russian rule and oppression 
for over a century. 
The establishment of Soviet power in Eastern Europe can be seen, 
historically, as a continuation, perhaps the culmination, of a process of 
westward expansion began long ago under the Czars. Stalin's bargain 
with Hitler and their subsequent disputes left no doubt about the Soviet 
Union's interest and ambitions in Eastern Europe—whether for security, 
for imperial expansion, or for the cause of revolution—and those ambitions 
were not abandoned even when the Soviet State was fighting for its life 
and needed Western help. With the defeat of Hitler's armies and the 
creation of a vacuum in the region, it was inevitable that the Soviets would 
move in. The Western powers were not there; they were not able or 
prepared to contest Soviet moves except by ineffective protest. 
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It was not entirely clear, in 1944 and 1945, how much of the area the 
Soviets would insist on dominating, or whether they would be satisfied in 
some cases with influence short of domination40. 
As for Hungary and Balkans, Stalin's famous percentage deal with 
Churchill in 1944 documented his insistence on Soviet primacy in 
Romania and Bulgaria (in return for British primacy in Greece), while in 
Yugoslavia and Hungary, where he agreed to a more even division of 
influence with the West, he must have had confidence that the cards were 
stacked in the Soviet Union's favor. 
It is often said that the boundaries of empire were set by the lines reached 
by the Soviet armies in World War II and that their presence made 
possible the imposition of statellite regimes in Eastern Europe. The lines 
of occupation in Germany and Austria were set by international 
agreement, not by the circumstances of military positions at the end of the 
War (and Khrushchev later gave up the Soviet zone in Austria in 
exchange for neutralization of the whole country); Soviet forces did not 
occupy all of Czechoslovakia (and withdrew very soon, in 1945), passed 
through only part of Yugoslavia and did not stay, and did not enter Albania 
at all. 
40. Vojtech Mastny; Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of 
Communism, 1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 183-228. 
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The decisive events that established Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe 
were those that marked the seizure of political power by communist 
parties. The pace, pattern, and degree of Soviet involvement varied from 
country to country, taking account of local conditions. The Soviets were 
always prepared, however, to make their own conditions when necessary 
in order to bring about the desired result. The chosen instruments were 
the leaders of the local communist parties, some of whom returned to their 
countries in the baggage train of the Soviet armies, while others emerged 
from the anti-Nazi resistance. These leaders were helped from the start to 
gain a share of power, then to take full control by suppressing or coopting 
their erstwhile non-communist allies. 
The eight communist states of East-Central Europe, all maintained 
basically the same apparatus of party over state heirarchies, economic 
planning, censorship and the like. Albania is independent and anti-Soviet, 
Yugoslavia independent and more or less pro-Soviet, and Romania 
independent so long as it does not seriously offend the Russians. Five 
states may be called Soviet vassals; four (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Poland and Hungary) have Soviet military forces inside the home land. 
The Soviets have long regarded these countries as virtually theirs. A 
Soviet editor remarked in 1968 that "we" would not have elected Dubcek if 
it had been known what a "reactionary" he was. Asked if it was not the 
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Czechs who elected him, the editor said, "you know we run these 
countries. It is our duty, we are responsible for them "41. 
One component of the process which the foreign policy doctrine of the 
Soviet Union maintains will lead to the reshaping of the comparative 
strength of forces in the world is the growth of world socialism. It is noted 
with pride that the world socialist system covers one-third of the earth's 
surface and takes in one-third of the world's population. Apart from the 
Warsaw Pact and Comecon countries, the Soviets regarded Yugoslavia, 
North Korea, Laos and Cambodia as belonging to the world socialist 
system. The Comecon Countries rank as the centre of the socialist world. 
With slightly more than 10 percent of the world population they generate 
one-third of world industrial production, one fifth of world agricultural 
production and roughly one-quarter of world income42. At the Second 
Comintern Congress in 1920, the Soviet Union had promised that, in the 
cause of proletarian internationalism, the interests of the Soviet Union 
would also be subordinated to those of the international proletarian 
struggle. Infact, the reverse conclusion proved to be of greater political 
impact, namely that all socialist countries were obliged to give 
unconditional support to the Soviet Union in the name of internationalism. 
4 1 . John Scott; Detente through Soviet Eyes (New York: Radio Liberty Committee, 1974), p.85. 
as cited in Robert G. Wesson; Communism and Communist States, 1978, p. 144. 
42. A. A. Gromyko and P.N. Ponomarev (eds); Soviet Foreign Policy, Vol.2, 1945-1980, 
Moscow, Progress, 1981, p.521. 
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Up until the Second World War, no "socialist camp" existed. Only 
Mongolia was made into a satellite in 1921 with the help of the Red Army, 
although Soviet Russia had recognised the sovereign right of China to 
Outer Mongolia only a year before. 
Even after the Second World War, there is no evidence of a selective 
policy aimed! at creating a socialist world system on the basis of a general 
plan. There would have been three potential routes for such a plan to 
follow: 
1. The annexation of the Young People's Democracies to the 'Fatherland 
of Socialism'. 
2. The creation of regional unions of socialist states would have been 
less suspicious a route towards a large-scale socialist complex but this 
was again forbidden by Stalin—especially the plans for a federation of 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 
3. The organisation of unity through a network of bilateral relations 
between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. 
From 1939 to 1945, Stalin sought to regain for the Soviet Union the 
territory that had once constituted the Tsarist Russian Empire in 1914 with 
two exceptions : Poland and Finland. Although accepting separate Polish 
and Finnish States, Stalin was not prepared to recognise as final their 
frontiers as established after the First World War, not their right to follow 
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policies of enmity to the Soviet Union. The twin impulses of expanding 
Soviet power for its own sake and of creating a 'buffer' of greater security 
against the West motivated Soviet policies from 1934 to 1945. From 1939 
to 1940, Stalin achieved his territorial objectives in alliance with Hitler. 
In September 1939, the Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland and 
incorporated this territory some weeks later in the Soviet Union. As a 
result of the Winter War with Finland (November 1939- March 1940) the 
Soviet Union annexed Finnish territory of strategic importance. In June 
1940, Romania under Soviet pressure and on German 'advice' returned 
Bessarabia to Russian rule; in August 1940, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
were incorporated in the Soviet Union. In 1945, the Soviet Union retained 
all these gains of 1939-40 and added further relatively small but 
strategically important areas: Ukraine was acquired from Czechoslovakia, 
and thereby the Soviet Union regained a common frontier with Hungary 
which had been lost after the First World War. 
A complimentary aspect of Soviet policy was to ensure that those 
independent states on her borders still surviving should be friendly to the 
Soviet Union and closely linked to her politically, economically and 
culturally. Before 1939, only Czechoslovakia had pursued a policy of 
friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. Stalin's diplomatic methods 
were fore-shadowed in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, 12 
December 1943. By friendly neighbours Stalin meant states which would 
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be bound by political treaties to the Soviet alliance, whose military 
resources would be dominated by the Soviet Union and which would 
permit the stationing or entry of Soviet troops for mutual protection. 
The Soviet Union signed alliances with Poland on 21 April 1945 and with 
Yugoslavia on 11 April 1945, in addition to the Czech alliance already 
cited. During the first six months of 1945, under the aegis of the Red 
Army, communist-controlled Governments were set up in Romania and 
Bulgaria. In 1948, Czechoslovakia came under complete communist 
control. In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito had established his communist 
Government without Russian help. Denounced by Stalin in June 1948 for 
national deviationism, Tito successfully resisted all Soviet pressure. 
The Soviet Union concluded alliance treaties with Romania on 4 February 
1948, with Hungary on 18 February and Bulgaria on 18 March 1948. A few 
months earlier in September 1947 the Communist Information Bureau, 
Cominform, had been established with headquarters in Belgrade but with 
nothing really to do. Tito's successful defiance of Stalin's accusations, 
which Stalin had delivered through the cominform, soon made the 
Cominform totally ineffective, though as an organisation it remained 
formally into being until 1956. Soviet policy was laid down by the Party 
and backed by Soviet Army units, which could be used a last resort. 
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Western policies were viewed by Stalin as attempts under the leadership 
of the United States to revive in a new form a capitalist coalition of states, 
which would encircle the Soviet Union. Stalin saw in the same light 
Western protests over Russian Policy in the Soviet zone of Germany and 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin interpreted the Marshall Plan and 
American economic aid as attempts to revive capitalism among Russia's 
neighbours to the detriment of the security of the Soviet Union. But the 
event which most alarmed Central and Eastern Europe was the creation of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and German rearmament. The Soviet 
response v/as to form an alliance of communist states, ostensibly among 
equals, with joint responsibilities and mutual decision-making organs 
giving the appearance of equality. 
In Stalin's time, no one questioned the Soviet Union's complete control 
over its Eastern European domain; and no one ventured to rebel. The 
prestige of Stalin, the servility of the satellite parties, each with its little 
Stalin (Gottwald, Ulbricht, Rakosi, etc.) sufficed without direct military 
intervention. In 1953, Malenkov introduced a "New Course" for the 
satellites, paralleling relaxation at home. This was largely undone after his 
fall, but Khrushchev, and after him his successors, lacked strength to rule 
as Stalin did and had to depend much more on institutional, less on 
personal bonds. 
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Stalin was never reconciled with Tito, but it is significant that for nearly five 
years he lived with Tito's "intolerable" deviation. Meanwhile, he had to 
adjust Soviet military strategy to the loss, and tried to contain Titoism in 
Eastern Europe by a series of purges of the leadership, complete with 
show trials. It was left for Khrushchev, two years after Stalin's dealth, to 
make the grand gesture of reconciliation with Yugoslavia, a confession of 
Stalin's errors and his failure, and the beginning of a new Soviet approach 
to Eastern Europe. 
Actually, the process of change had already started before the 
reconciliation with Tito. The end of the Stalin era brought decompression 
and new departures both in the USSR itself and, as if by reflex action, in 
Eastern Europe. The new Soviet rules, as they sorted out the distribution 
of power among themselves and debated what should be done at home, 
called into question the state of affairs in the satellites as well. The New 
Course of liberalization and reform begun in Hungary in 1953, putting Imre 
Nagy at the head of the Government and clipping the wings of Matyas 
Rakosi, the old Stalinist, could not have originated in Budapest alone. It 
emerged from decisions made in Moscow. Comparable manifestations of 
the thaw took place in East Germany, Poland, and other states of the bloc, 
although in some the change was negligible. 
In seeking to maintain a reliable political base in Eastern Europe, Stalin's 
successors groped their way toward new relationships, acting to ease 
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tension and to dissociate themselves from failed and unpopular leaders 
but uncertain of their course, wavering between past practice and reform, 
and underestimating the extent of disaffection. The fact that individual 
Soviet leaders had differences with one another, and that their relations 
were linked to those between leaders and faction in the satellite states, 
contributed to the Soviet Union's surprise and unpreparedness when 
events began to spin out of control in Poland and Hungary in 1956. 
Khrushchev's regime was innovative, in Eastern Europe as in other 
aspects of his policy. He knew he had to find substitutes for Stalinist terror 
and coercion. Thus, an indeterminate gray area was allowed to develop 
around the old Stalinist standards of conformity. Within that area the 
Soviet Union permitted the East European regimes considerable leeway in 
coping with their own problems responding to domestic pressures, 
stressing national interests, or even quarreling with each other (as 
Hungary and Romania did over minority rights in Transylvania). 
Khrushchev introduced the concept of the socialist commonwealth, 
conceding that national conditions could differ on the road to socialism as 
long as essential Leninist principles were preserved. The idea was not 
purely propaganda, although ultimate power remained in the hands of only 
one member of the Commonwealth. The Soviet Union never accepted the 
concept of multiple centres of authority on idiology and doctrine, and 
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asserted the right to determine which policies were correct and which 
were revistionist. 
The transition to Brezhnev and Kosygin brought no indications of new 
departures in policy toward Eastern Europe. Again, however, the 
uncertainty of where power resided in Moscow in a transitional period 
raised questions in the minds of East Europeans. In the first year 
Brezhnev's primacy was not clearly established, nor were his positions 
known. Kosygin's prominence and the encouragement of new thought on 
industrial management pointed to the possibility of economic reform 
through out the Soviet bloc. 
The main purpose of policy is to have the East European states serve as 
assets, not as burdens or points of vulnerability, in the strategy of the 
USSR as a global power. From the very beginning it was made clear that 
Eastern Europe, won at a high cost in Soviet lives, is vital to the security of 
the USSR. Stalin saw the territory as a glacis providing defensive depth 
and protecting the Soviet Union from invasion not just by some future 
Hitler but by a present and powerful America. By the beginning of 1980s 
the nature of the Soviet Union's relations to the other socialist states and 
parties had changed by comparison to the seizure of power phase. At the 
end of 1940s, Stalin used to summon the party leaders to the Crimea. At 
the start of 1980s, the Soviet Union had to send out invitations to win over 
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the other socialist countries. In reality, however, the Soviet Union had a 
hard job winning over her allies' comprehension for this policy. 
Soviet Instruments of Intervention: 
The means of Soviet domination are various. Most obvious and perhaps 
most decisive are the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon), the Warsaw Pact and the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
1. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon): 
What the Cominform was designed to do in the way of enforcing uniformity 
in the "informational" sphere, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon) was intended to accomplish in the economic arena. Moscow 
has used Comecon to promote economic integration and thereby political 
stability and institutionalization of its authority in the bloc. A crude 
limitation of the European Recovery Program, it helped to ensure Soviet 
access to East European resources and to bind the economies of these 
countriefe more closely to that of the USSR. The Council on Mutual 
Economic Cooperation (Comecon) was formed in January 1949 largely as 
a response to the Marshall Plan. It too was an instrument under Stalin for 
economic exploitation, although its main activity was originally limited to 
coordinating trade among the satellites. The founding members were the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. 
They were joined subsequently by Albania (which broke away in 1961), 
East Germany in 1950, Mongolia in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam. In 
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1950, the rouble became the standard currency for international 
transactions within Comecon, making the USSR the arbiter of all rates of 
exchange. 
Under Stalin, there was no necessity for an effective regional organisation; 
the USSR was in physical control and preferred to maximize its 
exploitation on a bilateral basis. It felt no need to rationalize the Soviet-
East European economic relationship. Starting under Khrushchev in 1955, 
Comecon went through a period of gradual upgrading: information was 
pooled, economic agreements were placed on a five-year instead of a one 
year basis, and an atmosphere of bargaining replaced that of 
acquiscence. On December 14, 1959, Comecon adopted a Charter 
(heavily amended in December 1962 and June 1974) defining its 
purposes and organisational structure. Standing commissions deal with a 
wide range of subjects, from electric power and nuclear energy to financial 
problems and transportation. In institutional terms, Comecon came of age 
in the 1960's but actual integration has proceeded very slowly. 
At Khrushchev's behest, in June 1962, a programmic document, "The 
Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour", was 
adopted. In November, Khrushchev pushed for a supranational entity 
capable of rationalizing and transforming the economies of the bloc: 
We must move more boldly toward establishing a single planning 
agency for all countries that belong to the council for Mutual 
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Economic Assistance. This planning agency should be empowered 
to draw up joint plans and settle organisational questions so as to 
coordinate the development of the countries of the socialist 
system43. 
Economic levers also hold the Soviet sphere together. Under the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), trade and to some extent 
production and planning are co-ordinated and interdependence is created, 
so that any break with the bloc would require extensive and costly 
readjustments. Buy such means, an artificially large proportion of the trade 
of the satellite countries is with the Soviet Union and one another, from 
about half to four fifths in the case of East Germany and Bulgaria, the 
most loyal. These were several reasons in Stalin's foreign policy for this 
new institution44. 
1. The People's Democracies had been forbidden to accept aid under the 
Marshall Plan. Th.s negative step by Moscow had to be offset by 
positive incentives. 
2. A counterweight was to be created to the OEEC (later the OCED) of 
the Western European States. 
3. A co-ordination centre was required for the blockade measures against 
Yugoslavia following the break between Tito and Stalin. 
43. Pravda, November 20, 1962. 
44. Klaus Von Beyme; The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1987, pp.97-98. 
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4. The Sovietisation of the People's Democracies was to be pursued in a 
more systematic fashion. 
At first Comecon was little more than a paper organisation: it held only two 
meetings prior to the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953. After 1956 more life 
was breathed into the organisation, which the USSR sought to develop 
into a closed trading system under its control. But by the 1970s some 
members, notably Romania, Poland and Hungary, had succeeded in 
shaking loose to some extent from the restrictions of the system and built 
up sizable trading relations with capitalist economies. 
2. The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe 
Russia has always felt vulnerable to military pressure ever since its people 
tried to setup a national state in the vast plains of the northern parts of the 
Eurasian land mass. Lacking natural defenses, the Russians found their 
territory overrun by Tartars and Mongols from the east, by Turks from the 
South, and attacked by Poles, Swedes, French and Germans from the 
West. This experience fostered in the Russians a deep sense of the need 
to amass military power and to entrust their survival exclusively to their 
own military effort. 
These historical and traditional attitudes to military power and defence 
combine today with more recent political and ideological trends to form the 
current Soviet attitudes to military power. The preservation of the Soviet 
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system wherever it exists as well as the defence of the homeland and its 
client state are the first priorities of the Soviet armed forces. Defence 
issues have also played an important part in Soviet attempts to protect the 
frontiers of the USSR by establishing pro-Soviet regimes in neighbouring 
states close to the Soviet border, in other words, the longstanding Soviet 
tradition of the buffer zone. The most important of three zones, which was 
setup after the Second World War, is, of course Eastern Europe. Military 
power is also essential to the Russians in the maintenance of the status of 
the Soviet Union as a super power. 
In June 1953, the first of a series of upheavals among Russia's satellites 
was crushed in East Germany. The Post-Stalin period of flexibility over 
Germany drew to a close with the signature by the Western allies of the 
Paris Agreement, 23 October, 1954, which came into force in May 1955 
and which restored sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and 
provided for her entry into NATO. The Soviet response was to convene a 
conference in Moscow from 29 November - 2 December 1954 attended 
by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany), Poland. Romania and the Soviet Union. They 
jointly declared that if the Paris Agreements were ratified they would adopt 
measures to safeguard their security. On 6 May 1955, the day after the 
ratification of the Paris Agreements, the Soviet Union denounced the 
Anglo-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1942. On 14 May 1955, the same eight 
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communist states45 signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance known as the Warsaw Pact. 
It was not intended to be all-inclusive, and it did not extend to cover 
Yugoslavia (who had in effect excluded herself by her independent action 
in 1947), China, or the Asian Communist States. It was esentially a feature 
of the Soviet Union's European defence policy. Militarily, a joint Command 
was established and Marshal Koniev appointed to head it, with Deputy 
Commanders from all the Pact countries. This in effect legalized the 
stationing of Soviet troops in the satellite states, and no mention was 
made of the possibility of a future withdrawl. A Political Consultative 
Committee was also established, and though it was not known at the time 
what form this would take, it was important in that the Pact had some 
political content and there was a chance that non-Soviet voices might be 
heard. 
To promote bloc cohesion and integration, the Soviet Union increasingly 
relies on a number of multilateral institutions, most notably the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation (WTO; more commonly referred to as the Warsaw 
Pact). The Warsaw Pact was created on May 14, 1955, the day before the 
signing of the Austrian State treaty. Moscow decided that it needed a 
45. Albania had defected from the Pact in all but name as a result of her alignment with China. 
In December 1961, Soviet diplomats and aid were withdrawn and all political relations 
ended E3ut Albania can not be stressed as an example: She was able to follow such an 
independent course only because she had no Soviet troops on her geo-political position, 
because she had no Soviet troops on her territory, and because she was willing to align 
herself with the Great Power—still nominally aligned with the Soviet Union. 
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formal alliance binding the bloc together. In shifting from an exclusive 
reliance on bilateralism to a heavy emphasis on multilateralism, it was 
motivated by several aims. The first and most immediate, given the 
imminence of the treaty with Austria, was to find a way to legitimize the 
continued pressure in Hungary and Romania of the Soviet troops, until 
then justified on the basis of assuring lines of communication for Soviet 
occupation forces in Austria. The second, after Moscow had failed to 
prevent the FRG's rearmament and formal entry into NATO on May 9, 
1955 was to carry through on its previously announced intention to have 
Soviet-bloc countries "take common measures for the organisation of 
armed forces and their commands", and to create a counterpart to NATO. 
Third, Moscow wanted an effective instrument for safeguarding its interest 
in the area. 
Though formally a military alliance protecting the bloc against external 
threats, the Warsaw Pact mainly serves an intrabloc policing function. This 
has been acknowledged by Soviet General Sergei Shtemenko46, who 
shortly before his death in April 1976 wrote in an article commemorating 
the WTO's twenty first anniversary that alliance plays an important role in 
suppressing counter revolutionary activity against members of the 
"socialist community"; he mentioned Czechoslovakia as a case in point. 
The pact is also used by Moscow to pressure a reluctant member to go 
46 Alvin Z Rubinstein; Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global (2nd ed ) 
1958, p.102. 
97 
along with the consensus view, to persuade bloc members to join with it in 
isolating a dissident member (for instance, excluding Albania from 
participation because of its pro-Beijing policies from 1961 to 1978), to 
rebut Chinese accusations that the USSR is a disintegrating rather than 
integrating influence within the Communist world, and to encourage a 
sense of common interest among the members. 
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has many dimensions, including 
political, economic, and ideological factors. But most fundamentally, the 
Soviet stake in East Europe involves security considerations and is based 
on military power. The external and internal aspects of that military power 
have been inextricably linked since Stalin extended Soviet influence to the 
region in 1944-45. World War II demonstrated to Stalin and his successors 
the crucial importance of sufficient military power and secure border areas 
to counter opponents of the Soviet state. Security also implied, for Stalin 
and his successors, Soviet-style regimes in Eastern Europe. The reality of 
Soviet military power in Eastern Europe as a principal instrument of Soviet 
policy vis-a-vis Western Europe and as the ultimate guarantor of East 
European policies and regimes acceptable to the USSR has not changed 
—either infact or in the minds of Soviet leaders. As Leonid Brezhnev, 
objecting to the liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1968, told the 
Czechoslovak leadership at that time: 
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Your country is in the region occupied by Soviet soldiers in World War 
II. We paid for this with great sacrifices and we will never leave. Your 
borders are our borders. You do not follow our suggestions, and we 
feel threatened—we are completely justified in sending our soldiers to 
your country in order to be secure within our borders. It is a secondary 
matter whether or not there is an immediate threat from anyone; this is 
an issue of principle, which will hold, (as it has) since World War II, 
'forever'47. 
Soviet policy has been influenced by other factors as well. Soviet military 
forces in Eastern Europe serve a very real internal policing function, even 
though this role does not explain the numbers or (in most cases) the 
specific deployment of forces in the region. Soviet military power is the 
ultimate—indeed, the only real—guarantor of the stability and the very 
existence of the East European Communist regimes. 
The Warsaw Pact is t -nost important multilateral treaty between the 
communist states under Soviet leadership both militarily and politically. 
The treaty refers to a political consultative committee which has the power 
to setup auxiliary bodies. Militarily it formalized arrangements for Soviet 
control dating probably three years earlier to about August 1952, when a 
decision was taken to re-equip the satellite armies and place them under 
47. A. Ross Johnson; "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe" in Sarah 
Meiklejohn Terry (ed); Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, Yale University Press, New Haven 
& London, 1984, pp.255-56. 
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Soviet command. In accordance with the agreement reached in May 1955, 
the following January a United Military Command was established with 
headquarters in Moscow. A Soviet officer, Marshal Konev, became 
commander-in-Chief, and the Defence Ministers of participating countries 
were to be deputy commander-in-chief. Joint military exercises have been 
held in member countries since the autumn of 1961. 
At first the Asian communist countries-China, North Korea and North 
Vietnam—sent observes to the Warsaw Pact, but they withdrew by 1962. 
Albania excluded and withdrew after 1961, siding with China in the Sino-
Soviet conflict. 
In November 1956, Soviet troops crushed Hungarian resistance after the 
Hungarian Government of Imre Nagy on 1 November 1956, had seceded 
from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union moved back into Hungary just as 
the Western Suez involvement was reaching its culmination. 
The limitations of independence and of the alleged equality of Communist 
States were again exposed when on 21 August 1968, the Soviet Union 
and the other European Warsaw Pact countries (except Romania) acting 
as Socialist allies, invaded Czechoslovakia, itself a member of the 
Warsaw Pact. The reformist communist government of Alexander Dubcek 
was deposed, and a more pliant pro-Soviet regime installed. According to 
Pravda, the 'allied socialist' troops together with the Soviet Union, i.e., the 
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Warsaw Pact countries, had 'as solemn commitment—to stand up in 
defence of the gains of socialism'48. Participants of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization were involved, for to tolerate a breach in this organization 
would contradict the vital interests of all the member countries, including 
the Soviet Union. Although the Czech Government denounced the 
invasion as illegal and Romania also condemned it, Czechoslovakia by 
the end of August 1968, was occupied and forced to submit. The Soviet 
justification on the basis of limited sovereignty within the socialist 
community became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
3. The Brezhnev Doctrine: 
The Communist countries, notably the USSR have evolved a new socialist 
international law overriding the conventional law which takes into account 
new developments in international relations. Lenin first propounded this 
theory in February 1918, by stating that the interests of socialism are 
higher than the interests of the right of nations to self-determination. 
Within a few weeks after the march into Prague the method behind 
Brezhnev's madness became apparent: it is embodied in the doctrine of 
"limited sovereignty" of Communist countries, the "Brezhnev Docrine", as it 
has come to be known. 
48. J A. S, Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein, The major International Treaties Since 1945 
1987, p. 140. 
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It had been expressed in rather vague terms in the August Bratislava 
communique, then reiterated more precisely by a Soviet theorist using the 
pseudonym sergei Kovalev, in a 26 September article in Pravda. 
"There is no doubt", he wrote, "that the peoples of the socialist countries 
and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine 
their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must 
have damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental 
interests of other socialist countries, nor the worldwide worker's 
movement . This means that every Communist Party is responsible 
not only to its own people but also to all socialist countries and to the 
entire Communist movement—". 
In November, at the Polish Party Congress, Brezhnev formulated that 
doctrine more emphatically, underlying the "qualified sovereignty" of 
Communist countries and the USSR's obligation to intervene where 
"socialism is imperiled". In view of the fact that Moscow considers its own 
"model" of Communism as the only acceptable one, it follows naturally that 
Communism is "imperiled" whenever there is a deviation from the Soviet 
path49. 
The Soviet justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia appeared in 
Pravda on September 26, 1968. Quickly dubbed the "Brezhnev Doctrine", 
49. John Dornberg; Brezhnev: The Masks of Power, 1974, p. 229. 
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it proclaimed the inherent right of the Soviet Union to be the sole judge 
and jury of when the limits of permissible autonomy in the socialist world 
had been exceeded and to intervene as it saw fit to preserve socialism. 
While reaffirming the principle of "many roads to socialism", it insisted that 
no action "should do harm either to socialism" in the country or party 
involved 
or to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries and of their 
entire working class movement which is striving for socialism. This 
means that each Communist Party is responsible not only to its own 
people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire 
Communist movement—Just as, in V. I. Lenin's world, some one 
living in a society can not be free of that society, so a socialist state 
that is in a system of other states constituting a socialist 
commonwealth can not be free of the common interests of that 
commonwealth. 
The article warned that though every Communist Party is free to apply the 
basic principles of Marxism—Leninism, it is not free to depart from those 
principles or to adopt a non-affiliated attitude toward the rest of the 
socialist community: 
// should be stressed that even if a socialist country seeks to take an 
"extra bloc" position, it in fact retains its national independence 
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thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth—and 
primarily to its chief force, the Soviet Union—and the might of its 
armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system 
has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, which cannot be 
indifferent to this. Thus, the anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia 
were in essence using talk about the right to self-determination to 
cover up demands for so-called neutrality and the CSR's withdraw! 
from the socialist commonwealth . The Communists of the 
fraternal countries naturally could not allow the socialist states to 
remain idle in the name of abstract sovereignty while the country was 
endangered by anti-socialist degeneration. 
Two months later, speaking in Poland, Brezhnev declared: 
Affirmation and defense of the sovereignty of states that have taken 
the path of socialist construction are of special significance to us 
Communists And when external and internal forces hostile to 
socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in 
the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat 
arises to the cause of socialism in that country—a threat to the 
security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—this is no longer 
merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, 
the concern of all socialist countries— Let those who are wont to 
forget the lessons of history and who would like to engage again in 
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recarving the map of Europe know that the borders of Poland, the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia, as well as of any other Warsaw Pact 
member, are stable and invoilable. These borders are protected by 
all the armed might of the socialist commonwealth50. 
According to the Brezhnev Doctrine, Socialist countries cannot go beyond 
the communist orbit. Therefore, if any socialist country wants to be 
independent of Soviet influence, other Communist countries have a right 
to intervene'31. 
The USSR's intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 deplored by 
all right thinking people of the world, and only proved that, until a more 
equitable order was established, the smaller states would only serve as 
factors in the grand design of the super powers52. 
50. Francis Anthony Boyle; World Politics and International Law, p. 278. See Richard J. 
Erickson; International Law and Revolutionary State, 1972, pp. 68-69. 
5 1 . See Soviet Land, December 1968. 
52. M. P. Tandon, Shorter International Law (5*1 ed). 1975, p. 87. 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNITED STATES' POLICY OF INTERVENTION 
Introduction: 
American foreign policy has always included contradictory attitudes and 
practices with respect to intervention. Early US policy developed into the 
full-blown 'Monroe Doctrine' of 1823 around the notion that the New World 
ought to be free from intervention from the Old. In order to discourage 
European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, however, the United 
States asserted the right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American 
countries in a fashion that expanded significantly throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, in American foreign policy, 
as in that of most states, there emerged a basic ambivalence about 
intervention in the affairs of other states. Where as the principle of non-
intervention tended to be asserted more prominently, the principle of 
justified intervention as a right, and even a duty, was also to be found in 
American foreign policy from an early date. Today we still find this 
ambivalence in the international system, within all blocs and groupings of 
states. Non-intervention is the rule, but it is frequently claimed, my state or 
my side ought to be allowed to make exceptions to the rule in the form of 
permissible or justified interventions. 
The United States very early assumed the right of hegemonial intervention 
in the Western Hemisphere, its claims limited mainly by the modest 
dimensions of American power before the twentieth century. Typically, in 
the fashion of great powers, the United States in this century expanded its 
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definition of areas of vital interest to include most parts of the world, and, 
accordingly, has been tempted to intervene in the affairs of states far from 
the shores of the Western Hemisphere. 
Since the Second World War, however, the term 'Communist' has been 
used to justify US intervention against a variety of regimes with widely 
differing ideologies and relationships with the Soviet Union, including 
Arevalo's Guatemala, Mossadeq's Iran, Goulart's Brazil, Sukarno's 
Indonesia, Caamano's Dominican revolutionary junta, as well as insurgent 
movements in Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia. 
Indeed, from the Truman Doctrine' on, the suppression of insurgent 
movements has remained a principal goal of US foreign policy. It has been 
the prime target of the US foreign-assistance program, most of the funds 
for which have gone for civic-action teams, pacificatin programs, support 
for local police, and, above all, military aid to the local army \ 
In other words, US policy is to support governments that promise to 
revolutionize their societies from above, although, as the continued 
support of military dictators and reactionary regimes demonstrates, this is 
scarcely a requirement. US officials, some as advisers to local police. 
others as Green Berets attached to local armies, assisted governments to 
put down insurgent movements in Guatemala, Thailand, and elsewhere in 
1. See Agency for International Development, Special Report Prepared for the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee: US Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1956 
(Washington, D C , 1967). 
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Latin America and Africa2. 
Counter-insurgency continues to be the major preoccupation of US 
military planners3. Consequently, during the postwar period, on the 
average of once every eighteen months, US military forces or covert 
paramilitary forces have intervened in strength in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America to prevent an insurgent group from seizing power or to subvert a 
revolutionary government. 
In 1965 an American expeditionary force was sent to Vietnam and Marine 
divisions landed in the Dominican Republic to prevent insurgents from 
taking power. Such major commitments demanded a clearer articulation of 
US policy. "Revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal 
with", President Johnson declared as he ordered the Marines to Santo 
Domingo. "It becomes a matter for hemispheric action only when the 
object is the establishment of communist dictatorship"4 The "Johnson 
doctrine" merely stated more explicitly and honestly an American policy 
that had in fact persisted since the end of the Second World War: the 
United States will oppose where it can or where it dares the establishment 
of new communist or communist-leaning governments, whether they come 
into being through foreign invasion, domestic revolution, or election. 
2. Richard J. Barnet; Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World, 1972, 
p.22. 
3. In 1971 the United States, despite the Vietnam withdrawals, still had 803, 901 soldiers in 110 
countries, according to a Pentagon public affairs spokesman. As cited in Richard J. Barnet, op. 
cit., p.22. 
4. Statement of Lyndon B. Johnson, May 2, 1965, quoted in Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New 
York. 1967), p.232. 
108 
Insurgent movements with radical programs, Marxist rhetoric, communist 
connections of any kind, or an anti - American bias are simply assumed to 
be the product of conspiracy by the 'forces of international communism'. 
Earlier, in March 1954 John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, 
persuaded the Organization of American States (OAS) to pass a 
resolution declaring that "the domination or control of the political 
institutions of any American State by the International Communist 
movement, extending to the Hemisphere the political system of an extra 
continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political 
independence of the American States "5. 
Communism is so blatantly an international and not an internal affair, 
its suppression, even by force, in an American country by one or of 
the other republics would not constitute an intervention in the internal 
affairs of the former6. 
The presence of a communist element—even the possibility of 
subsequent communist take over—justifies US intervention. As President 
Johnson put it at the time of the Dominican crisis, "The old distinction 
between civil war and international war has lost much of its meaning7". 
5. US Department of State, Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala (Washington, 
D.C 1954), p.69. 
6. Spruille Braden, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, quoted in 
John Gerassi; The Great Fear in Latin America (New York, 1965), p.241. 
7. Lyndon B. Johnson, Address at Baylor University, May 28, 1965, quoted in Ronald Steel; op. 
cit, p.233. 
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Faced with the unprecedented phenomenon of revolutionary violence 
erupting in pockets scattered across three continents, US officials have 
attempted to squeeze it into a familiar-framework with a set of ready 
explanations and old solutions. The framework is Great Power aggression, 
which, as the Second World War demonstrated, could be launched on a 
global scale and carried out by the subtle techniques of the Fifth Column. 
The tested remedy is the application of overwhelming military force. When 
it become clear that the costs of the counterinsurgency war in Vietnam 
exceeded all possible gain to the United States, the interventionist 
strategy was overhauled. The Johnson Doctrine was discreetely replaced 
by the "Nixon Doctrine". 
The shock of the Vietnam War has compelled changes in interventionist 
strategy. The official lessons of this searing national experience are 
embodied in the "Nixon Doctrine" around which a new foreign policy 
consensus seems to be forming. The Nixon Doctrine proclaims the end of 
the era of indiscriminate American "world responsibility". The United 
States will 'lower its profile' by encouraging 'indigenous' troops to fight 
each other with American weapons or where possible by resorting to 
automated war through the technology of the 'electronic battlefield'. The 
goal is to preserve American positions in the world through more judicious 
management of military power without involving the American people in an 
interminable, ambiguous war in which large numbers of Americans 
continue to get killed week after week. 
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Intervention and US Practice: 
The legal logic employed by the United States to support its use of 
intervention historically has been couched in the articulation of presidential 
doctrines. Accordingly, these dicta have significantly shaped the US legal 
attitude towards the permissibility of intervention. 
The foundation of US interventionist policy in the Third World rests in the 
Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt Corollary. As initially stated by 
President James Monroe in his message to Congress of December 2, 
1823, the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed that the American continents were 
no longer considered by the US government to be appropriate subject for 
future colonization by any European powers; that the countries of Europe 
must not seek to extend their political systems to Western Hemisphere8; 
that the United States would not interfere in the affairs of any current 
European colony on dependency in the Western Hemisphere; that the 
United States would remain neutral in the war between Spain and newly 
independent governments of South America, but not to the point of 
permitting a reimposition of Spanish rule; and, finally, that the United 
States would continue to obey the dogma of Washington's farewell 
address by preserving its neutrality in the affairs of Europe except when its 
rights were seriously jeopardized. Intended as a unilateral pronouncement 
of US policy in dealing with the incursion or threat of incursion by European 
8. The Text of the Monroe Doctrine is reprinted as "Monroe's Seventh Annual Message to 
Congress", in James D. Richardson; ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents, 1789-1897, Vol. 2, pp. 207-20. 
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powers into the Western Hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine came to be 
regarded as a defense doctrine, or what one commentator dubbed the 
"American doctrine of self-preservation"9. Moreover, the Roosevelt 
Corollary, articulated by President Theodore Roosevelt in his Annual 
Message to Congress on December 6, 1904, expanded the scope of the 
Doctrine by making the United States a self-appointed international 
policeman, providing a unilateral justification for increased intervention into 
the affairs of Latin American countries. 
Important to realize is that neither doctrine drew its validity from any 
legislative pronouncement, nor from any international treaty instrument. 
Nor was the ambit of jurisdiction or application of either doctrine ever 
precisely defined by specific law or fiat. Indeed, both doctrines were 
applied historically on an adhoc basis, in circumstances determined by the 
perception of US policy makers, to explain the government's rationale for 
taking certain interventionist actions. In short, from the mid-nineteenth 
century through the early portion of the twentieth century, both doctrines 
were held out as pillars of US foreign policy and, accordingly, were 
invoked periodically to justify unilateral interventions taken in the name of 
defending the Americas from European intrusions. For example, in the first 
three decades of the twentieth century, the United States intervened 
militarily on some sixty occasions in several smaller Caribbean and Central 
9. Donald M. Dozer; ed., The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modem Significance (New York: Knopf 1965), 
P-4. 
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American States10. In all these cases, little diplomatic consideration or 
formal concern was expressed by the United States about the 
international legal implications of these interventions or the critical attitude 
of other states. 
Since World War II, the US perception of aggression (that is, legally 
impermissible intervention) has been couched largely in terms of 
evaluating and containing communist intentions, capabilities and 
strategies through out the Third World in general and the Western 
Hemisphere in particular. Communist influence upon the domestic politics 
or governmental structure of a state may occur by friendly or hostile 
means. In either circumstance, an unstable situation in the region may 
intimate that a state is the victim of indirect communist aggression. Such a 
conclusion may be viewed as threatening to the US security zone. This 
perception has historically produced reactions by the United States to 
provide military supplies to a receptive government (or political faction) in 
order to redress the communist threat. The temptation to engage in 
military intervention of one form or another has been more likely to rise as 
the perceived threat to US security interests escalated. Important is that 
many of the fundamental principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine 
have continued to influence US interventionist policy in the Western 
Hemisphere. Indeed, the fundamental policy motive contained in the 
10. John Gerassi; op. Cit, p.231. 
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Doctrine—intervention for self-defense—was resurrected and reactivated 
in post-World War II foreign policy doctrines. 
The Johnson Doctrine derived from the episode in late April 1965 when 
the United States sent 21,000 troops to restore civil order in the 
Dominican Republic. The principal legal rationale for the action came to be 
self-defense—more accurately, anticipated national security 
considerations—against the perceived threat of communism being 
established in the Dominican Republic. The scope of the doctrine in the 
Western Hemisphere was expanded in 1958 by the Eisenhower Doctrine 
and US intervention in Lebanon to foster stability in that country. The 
Eisenhower Doctrine in effect authorized US military action to prevent a 
communist takeover of Middle Eastern countries. As a consequence, both 
doctrines during the 1960s came to designate US efforts to counter 
perceived communist threats in regions considered to be of significant 
foreign policy interest to the United States11". 
During the 1980s, the administration of President Ronald Reagan 
articulated its own policy dictum to reinforce and expand this central 
theme of stifling communist intrusion into the Americas in particular and 
the third World in general. Under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States 
indicated that it would aid and support paramilitary "freedom fighters" 
11. Peter J. Schraeder; ed., Intervention in the 1980s - US Foreign Policy in the Third World, p. 
200. Also see Abraham F Lowenthal; The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge. Harvard 
University Press, 1972). 
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engaged in armed struggle against repressive totalitarian regimes of the 
left, including guerrilla movements in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and 
Nicaragua. Citing the legal rationale for the doctrine, President Reagan 
noted in his February 6,1985 State of the Union Address: 
We must stand by our democratic allies. And we must not break faith 
with those who are risking their lives — in every continent, from 
Afghanistan to Nicaragua — to defy Soviet - supported aggression 
and secure rights which have been ours from birth. 
The Sandinista dictatorship of Nicaragua, with full Cuban Soviet- bloc 
support, not only persecutes its people, the church and denies a free 
press but arms and provides bases communist terrorists attacking 
neighboring states. Support for freedom fighters in self-defense and 
totally consistent with the OAS and UN charters12. 
As Marxist encroachment is presumed in globalist fashion to be instigated 
by the Soviets in concert with its allies (such as Cuba in southern Africa 
and Nicaragua in Central America), the legal edict of self-defense is 
perceived by Washington policymakers as applicable. In the case of US 
aid to the anti-Sandinista contras in Nicaragua, for example, The Reagan 
Administration has gone to some lengths to justify its interventionist 
actions on legal grounds of self-defense, noting that Soviet-led communist 
intrusion is real, ongoing, illegal, and threatening to regional interests 
12. "State of the Union Address", Reprinted in Washington Post, February 7, 1985, p. A16. 
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in general and US interests in particular13. 
The evolution of US foreign policy doctrines—from the region-centric 
Monroe Doctrine to the seemingly worldwide edict of the Reagan Doctrine 
—underscores a progression of US legal logic justifying US interventionist 
practices in the Third World. The common factors linking these various 
doctrines are several: First, each doctrine was issued unilaterally, leaving 
the United States as their only interpreter. Second, the United States 
insisted upon retaining the sole, exclusive right of interpretation for 
activating these doctrines for determining when they were necessary, the 
dimensions of that need, and where they should be applied—as 
conceived in terms of US diplomatic and security interests. Third, the 
unilateral character of these doctrines points up the guiding concept of the 
"free hand". This refers to the notion that although the United States might 
be willing to act in concert with other states in the world, it reserves for it 
self the right to make the decision if, when, and under what circumstances 
any action would be under taken. Finally, these doctrines explicitly have 
worked to fix a pervasive conviction in US foreign policy during the 
twentieth century—namely, that the continued independence of states in 
the Third World from communist control is a diplomatic vital interest of 
the United States, a vital interest that the US government should be 
13. See Christopher C. Joyner and Michael A Grimaldi; "The United States and Nicaragua: 
Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention", Virginia Journal of International 
Law, Vol., 25:3, 1985, pp. 621-689. 
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prepared to protect with force and by military intervention if necessary. 
Accordingly, these foreign policy doctrines have largely shaped the US 
legal attitude towards the permissibility of intervention. Yet, the legal 
dimension of these doctrines is grounded in notions that are drawn neither 
from US domestic law nor from international law. In fact, the US public's 
historical view of presidential doctrines has been that they are special 
legal edicts bestowing upon the United States the singular right to take 
certain interventionist actions throughout the Third World. Such an 
attitude, however, much it appears appropriate for US national interests, 
falls short of keeping up with the international legal norm of non-
intervention. These doctrines are not real tenets of international law; they 
are merely political instruments of self-defense, to be applied exclusively 
by the United States as that government alone defines and construes 
each case in the Third World14. 
The most important common factor under pinning these presidential 
doctrines is that they are all couched in international real politik rather than 
in consensual international law. That is, although stated in terms of legal 
justification of self-defense, these doctrines cannot perforce convey 
unilateral legal license to the United States to impinge upon the national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of any state in 
14. See Christopher C. Joyner; "The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the 
Lawfulness of Invasion", American Journal of International Law, Vol., 78, 1984, pp 131-44. 
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the Third world. To argue otherwise is to suggest the right of the United 
States to supersede the limits of self-defense and thereby mutate these 
doctrines into potential instruments for legitimizing the use of U.S force 
throughout the Third World. The explicit view of international law clearly 
rejects the propriety of any such self-serving legal percepts. Yet, the lack 
of an overarching international enforcement mechanism (that is, reliance 
on voluntary adherence by individual states to international law) has 
ensured that states sometimes adopt legal license to interpret international 
law such that it serves their own interests. 
The key legal facet of the Reagan Doctrine as implemented in Nicaragua, 
for example, centres around the rationale of US self-defense and the 
related need to preempt Nicaraguan - sponsored armed aggression 
against El Salvador. However, serious questions surface over the 
applicability of Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify the US interventionist 
role. In short, the legal notion of self-defense does not include the 
unilateral right of an outside power to intervene against the territory of an 
aggressor state. Even if it were proven that the Sandinista government 
was transporting significant amount of aid to rebels in El Salvador — 
patently illegal under international law - any responsive action by the 
United States nevertheless the less should neither be taken against the 
Sandinista government nor conducted in Nicaraguan territory. According 
to international law, the United States should instead limit its actions to 
assisting the government of El Salvador in putting down the insurgency in 
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its own State. Though this limitation may seem inherently unjust, providing 
opportunities for the instigating culprit, international law sanctions neither 
the notion that "might makes right" nor that "two wrongs make a right". 
Moreover, an implicit justification of US intervention into Nicaraguan affairs 
has been the necessity to preserve for Nicaraguans their inherent 
democratic rights under international law to choose their own form of 
government. As a result of the absence of an international legal 
enforcement mechanism, states have developed a practice of violating 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, often with impunity. This justification for 
intervention, however, presumes that the principle of self-determination 
(the right of individuals in a country to choose their own form of 
government) carries more weight than the principle of non-intervention. 
That the principle of self-determination out weights the principle of non-
intervention is difficult to prove, particularly because UN Charter law is 
silent on the matter, and neither scholars nor governments have 
embraced such a position. As one author has noted, such a view "would 
introduce a new normative basis for recourse to war that would give 
powerful states and almost unlimited right to overthrow governments 
alleged to be unresponsive to the popular will or to the goal of self-
preservation15. When one realizes that the Reagan Administration's main 
15. Oscar Shachter; "The right of States to use Armed Force", Michigan Law Review Vol 82 
1984, p.649. ' ' 
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foreign policy goal in Central America was to limit the hegemonial and 
ideological influence of the Soviet Union - while concomitantly projecting 
US political values it becomes quite evident that antithetical 
governments will disagree over the meanings of "popular" determination 
and "democratic" rule. The end result seems to be that spheres-of-interest 
politics are seriously impinging upon the ability of international law to 
maintain world order in general and regional order in Central America 
more specifically. Although this result is not new, it underscores the clear 
departure of the international system of the 1980s from that envisioned in 
the UN Charter. 
Indeed, the case of Nicaragua under scores how U.S policy makers, when 
US doctrines clash with international legal edicts handed down by 
international bodies, have been able to ignore these edicts with relative 
impunity. On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua submitted a formal application -
charging illicit intervention by Washington in Nicaraguan affairs - before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which instituted proceeding against 
the United States. The application alleged that US support of anti-
Sandinista rebels and its mining of Nicaraguan harbors violated applicable 
norms of international law. On May 10, 1984, the ICJ issued an interim 
ruling, holding that the United States should respect the sovereign 
independence of Nicaragua and that it should refrain from supporting any 
further anti-Nicaraguan paramilitary activity. The Reagan Administration 
agreed with the ICJ's decision regarding the prohibition against mining 
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Nicaraguan harbors and stated that such practices had been terminated in 
late March and would not be resumed. The administration maintained, 
however, that the ICJ actually lacked proper jurisdiction to render a ruling 
because " the United States had suspended its agreement giving the 
Court to right to rule concerning Central America, and that Nicaragua itself 
had no right to plead because it never filed the instrument of ratification 
required to officially accept the Court's judgement"16. The United States, 
therefore, did not consider itself legally bound to the ICJ's second ruling 
regarding cessation of paramilitary support for the contras. 
Although the ICJ ruled that it did have proper jurisdiction over the US -
Nicaragua dispute and that the Nicaragua had the legal right to plead its 
case, the Reagan Administration announced on January 18, 1985, that it 
would boycott further proceedings dealing with the subject as presented in 
the court. The State Department, supporting the boycott, argued that the 
"conflict in Central America is not a narrow legal dispute; it is an 
inherently political problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution. 
The conflict will be solved only by political and diplomatic means—not 
through a judicial tribunal17. Irrespective of how unenforceable the ICJ's 
decision may be, it nevertheless constituted a significant statement about 
armed intervention and other international legal issues. In challenging the 
ICJ's jurisdiction and subsequently abandoning its proceedings, the United 
16. P.J Schraeder, op.cit, pp 202-3. See also "Nicaragua Takes case Against US to World 
Court", New York Times, April 10, 1984, p. A1. 
17. See Christopher C. Joyner and Michael A Grimaldi, op. cit., pp. 621-89. 
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States called into question the sincerity of its commitment to a public 
international order under the rule of law. 
When seen retrospectively in light of the Iranian hostage case, and the 
attempt at that time by the United States to uphold ICJ as a crucible of 
international justice, it becomes clear that by turning away from the court, 
the United States lost legal credibility, appeared diplomatically 
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disingeneous, and allowed Nicaragua to gain a propaganda advantage in 
view of its lawful appeal to the international legal forum. By refusing to 
appear before the ICJ and make public evidence that could substantiate 
the real aggressor in Central America to be Nicaragua, the Reagan 
Administration effectively fostered the inescapable conclusion that it had a 
weak case. This generated a pervasive impression that the United States 
had something to hide and, accordingly, that it may have been guilty of 
some wrongdoing. In sum, the course of action chosen by the Reagan 
Administration suggested that the Central American situation was 
assessed predominantly in terms of strategic interest and national security 
implications, with scant attention to international legal considerations. 
In its December 1989 invasion of Panama, the Bush Administration 
identified four "objectives" of the action. In addition to the two legal 
justifications asserted—self-defense and the protection of the Panama 
Canal—the Administration mentioned to other goals motivating its 
decision to act in Panama: the promotion of democracy in Panama and the 
capture of General Noriega for trial on drug trafficking charges18. The 
18. John Quigley; "The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama" The Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol 15, No. 2, Summer 199f\ pp 276-315. 
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justifications asserted by the United States found scant support in the 
international community, which widely criticized the invasion of Panama as 
a violation of international law19. By a vote of twenty to one — the sole 
negative vote being that of the United States20 — the Organization of 
American States (OAS) adopted a resolution which said that members 
"deeply regret" the invasion, called for the withdrawl of US forces, and 
supported "the right of the Panamanian people to self-determination 
without outside interference". 
In the United Nations Security Council, a majority voted for a draft 
resolution declaring that the intervention violated international law, though 
vetoes by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France killed the 
resolution21. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution, 
75-20, to "strongly deplore" the intervention and to demand the immediate 
withdrawl of United States forces from Panama22. Clearly, the majority of 
States considered the action to be unlawful. 
Finally, the invasion of Panama was even more unfortunate because it 
occurred in a period in which super power tension has eased, reducing 
military conflict in the developing world. For the past several decades the 
United States had claimed that East-West confrontation provided a 
political justification for itsmilitary interventions in Central America. But 
19. Ibid; p. 314. 
20. OAS Votes to Censure US for intervention; Washington Post, December 23, 1989, p. A7. 
21 . Two Delegates Vying to Be the Voice of the New Government, NY. Times Dec 29 1989 p 
A12. ' ' 
22. UN Assembly Blasts Invasion of Panama, Washington Post, Dec. 30, 1989, p. A 17. 
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military interventionism by the United States in Central America antedated 
the East-West contention, and the Panama invasion demonstrated that it 
has outlived it. 
The Bush Administration continued America's past interventionist policies 
in the post-Cold War era. First, a large chunk of the Bush Administration's 
defense budget for fiscal year 1991 was allocated for forces optimized for 
Third World intervention. Second, the Bush Administration had continued 
four wars-by-proxy against leftist Third World regimes and movements 
(Cambodia, Afghanistan, El Salvador and Angola), long after a Cold War 
rationale for fighting disappeared. Third, during the latter half of 1990 the 
Administration deployed a large military force to the Persian Gulf, and it 
used this force in early 1991, to expel Iraq from Kuwait, which Iraq had 
seized on August 2. By January 1991, about one-fourth of all American 
military personnel and two-fifths of America's ground units, were 
deployed23. 
Throughout the cold War, proponents of US intervention have made two 
principal claims: that third World interventions protect American security 
by preserving the global balance of power24; and that interventions 
promote democracy, thereby promoting human rights25. Both arguments 
were false in the past, are false now, and would remain false even if the 
23. Stephen Van Evera; "American Intervention in the Third World; Less Would Be Better, 
Security Studies, Vol. 1, No 1. Autumn 1991, pp. 1-24. The Administration also began an 
intervention in Peru in early 1990, and has sustained lesser American involvement in civil 
conflicts in Guatemala and the Philippines 
24. For examples of such thinking from JohnFoster Dulles, Hubert Humphrey, Eugene Rostow and 
others, see F. M. Kail; What Washington Said: Adm. Rhetoric and the Vietnam War 1949 -
1969 (New York' Harper & Row, 1973; pp 84-116. Also see Lars Schoultz; National Security 
and US Policy towards Latin America (Princeton 1987) pp. 201 - 281. 
25. See Stephen Solarz: The Reage-i Doct' re and Beyond (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 1 - 6 
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Soviet Union regained its strength and returned to an aggressive foreign 
policy. 
The national security argument for intervention rests on three main 
assumptions: 
1. The Soviet Union seeks an empire in the Third World. 
2. It could gain such an empire, either by direct intervention or by 
sponsoring the expansion of proxies, unless the United States 
intervenes to stop it. 
3. Such an empire would add significantly to Soviet military strength, 
ultimately tipping the world power balance in the USSR's favor, thus 
threatening American national security. 
The failure of all three assumptions creates a redundant and therefore a 
very strong, case against intervention. Moreover, the latter two 
assumptions were false before the Gorbachev revolution and would 
remain false even if that revolution were reversed. Hence the security 
case for intervention was very weak before Gorbachev appeared, and 
would remain very weak even if the changes he instituted were swept 
away In short, no national security justification exists for US commitment 
to Third World intervention. 
During the 1980s, proponents of intervention supplemented security 
arguments with claims that American interventions promote democracy. 
This argument fails on both logical and historical grounds. 
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The historical record shows that past US interventions have generally 
failed to bolster democracy. These interventions have more often left 
dictatorship than democracy in their wake. Moreover, Washington has 
often subverted elected governments that opposed its policies, and many 
US supported "democratic" governments and movements were not at all 
democratic. Over all, this record suggests that US lacks the will and the 
ability to foster democracy. In short, American leaders have favored 
democracy only when it produced governments that supported American 
policies. Otherwise they have sought to subvert democracy26. 
The Clinton Administration initially gave good reason to think that it would 
act forcibly to promote human rights and democracy. Less than three 
weeks after the new administration took the office, Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher spoke of a "broader imperative" moving the President 
"to become actively and directly engaged in the multilateral effort to reach 
a just and workable solution" to conflicts in the Balkans27. Something had 
to be done to reverse the image of a President whose backing down over 
Bosnia surely contributed to a successful resistance to American power in 
Somalia, which in tern presumably emboldened the Chinese, then the 
Haitians, next the North Koreans, and finally the Cubans to test American 
intentions. 
For an intervention such as that in Haiti to be more than a political quick fix 
26. The prerequisites for democracy are discussed in Robert A. Dahl: Polyarchy: Participation and 
Opposition (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1971). pp.48-188; and Seymour Martin Lipset: Political 
Man the social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkius Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 27-63. 
27. Tony Smith: -'In defense of Intervention ", Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, No. 6.1994 pp. 34-46. 
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for the administration, however, it should be done with the intention of 
promoting democracy and strengthening the ability of international 
institution to defend human rights in different part of the world. 
The advent of democracy through out the Western Hemisphere holds the 
promise of bringing political and economic stability to Latin America and, 
in the process, to serve at once America's commercial interests, the need 
to control its borders, and the goal of creating a community of feeling that 
might one day rival that which now exists with much of Europe. In his 
speech of September 15, 1994, President Clinton declared his 
determination to restore Aristide to power: 
History has taught us that preserving democracy on our own 
hemisphere strengthens America's security and prosperity. 
Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize 
our region, and more likely to create free markets and economic 
opportunity and to became strong, reliable trading partners, and they 
are more likely to provide their own people with the opportunities that 
will encourage them to stay in their nations and to build their futures. 
A serious problem with making support for human rights and democracy a 
corner stone of American foreign policy is that the American people 
generally require a clear statement of the national interest before they will 
support prolonged and costly interventions. And calling on the nation to 
rally round the flag simply for the sake of doing good for others has never 
persuaded many Americans to respond. 
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In Eastern Europe, Central America, and the Caribbean, the establishment 
of democratic governments holds the best promise of stability and the 
emergence of states feeling a community of interests with the West. A 
forward-looking policy in defense of human rights and democracy in these 
circumstances in not only morally appealing, but it is also in the security 
interests of the United States. 
United States' Instruments of Intervention: 
The tools of US domination are various. Most obvious and perhaps most 
decisive instruments of intervention that have been employed by the 
United States in the pursuit of foreign policy goals are given below: 
1. Economic and Military Aid. 
2. Economic Sanctions. 
3. Covert Intervention 
4. Paramilitary Intervention 
5. Direct Military Intervention. 
1. Economic and Military Aid: 
Since World War II, the United States has provided more than US $ 200 
billion in bilateral (that is, government-to-government) economic 
assistance. Most of this money officially has been intended to promote 
economic development in other nations, either by underwriting specific 
projects or augmenting foreign treasuries. Tbe United States has also 
extended roughly US $ 120 billion in bilateral grants and loans to 
recognized governments (in contrast to guerrilla movements) for avowed 
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security purposes. The largest program is Military Assistance Grants, 
which provides cash to other nations to enhance their defense. Moreover, 
the largest share, 25 percent or more, of the nearly US $ 235 billion worth 
of multilateral (that is, international organization-to-government) economic 
assistance during the post-World War II period has come from the United 
States. Almost 75 percent of that money has gone through the World Bank 
and its two affiliates, the International Development Association and the 
International Finance Corporation. Other assistance has been channeled 
through the three regional development banks, the United Nations 
Development Program, and other UN agencies28. 
This flood of cash has thrust the United States into the affairs of virtually 
every other nation on earth, and, increasingly since the World War II, 
those nations comprising the Third World. In fact, although the United 
States most directly and effectively asserts its power through military 
force, foreign assistance has affected far more countries on a more 
frequent basis. However, the benefits of the US $ 375 billion (roughly US $ 
870 billion in 1988 dollars) spent on foreign aid since World war II are less 
clear: Many developing states have been moving back-ward economically; 
well-subsidized US allies have been overthrown; and funds have 
continued to flow to nations that regularly oppose US interests abroad. 
28. See Peter J. Schraeder; op. cit.. pp. 63-83. 
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Once the United States decided to try to enforce Pax Americana in the 
aftermath of World War II, foreign aid became an integral part of US 
interventionist policies. Although military force was considered to be the 
ultimate guarantor of US interests, financial and technical assistance was 
perceived as a less expensive and less intrusive means of reshaping the 
global order, especially throughout the Third World, in the US image. 
Over the years, foreign aid priorities have varied sharply, both in terms of 
recipients and types of assistance. The consistent theme underlying the 
program for five decades, though, has been a commitment to promoting 
US economic, security, and political interests, however these are defined. 
Foreign aid has often been presented to the US public and advertised to 
the world as selfless humanitarianism: in reality, nationalistic goals have 
always been dominant. 
Through out its history, foreign aid has been assumed to achieve its 
objectives. Indeed, its very name—foreign 'aid' or 'assistance'—implies 
that the program's overall results are salutary. Yet, the actual benefits of 
foreign aid for US foreign policy are debatable. Temporary humanitarian 
assistance has alleviated some suffering, but aid programs like Food for 
Peace have often done more harm than good. Financial flows to poorer 
states have underwritten some good projects but have also left a string of 
expensive white elephants across Africa and other nations. And although 
these are few plausible success stories in which assistance has spurred 
economic growth, disastrous examples abound in which US and other 
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Western aid has subsidized corrupt, autocratic elites as they destroyed 
their economies in the pursuit of their narrow self-interests. 
Foreign assistance is also viewed as a means of stabilizing Third World 
states that face social unrest, thereby advancing US security interests. 
Yet, strengthening incumbent regimes that suppress moderate opposition 
forces may ultimately be destabilizing US support for dictatorships in 
Nicaragua, Iran, Haiti, and the Philippines only seemed to make their rules 
more intransigent, thereby hastening their downfall. Some defense goals 
have been achieved through US assistance, but the programs directed at 
enhancing the military prowess of other nations have often been devoted 
to countries that can afford to defend themselves or are of dubious 
strategic value. Moreover, although an unending stream of foreign aid may 
buy political influence with other countries, Washington's promiscuous use 
of assistance has ensured that most states receive funds irrespective of 
their actions. Most important, access bought today may very well lead to a 
closed door tomorrow, as revolutionary regimes turn against the United 
States for helping to keep a prior government in power. 
Overall, foreign aid has been successful as an instrument of intervention 
in one sense: It has thrust the United States into the affairs of the majority 
of other nations around the globe. But whether the impact of that 
involvement has been beneficial or has achieved official US Foreign Policy 
goals is quite different matter. 
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2. Economic Sanctions: 
Economic sanctions—defined here as the deliberate government-inspired 
withdrawl, or threat of withdrawl, of customary (rather than contractual) 
trade or financial relations between two or more countries—have enjoyed 
widespread application as an instrument of intervention. Such sanctions 
typically involve reducing or even eliminating the flow of goods and / or 
money between a sender country, the country imposing sanctions, and a 
target country. 
The United States has been the dominant user of sanctions in the 
twentieth century. As of autumn 1988, US economic sanctions were in 
force against Chile, Ethiopia, South Africa, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, 
and Panama; in addition, long - standing trade embargoes were in place 
against Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam. The United States has taken the 
lead in imposing sanctions in 69 of 103 episodes occurring between 1914 
and 1983 and has targeted Third World countries in 48 of these, 
successfully 42 percent of the time in those Third World cases29. Closer 
examination of the record, however, reveals that the effectiveness of the 
US sanctions of the Third World declined substantially after 1973, even as 
the frequency with which sanctions were imposed greatly increased. 
Although approximately 50 percent of the cases involved sanctions 
against Latin America, almost a quarter targeted the Middle East or South 
Asia, with the rest centering on countries in Africa and East Asia. 
29. See Gary Clyde Huf bauer and JalTery .1. Schott: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current 
Politics [Washington, B.C.: Institute for International Economics. 1985). Also See Peter J Schraeder on 
cii.. pp. S5 - 99, : ' ' 
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In attempting to shape the post war world and its liking, the United States 
did not hesitate to use economic leverage to coerce, even destabilize 
uncooperative governments. Sanctions' efforts in the first twenty-five years 
after World War II focused on moderating—or failing that, overthrowing— 
nationalists, often left-leaning leaders in newly independent countries. In 
nearly half of the episodes in this period, the United States sought to 
destabilize governments led by such leaders. Another third of these cases 
involved relatively modest goals, including several aimed at settling 
disputes over expropriated or nationalized property (also a source of 
conflict in half of the destabilization efforts). Sanctions twice accompanied 
US military efforts and on two other occasions were used in attempts to 
influence military conflicts in which the United States was not directly 
involved. 
Despite the relative success that economic sanctions have achieved on 
average since the end of World War II, their effectiveness has declined 
substantially since the early 1970s. Approximately 64 percent of the 
episodes involving US sanctions against the Third World between 1938 
and 1972 were at least partial successes, compared to only 22 percent 
during the period 1973 - 1988. 
The newly industrializing countries of East Asia—Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan—successfully adopted a strategy of 
export-led growth and have become important trading partners of the 
United States (as such, they may be subjected to sanctions for economic 
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rather than political reasons), with growth rates that are the envy of the 
world. Ivlany of the Latin American countries, favorite targets of the past, 
have also successfully penetrated the US market, while diversifying their 
sources of supply for goods and finance. 
Although the United States rightly recognized that it was in its interest to 
assist in the reconstruction and further development of the world economy 
after World War II, it does not seem to have recognized that the 
subsequent growth of healthy and powerful competitive economies would 
entail a parallel reduction in its leverage relative to other countries and, 
thus, in its ability to influence them. The circumstances in which US 
economic leverage may be effectively applied have narrowed, and 
success will increasingly depend on the subtlety, skill, and creativity with 
which it is exercised. 
3. Covert Intervention: 
Covert action is, by definition, a foreign policy instrument based upon 
secrecy and deception. Note the CIA's official definition "Covert action is a 
special activity conducted abroad in support of United States foreign policy 
objectives and executed so that the role of the United States government 
is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Covert action is distinct from the 
intelligence-gathering function. Covert action often gives the United States 
an option between diplomatic and military action"30. 
30. Intelligence: The Acme of Skills (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Affairs. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1982 ), p.28. as cited in Peter J. Schraeder, op. cit.. p.101. C 
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This one official paragraph captures the essence of and rationale for a 
policy of maintaining the ability to intervene covertly in the politics of the 
Third World countries. The "special activity" referred to in official document 
has included secret propaganda, manipulation of foreign electoral 
processes, overthrowing of governments, secret financial assistance, 
paramilitary operations, and assassination of political leaders. The secrecy 
required for covert action makes it difficult for an outside analyst to 
describe in authentic detail the past and, in particular, the recent 
application of this instrument. Often, only the tip of iceberg is visible. In 
describing such a variety of supposedly secret activities, one must, 
therefore, proceed by making inferences from known facts, speculating, or 
relying on undocumented accounts. At the same time, the pluralism of US 
Institutions and special interests makes secret-keeping a nearly 
impossible challenge for foreign policy decision-makers and secret 
operators. Consequently, many, if not most, of past US major covert 
operations have not remained secret. 
The covert action option for foreign policy implementation exists along a 
conceptualized "scale of coercion". It is one thing to give a little aid and 
comfort to US friends in strategic Third World areas. It is quite another to 
change a regime by the direct action of plotting to overthrow its leaders, 
perhaps by assassination. Indeed, the most extreme (coercive) form of 
covert action represents a foreign policy instrument just short of war. The 
four primary types of US covert action are assassination plots, coups 
d'etat, election intervention, and propaganda and psychological warfare. 
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Political assassination of a foreign leader is the most extreme form of 
covert action and it usually part of a greater goal to change the existing 
government of the target country. Documented evidence provided by 
Church Committee investigators brought home the reality that 
assassination had been regular instruments of US foreign policy31. Little 
doubt exists, however, that the CIA was to some degree involved in a 
number of assassination plots, including efforts to murder Fiedel Castro in 
Cuba, Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Colonel Abdul Kassem in Iraq. The 
CIA was also associated with conspirators who plotted the death of Rafael 
Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, and 
General Rene Schneider, Army Chief of Staff, in Chile. 
The United States has been more successful, at least in the short-run, in 
staging coups d'etat against foreign governments deemed inimical to US 
interests. The first documented example in the Post-World War II period 
was CIA-directed overthrow in 1953 of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mosaddeq and his replacement by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahalvi. A 
second example of US covert intervention against a. democratically 
elected leftist regime in the name of anti-communism in Chile. President 
Richard M. Nixon stressed the removal of Allende by a US - induced 
military coup d'etat. In 1973, Allende indeed was killed during a successful 
military coup d'etat. 
US Congress. Senate, Church Committee. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" An 
Interim Report, no.94 - 465.94th Congress. 1975. As cited in Peter J. Schraeder, op. cit. 
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Assassinations and coup d'etat were the exception in the CIA's program of 
covert action during the cold war years. Other forms of covert action, such 
as interference with the electoral processes in areas of perceived strategic 
importance to the United States, were more common. In addition to the 
Chilean case, Italy, although not a Third World country, provided the 
classic documented example of US intervention in the electoral process in 
target lands, and one that would become the blueprint for future US 
intervention of this type in the Third World. US secret intervention in the 
1958 Italian election was, in words of its director, William Colby, "by far the 
CIA's largest covert political action program under taken until then, or 
indeed, since"32. Indeed, one author has described various episodes of 
US election intervention in countries as diverse as Brazil, British Guiana, 
The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, Nicaragua, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam33. 
The least coercive tool of covert action is propaganda/psychological 
warfare. Since the early 1950s, the United States has maintained a dual 
track for propaganda overseas: an open program, implemented by the 
United States Information Agency (USIA), and covert activities, most often 
performed by the CIA. A 1977 survey in the New York Times34 disclosed a 
number of details about the CIA's propaganda activities in the Third World 
at large. For example, at peak of such activities, the CIA "Propaganda 
32. William Colby: Honorable Men; My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978 ), p. 109. 
33. Ibid . Chapter A For a description of Various episodes of election intervention, also see William Blum 
the CIA. A Forgotten History (London: Zed Books. 1987). 
34. Terrence Smith. '-Secret CIA Propaganda Overseas". New York Times, December 25-27. 1977. 
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Assets Inventory" listed over 800 news and public information 
organizations and individuals that were on its payroll. 
4. Paramilitary Intervention: 
Paramilitary intervention is defined as US economic and military aid to an 
armed insurgency intent on overthrowing a government deemed inimical 
to US Foreign Policy interests and represents a proxy utilization of force in 
situations in which policymakers have decided that direct US intervention 
would be counterproductive. In short, use of this instrument allows US 
policymakers to carry a war to the territory of another nation while at the 
same time avoiding the most costly aspects of that war—American 
casualties. The agents of US paramilitary wars have included both existing 
guerrilla insurgencies and US-organized exile invasion forces. Usually 
implemented covertly under the banner of anti-communism, paramilitary 
intervention generally has revolved around the provision of military 
weaponry through CIA-contracted airlines and the organization and 
training of insurgents by CIA personnel in allied nations adjacent to the 
target country. 
This foreign policy instrument was used most often, though not 
exclusively, during the 1950s and early 1960s and included such varied 
cases as Angola, Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, and Tibet. It was not 
until the 1980s, however, that paramilitary intervention became a 
comprehensive, coherent, and overt instrument of US intervention in the 
Third World. During its time in office, the Reagan Administration 
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committed the United States to supporting guerrilla insurgencies 
attempting to overthrow Soviet-supported regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, and Nicaragua, all under the rubric of what has become known 
as the Reagan Doctrine. For the first time in post-World War II history, the 
United States publicly adopted and implemented a program that went 
beyond traditional containment and embraced instead the need to role 
back already established communist Third World regimes35. 
An overview of this tool's use in the post-World War II period provides that 
paramilitary intervention can be highly successful if the US goal is to 
harass or otherwise disrupt the normal political or economic proceedings 
of a Third World country. There is no doubt that support for UNITA has 
contributed to severe disruption of Angola's economy or that support for 
Tibetan guerrillas delayed China's consolidation of control over the 
disputed territory. 
If the goal of paramilitary intervention is to overthrow the government in 
question, however, the results have been less positive. Only in the case of 
Guatemala in 1954 — a democratic government with powerful domestic 
enemies, most notably a disenchanted military — did the United States 
succeed in overthrowing a government considered inimical to US foreign 
policy interests through paramilitary means. In all other cases, the 
paramilitary option has fallen short. 
35. The Reagan administration did not dogmatically follow ideological criteria, as it refused to support 
anticommunist guerilla insurgencies in Ethiopia and Mozambique. For an analysis of the Reagan 
Doctrine, see Jeane Kirkpatrick. the Reagan Doctrine and US Foreign Policy, (Washington D C : 
Heritage Foundation, 1985). See also Ted G, Carpenter; "US Aid to Anti - communist Rebels: the 
Reagan Doctrine and Its Pitfalls." Cato Institute Policy Anah sis. no 74, June. 24, 1986. 
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5. Direct Military Intervention: 
Direct military intervention in the affairs of Third World countries has been 
a crucial component of US foreign policy throughout the twentieth 
century36. The scope of such coercion is quite significant. Cambodia, 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Iran, Korea, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Iraq have all experienced the 
application of US military might at various times. Certain characteristics of 
military intervention have remained surprisingly constant during the 
century, whereas others have changed in significant ways, especially 
since the end of World War II. 
US leaders typically employ force to prevent political instability in 
important client states and to install or preserve regimes considered 
friendly to perceived economic and security interests. It is somewhat ironic 
that the United States, a nation that once symbolized revolutionary 
republican values, now seems obsessed with maintaining "stability" in the 
world. Nevertheless, US actions throughout this century, and especially 
since the onset of the cold war rivalry with the Soviet Union, have 
exemplified the objectives of a conservative status quo power. In virtually 
every case in which Washington has resorted to military force, it has done 
so to prop up clients — including several highly authoritarian ones — or to 
36. There is an important distinction between the use of major military actions as an instrument of 
foreign policy and more limited applications of force for other purposes, e.g. the Mayaguez 
incident of 1975 and the abortive Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 were relatively minor 
military actions in which there were few underlying foreign policy objectives. Conversely, the 
1983 Grenada invasion had elements of a hostage rescue—and the Reagan Adm. went to 
great lengths to portray it as such—but principal aim was the overthrow of a Marxist-Leninist 
regime 
140 
thwart radical insurgencies. The emphasis on the sanctity of stability has 
always been rather selective, however. US leaders have rarely hesitated 
to foment coup d'etat or employ direct military action against incumbent 
governments deemed hostile to US interests37. 
37. For detailed discussions of destabilizing US tactics, see Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: 
The Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984); Richard H. 
Immerman, the CIA in Guatemala. The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin. Univ. of Texas 
Press. 1982). 
CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERVENTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD: AN OVERVIEW 
Intervention in International relations is not a new phenomenon. From the 
ancient Greeks to the present time, there have, always, been some states 
who intervened in other states in various ways, and by different means. 
The past and the present history is repleat with examples showing that 
generally the strong states have intervened in the affairs of the weak. 
In fact, there have, always, been strong and weak states in the world. And 
the strong have, always, tried to evolve such systems in which they can 
protect their interests. And wherever they felt their interests are 
threatened, they have intervened. Pax-Romana and the Pax-Britannica 
were the systems to protect the Roman and the British interests. They did 
so by evolving the systems of law in which their interests could thrive and 
by providing the military might to defend the systems1. 
In the period of colonialism, the European powers intervened almost every 
where or where ever they liked—considering and justifying it as their 
imperial prerogative. The continent of Africa, they justified, did not 
constitute the part of the civilized world, and, therefore, the rules of non-
intervention did not apply there2. The continent, not being civilized 
according to them, became an area where any act was permissible and 
1. Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World, 1972, 
p. 15-32. See also Robert L Rothstein; The Weak in World of the Strong: The Developing 
Countries in the International System, 1977, p. 12. 
2. James Lariner, The Institute of the Law of Nations, Vol. 1, 1983, Edinburg, pp. 226-230. 
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justified by them for themselves. The situation in Asia and Latin America 
was not quite different from the African continent. America, which itself 
was a colony of the British Empire became one of the strong powers in 
international system after getting independence in eighteenth century. 
And, it very frequently started resorting to the use of intervention in its 
relation with other countries. From 1813 to 1928, writes Offut, America 
dispatched its troops abroad for at least seventy times to protect its 
nationals or in other words its interests3. A report entitled "Instances of the 
Use of US Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945", also lists nearly 160 
occasions when the United States used its armed forces, over whelmingly 
in the Countries of the Third World4. It is to say that the use of intervention, 
throughout the history, by some states in the affairs of other states, has 
been a very common phenomenon. 
Where the phenomenon of intervention in international relations has been 
very common, the question about its legitimacy and illegitimacy, 
justification and non-justification have also been raised. And respect to the 
rules of non-intervention commonly in the form of lip-services has always 
been paid. This also happened when the system of balance-of-power 
based, among other things, on the right to intervention in the interest of 
3. A. Offut; The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the US, Washington 1928 
pp. 12ff. 
4. L S Stavrianos; Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age, 1981, pp. 462-463. From 1900 to 
1925, US intervened in China and Honduras seven times each, Panama six times, the 
Dominican Republic four times, Columbia, Mexico and Cuba three times each, and once each 
in Morocco, The Philippines and Syria. 
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peace and security collapsed with the outbreak of World War I. Greater 
significance began to be attached to the idea of forbidding intervention. 
And this idea became one of the most respected but, unfortunately, also 
one of the most violated principles of International law5. In fact, the rules of 
non-intervention never restricted the interventionary actions of strong 
powers whenever they intended to intervene either for the protection of 
their interests or the protection of whatever they thought necessary. 
Richard J. Barnet very aptly observes that, "there is nothing exceptional 
about powerful countries asserting their imperial prerogative of using force 
or coercion on the territory of another without its consent"6. His 
observation seems to be echoing the famous saying of the Athenian 
Empire that strong do what they can and weak do what they must. The 
situation did not change even after the outbreak of the World War I.. 
Intervention for many powers remained available as one of the 
instruments of their foreign policy. 
After the World War II, much attention in the Charter of the United Nations 
was given to the principles of non-intervention, asking states to adhere to 
these principles in their post-war relations. However, their relations do not 
show that these principles have not been violated. In fact, they have been 
violated and violated at large. Hans J. Morgenthau, observing the post-
war interventionary situation, writes that there is nothing new in the 
5. Ranko Petkovic; "Right to Intervention", Review of International Affairs, Vol. XLII, June 5 1991, 
p. 1. 
6. Richard J Barnet; op. cit, pp. 261-62 
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contemporary doctrine prohibiting intervention or in the pragmatic use of 
intervention by individual states on behalf of their interests. He finds 
the post-war interventionary situation merely as the continuation of a 
tradition which was established in the nineteenth century7. So, states 
continued to resort to intervention in their post-war relations much in the 
same way as they as they have been doing in the past. 
In the wake of the World War II, some very significant changes took place 
in the world. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the only 
major world powers leading the two ideologically conflicting blocs - the 
Socialist East and the Capitalist West, former dominated and led by the 
Soviet Union and the latter by the United States8. The process of 
decolonization also began, and most of the Third World which was divided 
among the few European powers gradually became independent. But the 
process of decolonization was followed by another kind of colonization: 
neo-colonialism, a system of indirect domination and control to maintain 
economic domination and subordination of tne Third World9. S. D. Muni, 
observing the situation writes that "the Third World was not born as a 
free and autonomous entity''10. In fact, the economic, political and other 
7. Hans J. Morgenthau; "To Intervene or Nor to Intervene", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 3. April 
1967, p. 426. 
8. It is not intended here that the ideological rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United 
States and European powers was non-existent before the World War II. In fact, the ideological 
rivalry came into being with the establishment of USSR in 1917. It put them on collision course. 
However, the rivalry became more manifested in international relations after the end of World 
War II, especially with the beginning of 1950s. 
9. See for details: Woddis; introduction to Neo-Colonialism, New York. Internationa! Publishers, 
1967; Gunnar Myrdal; The Challenge of World Poverty, New York Pantheo Books 1970 pp 
72-73. 
10. S. D. Muni; "South Asia " in Mohammad Ayoob (ed.); Conflict and Intervention in the Third 
World, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980, p. 38. 
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interests of the former colonial and the newly emerged major world 
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, remained involved in the 
Third World. And in order to protect their interests, they began to resort to 
other means to keep the Third World in their domination and control 
indirectly than directly which was only possible through the maintenance 
of colonialism. This system of indirect domination and control is being 
practiced through a variety of measures both repressive such as overt 
armed intervention, covert destabilization, bolstering of unfavorable 
regimes as well as non-repressive such as economic help, technological 
domination and arms transfer. It is to say that the liquidation of colonialism 
was taken over by neo-colonialism. In other words, the colonialists never 
gave up; instead they are continuously doing the same thing as did in the 
past, but now through neo-colonialism, not colonialism. 
The post-war international system is a continuation of the old system of 
exploitation and domination11. The old system which began with 
colonialism was effectively maintained throughout the world during the last 
11. L. S. Stavrianos; op cit, p. 456. Also see Roberto Remo Bissio; Third World Guide, 89/90, 
Uruguay, Argentina, p. 13; Mohammad Ayoob; "Superpowers and the Third World: Prospects 
for the 1980s", IDSA Journal. Vol. XIII, No. 3, Jan. - March 1981; M. Zuberi; "Intervention. 
Deve'oping Countries in the International System", Contemporary Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, Jan. -
March 1988, p. 7. The Third World nations after getting independence felt that they have got 
rid of colonial domination and are free to shape their own destinies. But the harsh realities of 
international system dominated and controlled by the big powers forced them to surrender to 
other kind of domination. They even after decades of their formal independence, find 
themselves severely restrained to exercise their sovereignty as nation states. In fact, the'Third 
World nations did not play any role in the evolution of international system. They were part of 
the colonial empires who actually are responsible for the structuring of international system. 
The Third World nations by and large find themselves at the bottom of the international order. 
However, despite various efforts of the Third World nations to have their voice felt in 
contemporary international politics, the fundamental character of international system is still 
determined by big powers. 
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two centuries by the European colonial powers with Great Britain at the 
helm of affairs up to the end of World War II. After wards, the global role 
which was being played by the Great Britain was taken over by the United 
States12, with a marked difference that there also emerged an ideologically 
different power, the Soviet Union, aspiring to color the whole world with 
socialism. So, it started to rival the United States as the world power, 
ending the optimistic expectation of one world harmonized by American 
rules of conduct and capitalism. 
Whatever these powers wanted or the values they preferred to be 
globalised, patterns of behavior they chose for reward and punishment, 
created and dominated the world politics. These two powers, since the 
end of the World War II, had extensively, been involved in all kinds of 
interventionary activities throughout the world to extend their areas of 
influence. Great Britain and other European powers have also remained 
involved in defending their colonial sphere of influence. The other note 
worthy development is that regional powers like South Africa and China 
and small countries like Pakistan, India, Israel and Libya have also been 
interfering in the affairs of the neighbouring countries. 
The end of the World War II presented opportunities both for the United 
States and the Soviet Union to shape or to reshape the world according to 
12. L S. Stavrianos; op cit, p. 458. See also Hans J. Morgenthau: op. cat., p. 426. After the World WV I 
the United States gradually replaced the Great Britain, especially in the Western Hemisphere. And after 
the World War II it became the undisputed leader of the Capitalist World. 
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their ideological preferences. The United States struggled for the 
maintenance and the expansion of the old capitalist system. The Soviet 
Union desired the reshaping of the World on the Communistic/Socialistic 
lines. They started competing each other through out the world and soon 
the Third World became the battle ground for their competition13. Further-
more, the never-ending intra and inter-states military, ethnic and religious 
conflicts and economic weaknesses of the Third World countries provided 
them opportunities to exploit these situations to protect and extend their 
respective political and economic values or, in other words, to control and 
dominate the Third World14. Along with them, Great Britain and France15 
have also exploited the Third World on the same lines: fishing into the 
troubled waters of the Third World. 
These powers in order to achieve their desired objectives, resorted to all 
kind of activities both overt and covert. Comparing the American and the 
Soviet ideological rivalry with the Seventeenth Century religious wars, 
Hans J. Morgenthau writes that it "does not respect national boundaries. It 
finds enemies and allies in all countries, opposing the one and supporting 
the other, regardless of the niceties of international law. Here is the 
dynamic force which has led the two super powers to intervene all over the 
13. T. B. Miller; "Conflict and Intervention" in Mohammad Ayoob (ed); op. cit., p. 6. See also Jasjit 
Singh; "North-South Contradiction and the Security of the Non-Aligned Countries" USI 
Journal, Vol. CXVII, No. 493, July-September, 1988, p. 215. 
14. L. S. Stavrianos; op. cit. P. 459. 
15. The East and West blocs were dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States 
respectively. But in case of East bloc, no country, other than USSR, has powers projection 
capability where as in West bloc along with the United States, Great Britain and France both 
have it and can project that far beyond their immediate territories. 
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globe, sometimes surreptitiously, sometimes openly, sometimes with the 
accepted method of diplomatic pressure and propaganda, sometimes with 
the frowned upon instruments of covert subversion and open force" . 
They have, most often, resorted to coercive ways and means or have 
threatened to do so wherever they perceived threats to their respective 
interests. The coercive methods employed by them to protect their 
interests in the Third World could be compared to those undertaken by the 
Roman and the British Empires during hey days. They are the same in 
one way or the other. The difference is that they have become more subtle 
and less visible but equally effective these days. 
Before the World War II, most of the Third World was under colonial rule. 
And the decolonialization process which began after the war was followed 
by the super powers' struggle for establishing their influences and 
domination in the world. Further more, out of their struggle was born a 
process which initiated, encouraged and contributed to the arms build up 
activities in the Third World. The conflict prone nature of the Third World 
provided sustenance to the armament activities in the region, and great 
leverage to the superpowers to extend their influence. The arms sales and 
assistance became the vital instruments of their foreign policies17. Other 
major powers who also happed to be major arms manufacturers like Great 
16. Hans J. Morgenthau; op. cit., p. 429. 
17. Farley, et al; Arms Across the Sea, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D C 1978 p 2 
See also R Rama Rao; "Arms Supplies as an Instrument of Foreign Policy" USI Journal 
April-June 1975, pp 125-46; Gibert; Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military and Diplomacy' 
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1969. 
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Britain, France, China etc., got involved in arms build-up activities in the 
Third World. Along with encouraging armament activities they, especially, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, also struggled for establishing 
their military bases in different parts of the Third World. An important 
aspect of this struggle was to destabilize the Third World countries for 
ensuring that a pliable ruler stays in power in a client state or for toppling a 
ruler pursuing independent foreign policy or supposed to be close to either 
one of the super powers. Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, a well-known author of 
Pentagan Papers, has observed that smaller or less powerful countries 
towards which USA is ill-disposed are considered to be either aligned with 
or have received aid from the Soviet Union18. Arms sales and assistance 
have been effective instruments of superpowers' foreign policies, for the 
extension of their respective power and influence in the Third World. 
Arms sales, other than being an instrument for extension of power and 
influence, also subserve the economic interests of the sellers by earning 
foreign exchange, subsidising arms build-up research and development 
cost and enabling the arms producing countries to clear their stocks of 
obsolete weapons. Additionally, sellers acquire influence over the policy 
makers in the Third World countries that buy or receive arms. Another 
aspect of arms sales and assistance is that in some cases arms sales or 
assistance is provided especially to enable the recipient to pose security 
18. Nuclear Armaments: An interview with Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, Berkley, California, 1980, quoted in 
R Rama Rao; " Developing Countries: Threats to their Security", India Quarterly, Vol. XLII, 
No.1, Jan. - March, 1986, p. 55. 
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threats whether by being able to launch a full-scale attack or by acting as 
a launching pad for covert or guerrilla operations in a neighbouring 
country. In either case, the arms supplies' intention would be to coerce the 
targeted country19. Further more, the supply of sophisticated weaponry 
also make the recipient states dependent on suppliers for training their 
personnel and for manning and maintaining such sophisticated weapons. 
This in turn provide opportunities to the suppliers to extend their influence 
among the military personnel and elites of the recipient countries. The 
United States alone trains military personnel in some 150 bases and 
training schools, and send mobile units and advisors in the client states for 
the purpose20. Over 200,000 Latin American military personnel have been 
trained in US. And since 1949, over 35000 Latin American officers have 
been trained in the schools for the Americans only: a school identified in 
Latin America by its historic function as the school of Coups21. 
The supply of sophisticated weaponary by the Soviets has also made 
some of the recipient countries dependent on them for training their 
personnel and for manning and maintaining such equipments there by 
providing opportunities to the Soviet Union extend its influence among the 
military personnel and elite of the weapon receiving countries, such as 
Somalia, Egypt and Afghanistan. Training of military personnel provides 
19. R. Rama Rao; "Developing Countries: Threats to their Security", op. cit. 
20. Noam Chomsky, and Edwards Herman; The Washington Connection and Third World 
Fascism, Spokesman, Great Britain, 1979. P. 47. 
21 . See Jan K. Block; United States Penetration of Brazil, University of Pennsylvania Press. 1977, 
p. 98 and 170; Jeffery Stein; Grand School for Juntas, Nation, May 21, 1977. 
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the opportunities for their ideological indoctrination. The supply of arms to 
the Third World creates, in general, a relationship of dependency among 
the Third World and the suppliers of arms. 
The supply of arms to the Third World sinks it into the morass of economic 
and military dependence upon both super and major powers. Despite few 
countries of relative self-reliance in the Third World like India, Vietnam and 
at time Egypt and Indonesia by and large, this dependency relationship 
has contributed towards the consolidation of neo-imperial order in the 
Third World22. This situation has been very perceptively analyzed by Ali 
Mazuri. He writes that "there has certainly been a change from the old 
days Pax-Britanica, whereas the old imperial motto was 'Disarm the 
natives and facilitate control', the new imperial cunning has translated it 
into 'Arm the natives and consolidate dependency'. While the British and 
the French once regarded it as important to stop tribal warfare, they now 
regard it as profitable to modernize tribal warfare—with lethal weapons"23 
The supply of arms to the Third World after the World War II was 
consciously initiated by the supper powers to effect changes in policies of 
the Third World countries as per supper power's interests and policy 
preferences. This all, in other words, was for establishing their domination 
and hegemony over the entire Third World. 
22. Mohammad Ayoob; Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, op. cit, p. 243. 
23. Ali A Mazuri; "The Barrel of the Gun and the Barrel of Oil" , Alternatives vol 3 No 4 May 
1978, p.474 
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The supper powers, specially the United States and other major powers 
like France, Britain etc. also pursue policies, the purpose of which is to 
keep the Third World under their domination. They pursue a number of 
economic policies which directly or indirectly influence the policies of the 
individual Third World countries and exercise greater influence on the 
economic development of the Third World as a whole, there by creating a 
relationship of acute dependency of the Third World upon the developed 
world. 
The international economic system dominated by the Developed World 
has created the under development of the Third World countries. The 
economic under development of the Third World was set in motion when it 
came in organic contact with those areas where capitalist development 
and industrialization took place. The Europe upon the birth of the capitalist 
system undertook the unprecedented task of overrunning the whole world, 
thereby sowing the seeds for the peripheralization of the Third World in 
international system. 
In fact, the Third World countries were bom into an international system 
where the rules governing the international relations were already set by 
the strong developed nations. And the Third World countries have been 
operating within the domain of a system imposed upon them. The effects 
of which have been to further the economic dependency of the Third 
World upon the developed nations. The question of underdevelopment of 
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the Third World is not economic as to be resolved by injecting capital in 
the Third World but rather a problem to be resolved politically. It is in this 
context that the various scholars have argued that the underdevelopment 
of the Third World countries have not taken place in isolation. It has been 
deliberately done by Developed World against the Third World or the 
development of the former was possible because it underdeveloped the 
latter24 
The experience of the Third World development in recent past suggests, 
according to a study by UN experts, that the gap between the two (The 
Third World & the Developed World) is widening rather than narrowing 25. 
The determinative feature of the effects of the international system 
devised and controlled by the strong developed nations is the under 
development and marginalization of the Third World in the international 
system. 
The systematic mechanism of the Third World economic dependence on 
the developed nations can be well described by discriminatory structures 
of trade and the functioning of Transnational Co-operations. The present 
international economy is dominated by the Transnational Co-operations. 
Investment, technology and trade are well controlled by them. Their 
functioning transgress territorial laws and their dominance vitiate and 
24. For details see G. Chaliand; Revolution in the Third World, New York; Viking Press, 1977; L S. 
Stavrianos; op. cit; Robert L. Rothstein, op. cit, and Roberto Remo Bissio; op.cit 
25. Roberto Remo Bissio; op. cit., p.13. 
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subordinate national economies. Their comprehensive economic control 
negates the very structures of political and economic independence. The 
Transnational Cooperations due to their penetrative and controlling 
characteristics are known as global leviathans, which are sustained as 
functioning structures of neo-colonialism by the inequitious provisions of 
the Bretton Woods-GATT regime whose functioning has been 
economically detrimental for the Third World countries26. The resultant 
relationship between the Third World and the developed countries has 
been of an exploiter- exploited, dominant- subservient nature for which the 
euphemism inter-dependence has been coined. The global economy, 
dominated by the Transnational Cooperation and the GATT arrangement 
is aimed principally against the third World. 
Besides the developed nations also sought to impose varied forms of 
economic dependency and exploitation by their financial institutions— 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. They use the 
coercive measures of economic character in order to force the sovereign 
will of the Third World countries and obtain from it advantages of any kind. 
Frequent charges of economic intervention by the Third World concern the 
relationship between the International Monetary Fund and the individual 
26. R.S. Bhatt; "Problems of Transnational Corporations", India Quarterly, Vol.34. No.1, Jan-
March, 1978. See also Rasheeduddin Khan; "India and the Third World", Employment News 
11-17 August, Vol. 15, No. 19, 1990. 
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Third World countries27. At the Arusha Conference in Tanzania in the July 
1980, the IMF was accused of imposing conditionalities on the Loan 
seeker Third World countries which amounted to grave infringement of 
their sovereignty28. It attaches an ideology of economic, social and political 
development along with its loan irrespective of the third world countries' 
own clearly stated policies. The Third World countries being born into a 
system which had the development of Free Market economy as the 
primary objective, and, due to non-availability of other sources of finance 
open to them are forced to join the IMF and accept its conditionalities 
despite their reservations. They, while accepting the IMF conditions have 
objected to the nature of such conditions. A Third World Leader Julius 
Nyerere, arguing over the content of conditionalities says "we expected 
these condition to be non- ideological and related to ensuring that money 
lent to is not wasted, pocketed by political leaders or bureaucrats29". In 
spite of the Third Wold countries' reservations about IMF conditions, their 
economic weakness is further more exploited by the IMF through the 
imposition of the ideological solution on a country's problems regardless of 
the clearly chosen ideology of the country involved. 
27. See for details: Inter-American Juridical Year Book 1948, Washington, DC; Year Book of 
United Nations 1974, New York; Corline Thomas; "Third World Attitude to the Non-intervention 
Norm", The Non-Aligned World, Vol.11 No.4, October-December 1984; Cathy Barbano; "The 
IMF's Deadly Cure", Third World Resurgence, No.9, 1991. In 1974, New International 
economic order was called for at General Assembly of the United Nation by the Third World 
Countries through which have been making a case for greater independence in economic 
realms and to be treated as sovereign, self-determining nation by the stronger nation. 
28. Caroline Thomas; op. cit., p.488. Conditionality refers to the price to be paid by a borrower 
from the IMF in terms of suggested policies, which a borrower has to implement if it wants to 
get loan. 
29. See Development Dialogue, No 2, Uppasala, Sweden, 1980. 
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The IMF has pressed in many cases for ideological remedies which are 
perceived by Third World countries as interventionary activities to deny 
them their right to decide their own ways of political, social and economic 
development. The case of several Latin American and other Third World 
countries are pertinent here. The IMF conditionalities in cases of Bolivia in 
1984, Jamaica and Brazil in 1970s have had disastrous consequences for 
these countries30 The IMF guidelines not only forced them to change their 
policies, but pushed them into morass of conflicts. Similar social and 
political problems have been experienced by various Third World 
countries when ever they implemented IMF conditionalities. The food riots 
in Morocco and Sudan in 1981 and 1982, respectively, were the 
repurcussions of the implementation of IMF conditionalities. The Indian 
case in 1981 relating to IMF conditionalities sparked off a heated debate in 
the country. The government in order not to loose its face on the issue of 
sovereignty stressed that it will only implement the policies already 
included in Sixth Five Year Plan31. The meddling of IMF through the 
conditionalities attached to its Loan given to the Third World countries 
clearly constitutes intervention in the affairs of the Third World countries. 
The guidelines imposed by the IMF upon the Third World Countries is the 
enforcement of non-colonial designs. L. S. Stavrianos writes that the IMF 
and the World Bank were designed to establish American control over the 
30. For details see Caroline Thomas; op. cit, pp. 489-90. 
31 . Ibid., p. 490. The devaluation of Indian Currency and the liberalization of its economic policies 
in 1992 are in view of many the result of IMF guidelines India accepted in exchange of IMF 
Loans. 
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Third World32. The IMF has the capacity to intervene in the Third World 
countries, and it take the advantage of its capacity to impose its own 
policies upon the countries which disapprove them. In fact, the element of 
compulsion exerted by the IMF falls within the realm of intervention. It also 
points out that international monetary organizations can interfere in the 
affairs of the states. 
The interventional activities in economic realm are not undertaken only 
by international monetary organization but states also indulge in such 
activities. As the Third World countries are under-developed and 
developing, they are more exposed to economic exploitation. The 
economically and industrially strong nations apply political pressure 
through their aid giving policies to effect changes in the policies of the 
Third World countries, according to their respective interests. France 
subsidizes the former colonies in Africa. French investment and economic 
assistance programs in the Francophone African countries have had 
significant consequences for the internal politics of the target-state and for 
regional security33. The Dominican Republic has recently been prey to 
more indirect US meddling. Critical loans to this country as to all Latin 
America are conditional on implementation of the IMF conditionally 
program34. 
32. L. S. Stavrianos; op. cit, p. 459. 
33. See P. Lellouche and D. Moisi, "French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle Against 
Destabilizaton", International Security, Spring 1979. 
34. Cathy Barbano; op. cit., p.10. 
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In fact, the economic assistance programs of the developed countries do 
not operate in vacuum. They have traditionally been linked to the political 
and military calculations of the assistance supplying nations35. Assistance 
programs apparently aim at the promotion of development in the Third 
World and thereby narrowing the gap between the Developed World and 
the Third World. What we see in contrast to the apparent aim of economic 
assistance is the growing gap between them. The reason for the failure of 
assistance programs is that the allocation of aid has been determined less 
by the needs of recipients and more by the political objectives of the aid 
giving nations. The US Secretary of States, Dean Rusk, once stated that: 
"foreign aid program form its beginning in 1940s was planned and 
administered to serve the vital interests of the United States....our security 
would be in great jeopardy without the aid program"36. 
The economic assistance program following the World War II became the 
policy instrument of developed nations. The US emerged as the largest 
supplier of economic aid to the Third World countries37. Economic 
assistance program instead of fostering the Third World development 
have rather enlarge uneven development thereby causing social, 
economic and political disputes. They have been sinking them into the sea 
of debt crisis. The economic assistance programs are used as levers to 
pressurize the Third World countries to act as per desire of the aid giving 
35. Andreas Oldag; "Regional Conflict in the Third World: Militarization and Diffusion of Power in 
International Order", Non-Aligned World, Vol. 20, Oct. -Dec. 1984, pp. 597-98. 
36. Cited in F. Claudin; The Communist Movement, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1975, p. 71 
37. See for a numerative and good account of US aid program: Peter J. Schraeder (ed ): 
Intervention in the 1980s: US Foreign Policy in the Third World, pp.63-83. 
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nations. 
Other than IMF conditionalities and the use of economic assistance for 
political objectives the strong powers specially the United States apply 
economic sanctions to put pressure on the target states to change the 
policies as demanded by the sanctioning state. The United States has 
been the dominant user of economic sanctions in the twentieth century, 
mostly in the post-World War II era. The intensity of US sanctions against 
the Third World countries increased greatly in 1970s. As of autumn 1988, 
US economic sanctions were in force against Chile, Ethiopia, South Africa, 
Haiti, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, and Panama; in addition, long-standing trade 
embargoes were in place against Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam38 
The more recent cases of economic sanctions initiated by the United 
States are in operation against Libya, Iraq, India and Pakistan. In number 
of episodes of economic sanctions, they have been accompanied by other 
coercive measures. The Un'ted States applied non-economic measures in 
addition to economic ones in number of cases. In Nicaragua, continued 
economic sanctions were coupled with financial support for internal 
opposition. In Panama, initial hopes were that General Manual Noriega 
would be removed through electoral process. Following elections, the 
United States condemned the results, instituted economic sanctions and 
called for a popular overthrow of Noriega's regime. The failure to achieve 
38. Ibid., pp. 85-99. 
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Noriega's overthrow by others means led to the direct US military 
intervention in Panama. There have been number of other cases of 
economic sanctions like Cuba, Libya, the Dominican Republic, Iraq, etc. 
which were accompanied by other military and covert measures. 
The United States, in attempting to shape the post-War World to its liking, 
used economic leverage to coerce the number of Third World countries 
supposed to be pursuing contradictory policies in US presumptions. 
Where the United States intervened frequently in the Third World with 
economic sanctions, its counterpart the Soviet Union intervened in 
negligible number of times39. The other major powers, France and Britain, 
also lag much behind the US in episodes of economic sanctions. They 
have often participated in US led or imposed sanctions. Economic 
sanctions are imposed to effect changes in the political behaviour of the 
target state. And the Third World countries have been the frequent target 
of economic sanctions imposed by the strong developed nations. 
There have been many occasions when strong powers have covertly 
intervened in the Third World countries, by various means namely secret 
propaganda, manipulations of foreign electoral processes, coups d'etat. 
secret financial assistance, paramilitary operations, assassination of 
39. There seems to no comprehensive study conducted regarding the Soviet Union's used of 
economic sanctions against the Third World countries. However, Peter Wallensteen to study 
the feasibility of economic sanctions of peaceful means of conflict resolutions has included one 
episode of economic sanction by the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia (1948-55) in his 
selection cf 10 modern cases of economic sanction since 1932. See his book, Dilemmas of 
Economic Coercion. Sanctions in World Politics, New York: Praeger, 1983. 
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political leaders etc. The covert interventionary activities in the post-War 
World became very common. The United States very often used covert 
activities as the instruments of its foreign policy. To contain the expansion 
of communism around the globe and to safeguard the non-communist 
governments from communist subversive activities, the United States 
initially and publicly provided economic and technical assistance to 
Greece and Turkey. But its fears fueled by the ruthless Soviet takeover of 
Czechoslovakia, the perceived communist threat to Italian independence 
in its 1948 elections, and accession to power of communist governments 
in Poland, Hungary, and other East European countries, pursuaded 
President Truman that containment required an additional covert side. He 
signed a National Security Council Directive (NSC 10/2) that set in motion 
several secret covert action program to contain communism40. Afterwards 
the covert interventionary activities of the US began to grow. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower further reaffirmed the necessity for a 
major covert-action capability. The temperament of his period is best 
illustrated by the words of a secret report to the President by Hoover 
Commission Sub-Committee in 1954. The report declared that "hitherto 
accepted norms of human conduct do not apply to survive, long 
standing, American concepts of fair play must be reconsidered. We must 
learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more 
40. See Peter J. Schraeder, op. Cit., p. 102. 
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sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us"41. 
Hundreds of covert interventional activities were undertaken throughout 
the Third World. The Church Committee's final report in 1976 revealed that 
that CIA had conducted nearly 900 major and thousands of smaller covert-
action projects since 1961, the majority of which taking place in the Third 
World42. The Church Committee also revealed that assassinations of 
foreign leaders have been the regular instruments of US foreign policy and 
the CIA had been deeply involved in assassination plots during the several 
decades of the Cold War. 
The United States covert interference with the electoral processes in other 
countries have been very common. Italy, although not a Third World 
country provided a classic documented example of US intervention in the 
electoral process in target countries. In 1958 election, the possibility was 
that a democratically elected government headed by communist party of 
Italy would capture the power. The Soviet Union was reportedly spending 
US $ 50 millions per year to aid the Italian communists. The US 
government assigned the CIA the task of secretly intervening in Italy to 
counter the Soviet political designs. Such US covert intervention as in Italy 
would have certainly taken place in many of the Third World countries 
wherever there was a possibility of leftist election victories. There have 
been reported instances of US election intervention in countries such as 
41. US Congress, Senate, Church Committee, Final Report, Vol. 4., No. 94-755, 94th Congress, 
2nd Session 1976, p. 53. as cited in Peter J Schraeder, op. cit. 
42. Ibid pp 159-61. 
163 
Brazil, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Laos, 
Lebanon, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Vietnam43 
A book about US covert action in 1980s was authored by a renowned 
investigative journalist Bob Woodward. His book "Veil: The Secret Wars of 
the CIA, 1981-1987" detailed a variety of covert actions taken by the 
Reagan Administration to influence political events in selected Third World 
areas44. The Reagan Administration, since 1981, has attempted to 
overthrow or weaken the regime of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi45. A crucial 
aspect of this effort has been to assist Qaddafi's enemies both within 
Libya and in neighboring countries. The United States initiated a major 
covert action in Chad beginning in 1981, which included arms, money, 
technical assistance, and political support to Hissene Habre, Chad's 
former Minister of Defense, to overthrow the existing pro-Libyan 
government. The CIA in 1982, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, 
sponsored efforts by exiled Yemenis to conduct sabotage activities 
against the Soviet-dominated state of South Yemen. Bob Woodward also 
claimed that the US administration attempted to assassinate Lebanon's 
Sheikh Fadlallah, the leader of Hizbollah, who was believed to be 
responsible for the three terrorist bombings of US facilities in Beirut. The 
United States to protect its foreign interests in the Third World has covertly 
43. Peter J. Schraeder, op. cit., Chapter 4. Also see William Blum; The CIA: A Forgotten History. 
44. Peter J. Schraeder, op. cit., p. 109. See Also Thomas Powess; The Man Who Kept The 
Secrets (New York: Knopf, 1979); John Prados; President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon 
Covert Operations Since World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1986). 
45. US efforts to dislodge Qaddafi were, however, initiated since Qaddafi captured power in 1969. 
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intervened in number of countries. These examples are the tip of the 
iceberg of covert intervention, as scores of such activities remain invisible. 
Besides covert assassinations of foreign leaders and election intervention, 
the United States has covertly sponsored various coups d'etat and 
provided economic and military assistance to armed insurgencies 
throughout the world with the basic intention of overthrowing the 
governments deemed inimical to US foreign policy interests. The CIA 
secretly encouraged a right wing military coup in Syria in March 194946. 
Nearly a decade of covert American meddling in Syria resulted in an 
attempted abortive CIA plot to topple the Syrian regime in August 1957. 
Most recent accounts of the CIA's secret operations during the early years 
of post-War period, however, ignore Syria entirely and focus instead on 
better known instances of covert intervention in Iran, Guatemala, and 
Indonesia47. 
The CIA was directly involved in overthrowing of Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddeq i n ^ S 4 8 . Since then the US maintained very close 
relations with Shah of Iran and his overthrowing in 1979 led to the 
increased involvement of US to topple the revolutionary government in 
Iran by providing covert support to groups opposed to the government. In 
46. Douglas Little: "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958", The 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2, Winter 1990, p. 52. 
47. David Wise and Thomas Ross: The Invisible Government (New York: Vintage, 1974). 
48. See for details: Mark Gasiorowski: "The 1953 Coup d'etat in Iran", Internationa! Journal of 
Middle East, Vol. 19, August 1987, pp. 261-87. 
165 
1987, the US undertook a more activist policy of trying to contain Iran with 
the threat of military force in the form of a naval armada in the Waters of 
Iran's Persian Gulf Coast. In 1954, the American covert meddling resulted 
in overthrowing of Guatemala's democratically elected and reform-minded 
government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman49, a leader perceived by US policy 
makers as leading Guatemala on a path toward communism. The 
President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia met with American disfavour 
because he included communists into his Cabinet. The vehicle for 
subverting Sukarno was paramilitary support, beginning in 1956, for an 
existing secessionist movement that incorporated the Indonesian Islands 
of Celebes, Java, and Sumatra. The covert CIA program included transfer 
of military weapons to the rebels and CIA-piloted B-26 bombers flying 
support missions50. The US supported Tibetan guerrillas fighting against 
communist China. US support for the guerrilla movement in Tibet, which 
lasted from 1956 to 1973, included the training of guerrillas in the United 
States, India, and Nepal, as well as direct re-supply of military material 
into Tibet through CIA air support51. 
The United States also became involved in organizing and funding 
guerrilla armies in Laos and South Vietnam. In both cases, the CIA and 
US Defense Department created autonomous guerrilla armies with the 
acquiscence of the host government, most notably among the Hmong 
49. For an overview of this case see: Richard H. Immerman; The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign 
Policy of Intervention, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982. 
50. John Prados; op. cit., pp. 128-49. 
51. Ibid., pp. 61-78. 
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ethnic group in Laos (1960-1973) and the Montagnards of South 
Vietnam's central highlands (1961-70)52. In overthrow of Chilean President 
Salvador Allende, the United States was involved. In 1973, Allende indeed 
was killed during a successful US-induced military coup d'etat53. The 
United States provided covert aid to Kurdish guerrillas seeking to secede 
from Iraq from 1972-73 in order to force Iraq to settle its territorial dispute 
over Shaat-AI-Arab waterway as per interests of Iran. In return from Iran's 
assurance that no further aid would be furnished to Kurdish guerrillas, Iraq 
in 1975 recognized Iran's territorial claims54. The other interventionary 
involvement of US was in Angolan Civil War of 1975. The most significant 
aspect of the Angola intervention was that it represented congressional 
assertion of oversight of US foreign policy in general and covert 
intervention in particular55. 
The number of other interventionary activities were undertaken by US in 
the affairs of many countries; Sudan, in late 1960s and 70s, Horn of 
Africa, Western Sahara in 1970s, Chad in 1970s and 80s, Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan after Soviet intervention in 1979, Cambodia since the mid 
70s, El-Salvador, etc. This is the political list of US interventionary 
activities in the Third World. In fact fewer interventionary activities have 
been recorded than actually occurred with emphasis on those which 
occurred at higher levels than the lower levels. The United States in 
52. Peter J. Scnraeder; op. cit., p. 118. 
53. Ibid., p. 107. 
54. William Blum; op. cit., pp. 275-78. 
55. Peter J. Schraeder, op. cit., p. 120. 
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pursuing its foreign policy interests in the Third World has employed 
different types of intervention. Within the realm of US coercive actions, 
there have also been many occasions when it has intervened militarily in 
the affairs of the Third World countries. Cambodia, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Iran, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico and Nicaragua have all 
experienced the application of US military might at various times56. 
Blechman and Kaplan have listed all the cases in the period after World 
War II where the United States has used its armed forces to compel action 
or arresting of action by hostile actors or to assure support to a friendly 
actor for its action or inaction. From 1946 to 1975 excluding the Korean 
and Vietnam War years, they have found that the United States used its 
armed forces as a political instrument on as many as 215 occasions. 
While most of the incidents took place in Europe in the period 1946-48, 
the Third World took over as the predominant position in the following 
decades57. According to them, the United States used its armed forces as 
a political instrument once every other month. 
The more recent cases of US direct military intervention are Grenada, 
Libya, Panama and Iraq. Grenada, an island state in Caribbean region, 
was invaded by US in October 1983. The invasion was widely regarded as 
a part of bellicose foreign policy being persuaded by President Ronald 
56. Ibid., pp. 131-44. 
57. See for details. Barry M. Blechman, and Stephen S. Kaplan; Force Without War: US Armed 
Forces as a Political Instrument, (Washington, D C : The Brookings Institution), 1978 They 
have defined political use of armed forces in the following words: "A political use of armed 
forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed 
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Reagan. The invasion was also seen as a contemporary application of 
foreign policy formulated by a much earlier President James Monroe 
whose Doctrine of 1823 has been central to United States policy in the 
Western Hemisphere ever since its pronouncement58. US involvement in 
the Libya began after Qaddafi captured power in 1969. However, the US 
directly intervened by bombing Libya in April 198659. 
In 1989, the tiny state of Panama was invaded by the United States, 
resulting into the overthrowing of the regime and capturing President 
General Manuel Noreiga60. After the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait on August 
2,1990,the United states got directly involved in the Gulf crisis and used its 
military might against Iraq61. The case studies presented here provide an 
overview of US interventionary practices in the Third World. However, the 
United States has not been the only nation which has under taken 
interventionary activities to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the Third 
World. There have been other strong and great powers which engaged in 
such activities and the Soviet Union has been a frequent practitioner of 
such activities in the Third World. 
military services as part of deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be 
prepared to influence, specific behavior of individual in another nation without engaging in a 
continuing context of violance". 
58. Peter J. Schraeder; op. cit., pp. 249-63. 
59. Ibid , p, 143, See also Gregory F. Intoccia; "American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal 
Analysis", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1987, 
pp. 177-213. 
60. John Quigley; "The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama", The Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1990, pp. 276-315. 
61. The Gulf Crises and the subsequent US involvement indicate that the US interest in the Crisis 
was in establishing its supremacy in the region thereby preserving its oil interests. Though the 
purpose of the UN resolution was the liberation of Kuwait, this mandate of the UN was 
exceeded by the US and its multinational forces. The objective of the US was the destruction 
of Iraq and also its potential The liberation of Kuwait was only a pretext. 
Shortly after the World War II, the Soviet Union's interventional activities 
were restricted to Europe. However, since late 1960s it has been more 
and more involved in the Third World62. As the Soviet Union was a close 
system, its interventionary activities have been less documented as 
compared to the United States. Marita Kaw has noted 403 historical 
conflicts from 1950 to 1987 in which there were 4 instances of large scale 
Soviet military intervention; 14 to 19 instances of intervention with fewer 
than 15,000 combat support personnel; 19 cases of Arms delivery; and 
366 conflicts where verbal/diplomatic support was all that was 
dispensed63. Another study about Soviet Union's use of its armed forces 
as a political instrument was conducted by Stephen S. Kaplan. He has 
listed about 190 incidents in which the Soviet Union used its armed 
forces64. In the following two decades after Second World War, its use of 
armed forces was restricted to Europe, mainly in Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union directly intervened in Hungary65 in November 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia66 in August 1968. Kaplan concludes that from 1967 to 
1979 three-fourth of all incidents took place in the Third World mainly in 
the Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. 
Blechman and Kaplan in their study conclude that the Soviet Union was 
62. Richard Shultz; "The Role of External Forces in Third World Conflicts", Comparative Strategy, 
Vol.4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 81-82. 
63. Marita Kaw; "Predicting Soviet Military Intervention", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, 
No. 3, Sep 1989, p. 412. 
64. Stephen S. Kaplan; Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, 
Washington, D C , 1981, pp. 27-60. See also Herbert K. Tillema and John R. Van Wingen; 
"Law and Power in Military Intervention: Major States after World War II", International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 220-50. 
65. See Sandor Balogh and Sandor Jakab; The History of Hungary after the Second World War 
1944-1988, 1986, pp. 31-33. 
66. See I William Zartman (Ed.): Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact, 1970, p. 36. 
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involved in 75% of the incidents in Europe, 60% of those in Sub-Saharan, 
39% of those in Middle-East and only 7% in Western Hemisphere67. The 
Soviet Union's recent instance of direct military intervention was 
Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet Union has involved in many of the Third 
World countries directly and also indirectly through its surrogates68. The 
Soviet Union has undertaken a number of interventional activities in the 
Third World, the number of similar incidents attributable to other 
developed countries like the UK and the France is considerable. 
The United Kingdom has also undertaken interventional/ actions against 
the Third World countries. It practiced foreign military intervention more 
than thirty times in more than twenty countries after World War II69. She 
used force more extensively than any other major country despite her 
reduced status in the post-War era. Britain turned to force more often than 
any other major nation, including either the United States or the Soviet 
Union. She intervened in more places than any other state. Such militance 
seems inconsistent with England's post-War position. The United Kingdom 
fell to a secondary status after World War II: America and Russia eclipsed 
her; she was shorn of empire; her economy suffered; and she no longer 
exerted decisive influence upon the structure of the international system. 
She stayed out of most of her allies' conflicts, including Algeria, Angola, 
67. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan; op. cit., p. 136. 
68. For the Soviet Union's use of surrogate forces see: Brian Crozier; "The Surrogate Forces of 
the Soviet Union", Conflict Studies, Report No. 92, February 1978, pp. 1-20. 
69. John Van Wingen and Herbert K. Tillema; "British Military Intervention after World War II: 
Militance in a Second-Rank Power", Journal of Peace Research Vol XVII No 4 1980 pp 
291-303. 
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Indochina, Mozambique, and Vietnam. 
Britain initiated thirty-four foreign military interventions in the twenty-two 
years between 1949-1970. Some of these operations met sustained local 
resistance and became protracted engagements, including those in Aden, 
Cyprus, and Kenya. Others were one-day affairs. More than one-and-a-
half interventions began each year on average. Britain limited herself 
primarily to post-War Empire. Within these bounds she operated from 
Aden to Zanzibar, from the Bahamas to Hong Kong. She did not confine 
military action to colonies of the moment, for she intervened in Cyprus, 
Kenya, Suez, Tanganyika and Uganda after independence. But twenty-
nine of thirty-four military operations (85%) occurred in territories under 
her rule in 1946. However, Britain's shows of force, not involving the 
actual use of force, operations not involving regular troops and forms of 
military assistance not entailing the direct use of regular military forces 
have not been well documented. The United Kingdom like other great 
powers has employed more subtle and covert means of intervention. And 
its recent short interventional operation like US in Grenada was 
Antigua70. 
Like Britain, France has also intervened on many occasion. It has mainly 
been involved in Africa. In June1977, a small colonial enclave of Djibauti 
70. Ihab El sherif eta!; "The State as an Issue in Conflict Analysis", in Goran Lindgren and Peter 
Wallensteen (eds); Towards conflict Resolution in the Third World, Report from the 1988 
Advanced Interventional Program Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Jppasala University, Sweden, 1988, p. 116. 
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became independent bringing to an end 150 years of French colonial 
presence in Africa. Less than two months later not only there were more 
French troops in Africa than at any time since 1960. Deployed in more 
then twenty African States and territories, they were actively engaged in 
fighting in Chad, Mauritania and Zaire71. France's involvement in Africa 
gives strength to the inference that it had also practiced inteventionist 
policies in the Third World like the other great powers, although at less 
scale than the United States and the Soviet Union. 
There has also been a noticeable phenomena of regional powers' 
interventionary activities in their respective regions and even sometimes 
beyond their regions. Many regional and small powers like South Africa, 
China, India, Cuba, Libya, Pakistan, etc. have practiced interventionary 
policies in their neighbourhoods. South Africa's domestic conflict spread 
beyond its boundaries to include the neighbouring states who have been 
victims of destabilization and dependence policy called total strategy. The 
strategy includes a heavy blend of military, economic destabilization and 
political dialogue (which) aims at preventing neighbouring states from 
hosting anti-apartheid guerrillas and to tighten economic dependence in 
the region in the hope of avoiding sanctions and broadening markets for 
South African goods72 South Africa pursues the policy of destabilization in 
71. Julian Crandell Hollick; "French Intervention in Africa in 1978", The World Today, Vol. 35, No.2, 
February 1979,p.71: See also Gerad Chaliand; the Struggle for Africa: Conflicts of the Great 
Powers, Macmillan, London, 1982, p. 44, and Herbert K. Tillema & John R. Van Wingen; op. 
cit. 
72. Mark A. Uhlig; Apartheid in Crisis, Penguin Book, London 1986, p.287. 
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its neighborhood. Its destabilization manoeuvers have been its invasion of 
Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and 
Zambia; attempted assassination of the Prime Ministers of Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe; backed proxy wars against Angola (UNITA), Mozambique 
(MNR), Lesotho (LLA) and Zimbabwe73 (Super ZAPU). South Africa has 
been openly pursuing interventional policies against its neighbours to 
extort compliance and submission. 
Besides South Africa, China and Cuba have also been involved in 
southern Africa. China, although has mainly involved in South-East Asia74 
It also got involved in Angola, Zimbabwe75, Mozambique, as well as in 
South Asia especially its role in fomenting insurgency in the North-Eastern 
part of India. Cuba was mainly involved in Angola76. And it has also been 
alleged that the Cuban troops played an instrumental role in Abdul Fattah 
Ismail's ouster of Salem Rubaya Ali in South Yemen77. Libya has been 
blamed for supporting to a number of guerrilla and terrorist movements 
throughout the world. However, its involvement in Chad is well 
documented. Libya first provided financial and military support to Frolinat 
guerrillas and later on in 1973 moved its own forces in Chad78. India has 
also practiced interventionary policies in South Asia. It intervened in East 
Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) conflict of 1971 and it also provided financial 
73. Holon J.; Apartheid's second Front, Penguin, London, 1986, p.1. 
74. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan; op. cit, p.136. 
75. Berti! Duner; "The Many-Pronged Spears: External Military Intervention in Civil Wars in the 
1970", Journal of Peace Research, vol.20, No.1, 1983, pp63-65. 
76. Ibid., p.63. 
7 7 . Ibid, p. 64. 
78. Julian Crandell Hollick; op.cit.,p.73 
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as well as military support to Tamil guerrillas in Sri Lanka. Pakistan has 
extensively involved in fomenting and encouraging armed conflicts in 
Indian State of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. In all the Third World 
regions, there have been conflicts and tensions between one country and 
other resulting from territorial disputes, ethnic divisions, clashes of 
economic interests, ideological cleavages, and antagonistic aspirations for 
power and domination. And many of the Third World countries like Great 
powers have intervened on many occasions in the affairs of other 
countries. 
The Third World countries since long have been the victims of 
stronger/great powers' designs to maintain their respective control over 
them. In the past, almost all were colonized and after their independence 
in the post-war era, they have been forced to surrender to the desires and 
interests of the major powers. And to force compliance they have 
extensively intervened in the affairs of Third World countries. The United 
States and the Soviet Union alono have resorted to the demonstrative use 
of force without war on more than 426 occasions between 1945 and 
198279. While almost 98 percent of US employment of threat of force (in 
259 incidents between 1946 and 1982) was directed at countries and 
territories well away from the border, essentially the Third World countries, 
79. Jasjit Singh; "Insecurity of Developing Nation: Especially Small States", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 
XI, No.6, September 1977, p. 663. See also Jasjit Singh; "Developing Countries and Nuclear 
Issues", Stategic Analysis, Vol IX, No. 11, February 1986. 
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nearly 80 percent of Soviet use of force (in 167 incidents during 1946-
1979) were directed at countries bordering the Soviet Union and West Asia 
80
 There have also been surprisingly large number of instances when use 
of nuclear weapons was seriously considered by nuclear weapon powers. 
These two powers, the United states and the Soviet Union, in the post-war 
period struggled to influence the internal as wall as external dynamics of 
the Third World countries and on many occasions forced them through 
coercive means to surrender to their respective foreign policy interests. 
To the pursuance of interventionist policies of great powers the conflict 
prone nature of the Third World provides greater propensity to their 
interventionism. Prior to 1945, the center of conflict in the world was 
considered to be the Europe. In the second half of this century, the major 
portion of the conflicts moved away from the Europe to the Third World. 
As the Third World served as a battle-field for US - Soviet ideological 
competition, they got themselves involved deliberately in almost every 
conflict of the Third World. There have been nearly 160 major inter-state 
and intra-state armed conflicts in the Third World and direct foreign 
military intervention took place in nearly three-fourth of these conflicts, and 
of these the intervening powers belonged to the developed countries of 
the First and the Second Worlds, in about 80 percent of the cases 
(developed capitalist countries in nearly 70 percent and developed socialist 
80. Ibid., p. 664. 
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countries in nearly 10 percent cases)81. Covert intervention by these 
countries in the from of arms supplies, political moves or threat of use of 
force has been present in some form or the other in all armed conflicts. 
The conflicts of the Third World which mainly have their roots in 
colonialism were exploited by the great powers as per their foreign policy 
objectives. They provided arms training, finances to either of the parties in 
conflict according to their policy preferences and even sometimes 
intervened directly. External friends of the state supported by all means— 
economic, political and military, the initiatives taken up the state and the 
external adversaries of the state provided sustenance, through moral 
support, and covert supplies of arms and finance to the dissident groups 
and movements challenging the authority of the state. In this way the 
conflicts of the Third World far from resolution were exacerbated by the 
interventionist policies of the great powers. 
Increasingly significant has been the rise of regional as well as some small 
powers attempting to pursue the policies of regional hegemony, often 
through the use of military force. The regional powers themselves have 
been found seeking support or being supported by either of the super 
powers. South Africa set up a profile as an anti-communist stronghold in 
Africa indirectly siding with the United States in its ideological rivalry with 
the Soviet Union. Cuba being a surrogate of the Soviet Union, 
collaborated in foreign policy designs of the Soviet Union. Pakistan in its 
81. Jasjit Singh; "North-South Contradiction and the Security of Non-Aligned Countries" op cit p 
217. ' " 
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its foreign policy postures where as supported the United States in 
response to US economic and military assistance, India did so in case 
of the Soviet Union82. The regional aspirations of these powers have most 
often collaborated with the design of great powers and even sometimes 
they have exploited the Soviet-US ideological rivalry to obtain economic 
and military benefits from them. But in overall perspective these powers 
have been dependent upon the great powers and the great powers 
themselves have intervened in the affairs of regional powers like US 
intervention in Cuba and in China's Tibet region. 
The Third World countries after getting independence felt that they have 
got rid of colonial exploitation and domination and are free to shape their 
own destinies. But the harsh realities of international system, the 
fundamental character of which is still determined by the great powers 
especially the United States with support of its European allies, the United 
Kingdom and the France, forced them to surrender to the hegemonistic 
designs of the great powers. Whatever values the great powers preferred 
to be globalised, the patterns of behavior they chose for reward and 
punishment, in fact, to the greater extent determined the nature of 
international politics. As a matter of fact in determining the nature of 
international policies, the United States played an affective role as it 
inherited the fruits of a fallen Europe centric system that had been 
82. Although they have not always supported the policies of the United States or the Soviet Union, 
but more or less they have done so like in case of Indian response to Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan was not prompt, what it said was that all the foreign forces should withdraw from 
Afghanistan. While Pakistan became a conduit for US arms to Mujahideen in Afghanistan. 
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dominant in international affairs since the sixteenth century. The Soviet 
Union emergeged as an ideological rival to the US desires of harmonising 
the whole world by American political and economic rules. The Soviet 
Union itself while rivaling the United States, tried to color the whole world 
on communistic/socialistic lines. The Third World unwantedly become the 
part of their rivalry. 
While both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened on number 
of occasions in the affairs of the Third World countries, the United States 
became increasingly outspoken in claiming the unilateral right to make the 
determination whether a conflict any where in the world constitutes a 
threat to its national security or international order. The United States from 
the first strings of nationhood in the middle of the eighteenth century fixed 
its gaze outward. This American iterventionist impulse produced the 
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the original intent of which was to protect the 
Western Hemisphere from external interventions. In order to discourage 
the European intervention, the United States however asserted its 
unilateral right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries. The 
Monoroe Doctrine while directed against extra-continental intervention, 
Inevitably became associated with US interventionism in the region. This 
regional inteventionist propensity became globalised and fused with a 
virulent anti-communism as the United States embarked on an ideological 
rivalry with the Soviet Union at the end of the World War II. 
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The United States placed undue emphasis on the Soviet Union as the 
main provocateurs of conflict and instability in the Third World overlooking 
the historical roots of these upheavals in the Third World. The President 
Ronals Reagan in the early years of his administration said: "let us not 
delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going 
on. If they were not involved in this game of dominoes, there would not be 
any hot spot in the world"83. The United States' perceptions of the Soviet 
Union as trouble-maker and its challenge to US hegemonistic goals in the 
post-War provided a false context to the interventionary activities of the 
US in the Third World. 
The United States pursuing its policy of interventionism established in 
nineteenth century continued its interventions in the same way as it had 
been doing in the past. It is to emphasize here that the United States often 
has intervened in the Third World for reasons that have little to do with its 
rivalry with the Soviet Union but with its desire to safeguard and promote 
America's economic and military interests84. The United States excercised 
de facto dominion over Latin America long before the communist rose to 
power in Russia and what we have witnessed in the Central America is as 
much a reassertion of hegemonic impulse as it is a manifestation of US-
Soviet rivalry. The United States has requird substantial economic interests 
83. Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.; "Foreign Policy and the American Character", Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1, Fall 1983, p. 5. 
84. See Gabriel Kolko; The Roots of American Forein Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose, 
Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, p. 81. Kolko states that the relationship in the United States 
between the objectives of foreign economic policy and direct military intervention has been a 
continuous and intimate one. See also Magdoff; "Militarialism and Imperialism", American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1970, p. 240. 
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in the Third World after the World War II and the protection of these 
interests has became central to its foreign policy objectives. 
The United States from the very beginning has been an interventionist 
power, aspiring to dominate the world by setting the rules of interventional 
behaviors and directing the developmental course of the Third World 
countries in accordance with its economic interests. The Monroe Doctrine 
provided to the United States a unilateral right to intervene anywhere in 
the Western Hemisphere. All the five post-War military doctrines of US 
Presidents; Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter and Reagan have been 
concerned with the US intervention of one sort or the other in the Third 
World. The United States in order to prevent the countries of the Third 
World to adopt the policies not acceptable to it has intervened in their 
affairs. One cannot be confident that this pattern of US interventionism in 
the Third World will be reversed. 
The US - Soviet rivalry has virtually disappeared with the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union. The communism is no more a force to reckon with. The 
Third World has been the actual theatre over the last five decades, where 
United States was extensively involved. And the Third World stands to the 
greater chance of US interventionism. The United States also perceives 
more and more threats from the Third World countries. As President Bush 
after the invasion of Panama in 1989, declared in February 1990 that the 
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"New threats are emerging beyong the East-West antagonism of the last 
forty years and these contingencies must loom larger in our defence 
planning"85. The United States maintains a world wide network of bases, 
many of which are in the Third World. And this world wide network of 
bases in case of any contingency deemed unacceptable to US would 
provide a basis for potential US intervention. 
The Third World countries will remain a battle-field for great powers, 
especially now for the United States. As evident from the role played by 
the United States in the recent Gulf crisis. President Bush used a political 
slogan for a 'New World Order'. His 'New World Order' which to a 
substantial degree is the reformulation of the basic historical principles 
(political pluralism and free market economy) which have underlined the 
US policy throughout the twentieth century was meant to facilitate the 
creation of the colition forces that defeated Iraq. The US role in the Gulf 
crisis represents its desire for multilateral cooperation for unilateral action. 
The 'New World Order' envisions a world ruled by law and rationality 
under the guidance of the United States. Any state reluctant to relinquish 
its sovereignty will be visited by American onslaught. The recent US 
missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan and the ongoing US and British 
military assault on Iraq are naked examples of the violation of sovereign 
rights of the states and the provisions of the International Law. 
85. Quoted in Richard J. Barnet; "US intervention: Low Intensity Thinking" Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientist Vol. 46, No. 4, May 1990, p. 36. 
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The Third World countries have been the victims of the great powers' 
interventionist policies and have also been exploited both economically 
and politically, especially in the post-War period. They would continue to 
be exploited and their policies, especially the economic policies will be 
controlled and dominated by the big powers. The Third World countries 
failing to accept the international rules of political, economic and military 
behavior, formulated by big powers like the United States, Britain, France, 
etc., will be visited by their interventionist onslaught as they have 
experienced the interventional/ activities of the big powers in the past. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
It is an inalienable right of every state to manage its own affairs 
independently. Normally, a state possesses "sovereignty" over its subjects 
and its affairs within its territorial limits. Consequently, international law 
imposes an obligation on every state to abstain from intervention in the 
internal and external affairs of any other state. Dictatorial interference in 
the affairs of another sovereign state in known as intervention. It means 
interference has got to be dictatorial in order to constitute intervention. 
According to Kelsen, "the intervention prohibited by international law is 
usually defined as dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of 
another state. A dictatorial interference is an interference by threat or use 
of force". According to Hall, intervention takes place "when a state 
interferes in the relations of two other states without the consent of both or 
either of them or when it interferes in the domestic affairs of another state 
irrespective of the will of the latter for the purpose of either maintaining or 
altering the actual condition of things within it". According to Oppenheim, 
intervention is dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another 
state for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of 
things. It concerns, in the first place, the external independence, and in the 
second, either the territorial or the personal supremacy. But it must be 
emphasized that intervention proper is always dictatorial interference, not 
interference pure and simple. Therefore, intervention must neither be 
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confused with good offices, nor with mediation, nor with intercession, nor 
with co-operation, because non of these imply dictatorial interference. 
In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations resolved that, no 
state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason what 
ever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. However, 
circumstances may demand intervention. Intervention, which is dictatorial 
and is prohibited in the international law, however, can be justified on 
certain grounds, which are given below: 
1. Enforcement of Treaty Rights. 
2. Self - Defense or Right to Exist. 
3. Right Over Protectorate. 
4. Inpursuance of UN Charter. 
5. Inviolation of International Law. 
6. In Protection of Persons and Property Abroad. 
7. On Humanitarian Ground. 
8. Intervention in Civil War. 
Any such exceptional rights of intervention of states must be subordinated 
to their primary obligations under the United Nations Charter, so 
intervention must not go so far as the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. No matter how 
moral or desirable or plausible sum of the foregoing justifications of 
intervention may have appeared in specific instances, the fact remains 
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that intervention per se is an act in violation of rights which should be 
inviolable, represents a hostile act, and may be taken to be an 'act 
rendered possible only because of the superior force of the intervening 
state'. 
The past few years have witnessed other instances of armed intervention, 
surrounded in a number of cases by such a multitude of contributory and 
confusing issues that debate about them is still going on. The duty to 
abstain from armed intervention clearly means also that no state may 
permit the use of its territory for the staging of hostile expeditions against 
another state. According to Lawrence," state should intervene very 
sparingly on the clearest grounds of justice and necessity and when they 
do so, they should make it clear that their voice must be attended to and 
their wishes carried out". 
The Soviet attitude towards intervention is very closely connected with 
their theory of sovereignty. The aim of the Soviet Government, as set forth 
by the Third International, being to foment world revolution and thereby 
establish a class-less commonwealth, when a foreign non-communist 
state is viewed as a struggle of classes, intervention on the part of the 
Soviets is a commendable and justifiable act by which the sovereign 
laboring class fulfils its duty of extending its own class achievements to 
those who are still deprived of the enjoyment of the privileges. The theory, 
advanced as early as Grotius, that intervention was not illegal when 
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undertaken for the purpose of liberating the masses from tyranny, is 
perfectly acceptable to the Soviets. When action comparable to 
intervention is taken by socialist countries, it can be characterized as 
fraternal assistance because, in the Soviet lexicon, intervention is defined 
as the exclusive sin of capitalist states. The soviet vehemently deny that 
support for wars of national liberation constitutes a form of aggression or 
unlawful intervention. 
The main purpose of Soviet policy is to have the East European States 
serve as assets, not as burdens or points of vulnerability, in the strategy of 
the USSR as a global power. From the very beginning, it was made clear 
that Eastern Europe, won at a high cost in Soviet lives, is vital to the 
security of the USSR. Stalin saw the territory as a glacis providing 
defensive depth and protecting the Soviet Union from invasion not just by 
some future Hitler but by a present and powerful America. 
The study of Soviet interventions in general reveals that, it justified its 
interventions on the basic of "invitation" by 'legitimate' governments and 
"limited sovereignty" within the socialist community as propounded by 
Brezhnev in his "Brezhnev Doctrine". Lenin first propounded this theory in 
February 1918 by stating that the interests of socialism are higher than the 
interests of the right of nations to self-determination. 
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The United States' policy has always included contradictory attitudes and 
practices with respect to intervention. In order to discourage European 
intervention in the Western Hemisphere, however, the United States 
asserted the right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries in 
a fashion that expanded significantly throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The United States in this century expanded its 
definition of areas of vital interest to include most parts of the world, and, 
accordingly, has been tempted to intervene in the affairs of states far from 
the shores of the Western Hemisphere. 
The legal logic employed by the United States to support its use of 
intervention historically has been couched in the articulation of 
Presidential doctrines. The foundation of US interventionist policy in the 
Third World rests in the "Monroe Doctrine" and its "Roosevelt Corollary". 
Since the Second World War, however, the term 'communist' has been 
used to justify US intervention against a variety of regimes with widely 
different ideologies and relationships with the Soviet Union. The "Johnson 
Doctrine" stated that the United States will oppose where it can or where it 
dares the establishment of new communist or communist-leaning 
governments, whether they come into being through foreign invasion, 
domestic revolution, or election. The presence of a communist element— 
even the possibility of subsequent communist takeover—-justifies US 
intervention. "Communism is so blatantly an international and not an 
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internal affair, its suppression, even by force, in an American country by 
one or of the other republics would not constitute an intervention in the 
internal affairs of the former". 
Throughout the Cold War, proponents of US intervention have made two 
principal claims: that the Third World interventions protect American 
security by preserving the global balance-of-power; and that intervention 
promote democracy, thereby promoting human rights. The Bush 
Administration continued America's past interventionist policies in the 
post-Cold War era. The Clinton Administration also said that it would act 
forcibly to promote human rights and democracy. 
The study of US interventions in general reveals that, it justified its 
intervention on the basis of self-defence, humanitarian assistance, 
protection of nationals, and "invitation" by legitimate governments. 
From the ancient Greeks to the present time, there have, always, been 
some states who intervened in other states in various ways, and by 
different means. The past and the present history is repleat with examples 
showing that generally the strong states have intervened in the affairs of 
weak. In the period of colonialism, the European powers intervened 
almost every where or where ever they liked—considering and justifying it 
as their imperial prerogative. America, which itself was a colony of the 
British Empire became one of the strong powers in international system 
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after getting independence in eighteenth century. And, it very frequently 
started resorting to the use of intervention in its relation with other 
countries. 
In the wake of World War II, some very significant changes took place in 
the world. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the only 
major world powers leading the two ideologically conflicting blocs—the 
Soviet East and the Capitalist West, former dominated and led by the 
Soviet Union and the latter by The United States. The process of 
decolonization was followed by another kind of colonization: neo-
colonialism, a system of indirect control and domination. The old system 
which began with colonialism was effectively maintained throughout the 
world during the last two centuries by the European colonial powers with 
Great Britain at the helm of affairs up to the end of World War II. 
The end of World War II, which led to the decolonization of the Third 
World countries, also presented opportunities both for the United States 
and the Soviet Union to shape or to reshape the world according to their 
ideological preferences. The United States struggled for the maintenance 
and expansion of the old capitalist system. The Soviet Union desired the 
reshaping of the world on communistic/socialistic lines thereby ensuring a 
competitive rivalry between itself and the United States. The Third World 
soon became the battleground for their competition. And they got 
themselves extensively involved in influencing and directing the affairs of 
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the Third World countries through the application of variety of coercive 
measures both overt and covert. 
They intervened on hundreds of occasions making use of different kinds of 
political, economic and military measures in the affairs of number of the 
Third World countries thereby violating the sovereign right of those 
countries to determine their policies as per their respective interests and 
desires. They made use of arms sales and assistance as the instruments 
of their foreign policies for the extension and consolidation of their 
respective control and domination in the Third World. Arms sales and 
assistance where effectively served to their foreign policy objectives by 
enabling them to earn foreign exchange and clearing off their stocks of 
obsolete weapons, also contributed to the arms build up activities in the 
Third World and sank it into the morass of economic and military 
dependence on both the United States and the Soviet Union. Further 
more, arms sales and assistance involving the training of military 
personnel and officials provided them opportunities for their ideological 
indoctrination and for their use at some opportune time as Coup mongers. 
Other than arms sales and assistance both the United States and the 
Soviet Union made use of economic aid as levers to pressurize the Third 
World countries to act as per their desires. Their economic assistance 
programme did not operate in vacuum. They were rather linked to their 
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political, economic and military objectives. The United States due to its 
economic superiority over the Soviet Union and being the largest supplier 
of economic assistance to the Third World countries, used economic 
assistance as an instrument of coercion more frequently. Moreover, it also 
frequently applied economic sanctions to put pressure on the target Third 
World countries to seek change in their policies as demanded by it. The 
United States emerged as the dominant user of economic sanctions in the 
post-World War II period. 
Besides the United States and the Soviet Union, the International 
Monetary Organizations, controlled and dominated by the developed 
countries of the West, especially the United States like IMF and the World 
Bank have also used economic loans as instrument of coercion. These 
organizations attaching conditionalities to the loans they give to the Third 
World countries seek changes in their policies especially in economic 
policies which amount to grave infringement of their sovereignty as 
independent nation states. The United States along with its Western allies 
especially Britain and France sought to impose varied forms of economic 
dependency and exploitations on the Third World countries thereby 
exercising considerable influence on their economic development leading 
to the creation of acute economic dependency of the Third World on the 
developed nations of the West. Infact, the underdevelopment of the Third 
World countries which was sought and done by the colonialists in the past 
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is deliberately being maintained by the developed countries of the West 
with the United States at the helm of affairs. 
Within the realm of their coercive actions, there have been hundreds of 
occasions when both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened 
resorting to the demonstrative use of force without war, either to coerce or 
support the Third World countries as per their foreign policy objectives. 
While the United States used its armed forces as political instrument was 
overwhelmingly directed against the Third World countries in the post-
World War II period, the Soviet Union's use of its armed forces following 
the two decade after the War was mainly limited to the Eastern Europe. 
However, the Soviet Union in 1970s extensively directed the use of its 
armed forces against the Third World countries. Besides resorting to the 
demonstrative use of force without war, they on some occasions 
intervened militarily. In case of direct military intervention, the Soviet Union 
also lag much behind the United States. The direct military intervention 
undertaken by the Soviet Union in the Third World is the only solitary case 
of Afghanistan, while the United States intervened on many occasions. 
The more recent cases of US direct military intervention are Grenada. 
Haiti, Libya, Panama, Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan. 
There has also been a noticeable phenomena of regional powers' 
interventionary activities in their respective regions and even sometimes 
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beyond their regions. Many regional and small powers like South Africa, 
China, India, Cuba, Libya, Pakistan, etc. have also practiced 
interventional policies in their neighbourhoods. In all the Third World 
regions, there have been conflicts and tensions between one. country and 
other resulting from territorial disputes, ethnic divisions, clashes of 
economic interests, ideological cleavages, and antagonistic aspirations for 
power and domination. And many of the Third World countries like great 
powers have intervened on many occasions in the affairs of other 
countries. 
The Third World countries since long have been the victims of 
stronger/great powers' designs to maintain their respective control over 
them. In the past, almost all were colonized and after their independence 
in the post-War era, they have been forced to surrender to the desires and 
interests of the major powers. And to force compliance, they have 
extensively intervened in the affairs of the Third World countries. 
The Third World countries after getting independence felt that they have 
got rid of colonial exploitation and domination and are free to shape their 
own destinies. But the harsh realities of international system, the 
fundamental character of which is still determined by the great powers 
especially the United States with support of its European allies, the United 
Kingdom and the France, forced them to surrender to the hegimonistic 
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designs of the great powers. The Soviet Union emerged as an ideological 
rival to the US desires of harmonizing the whole world by American 
political and economic rules. Th Soviet Union itself while rivaling the 
United States, tried to color the whole world on communistic/socialistic 
lines. The Third World unwantedly become the part of their rivalry. 
While both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened on number 
of occasions in the affairs of the Third World countries, the United States 
became increasingly outspoken in claiming the unilateral right to make the 
determination whether a conflict any where in the world constitutes a 
threat to its national security or international order, the United States 
placed undue emphasis on the Soviet Union as the main provocateurs of 
conflict and instability in the Third World overlooking the historical roots of 
these upheavals in the Third World. The United States' perceptions of the 
Soviet Union as trouble-maker and its challenge to US hegemonistic goals 
in the post-War provided a false context to the interventional/ activities of 
the US in the Third World. 
The United States pursuing its policy of interventionism established in 
nineteenth century continued its interventions in the same way as it had 
been doing in the past. It is to emphasize here that the United States often 
has intervened in the Third World for reasons that have little to do with its 
rivalry with the Soviet Union, but with its desire to safeguard and promote 
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America's economic and military interests. The US-Soviet rivalry has 
virtually disappeared with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The 
communism is no more a force to reckon with. The Third World has been 
the actual theatre over the last five decades, where the United States was 
extensively involved. And the Third World stands to the greater chance of 
US interventionism. 
The Third World countries will remain a battle-field for great powers, 
especially now for the United States, as it is evident from the role played 
by it in the recent Gulf crisis. Any state reluctant to relinquish its 
sovereignty will be visited by American onslaught. The recent US missile 
attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan and the ongoing US and British military 
assault on Iraq are naked examples of the violation of sovereign rights of 
the states and the provisions of the international law. The Third World 
countries would continue to be exploited and their policies, especially the 
economic policies will be controlled and dominated by the big powers. The 
Third World countries failing to accept the international rules of political, 
economic and military behaviour, formulated by big powers like the United 
States, Britain, France, etc., will be visited by their interventionist 
onslaught as they have experienced the interventionary activities of the 
big powers in the past. 
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The principle of "invitational intervention" has provided pretext to 
superpowers to use smaller states as a pawn on the Chess-Board of 
power politics in the past during the Cold War period. Now, after the 
collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States has 
emerged as the only superpower and started dominating the world as an 
"International Policeman", by dictating terms even to the UN Security 
Council. And, the other major powers, like the Great Britain and the 
France, have started working as allies of the United States atleast in the 
present situations. Although, in the near future, no any country is going to 
emerge on the international scene, which can pose a challenge to the 
United States and stop her interventionary activities. In such a situation, 
this principle of "invitational intervention" would be used unhesitatingly 
without any check posing dangers to the sovereignty and independence of 
smaller states. However, it would be in the interest of international 
community to reject this principle. In fact, one is tempted to agree with 
Starke that, "in the case of strife which is primarily internal, and 
particularly where the outcome is uncertain, the mere invitation by either 
faction to an outside state to intervene does not legalise and otherwise 
improper intervention". 
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